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Abstract 
This thesis explores the relationship between the corporate governance and earnings 
management in director’s background and the relationship between the CEO and the 
controlling shareholder. Moreover, as this study is based on the Chinese market, and 
there some difference from west market. Therefore, this study will also discuss the 
difference Chinese market and west market, and improve the Jones model to measure 
earnings management in Chinese market. 
This study tend to address the following questions. First, how to measure earnings 
management for Chinese listed companies using Chinese accounting standard? 
Second, whether the directors' background influences the firm's earnings management. 
Third, whether the relationship between CEO and controlling shareholders has an 
impact on the firm's earnings management, all empirical chapters focus on Chinese 
listed companies. 
Firstly, previous research about earnings management uses the Jones model and 
various Jones-based model (like the modified Jones model, performance-adjusted 
model) to measure company's earnings management. These models were developed 
based on Western accounting principles, which is different from the Chinese 
accounting standards. There is some measurement error when using these models to 
measure the company's earnings management in the Chinese market. This 
studydevelop a new model based on Chinese new accounting standards, which was 
issued in 2007. The results indicate that the new model developed is better than 
previous models used in literature. 
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Secondly, based on the new model developed about how to measure earnings 
management for Chinese listed companies, this study investigate the impact of the 
director's financial background on the company's earnings management. The results 
show that the effect on the company's accrual earnings management is negative. In 
contrast, the impact on the company's real activist’s earnings management 
is positive when the director has some financial education or work experience. These 
results indicate that directors with financial background tend to help the controlling 
shareholder to manipulate earnings through real activities rather than accruals. 
Finally,this study investigate the impact of the relationship between the CEO and 
controlling shareholder on the company's earnings management. Same as the 
above,this study use the new model measuring earnings management. The results 
show that when the controlling shareholder's shareholding at a low level, there is a 
conflict between the CEO and controlling shareholder. However, as the increasing of 
the controlling shareholder's shareholding, the CEO tends to collaborate with the 
controlling shareholder to manipulate the company's earnings. 
This study developed a measurement model more suitable for the characteristics of 
the Chinese market, making it more accurate and effective. Based on the data analysis 
of the annual reports of domestic listed companies, the degree and scale of financial 
manipulation can be detected more effectively. This study suggests that policymakers 
pay particular attention to the background of directors. A financial background gives 
directors the ability to help companies manage their earnings. Policymakers also need 
to pay attention to the relationship between the CEO and the controlling shareholders. 
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The CEO tends to help the company to do earnings management if he/she is working 
for the controlling shareholder. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Compared with western countries, the research earnings management in China starts 
relatively late. Chinese research on earnings management is mainly carried out in two 
aspects. First of all, many Chinese scholars are still summarizing the experience and 
conclusions of western studies. Their work mainly focuses on literature review and 
translation, but there are few systematic monographs. On the other hand, some 
scholars focus on the existence of earnings management and the factors that affect 
earnings management. For example, Jiang H(1998) studied the earnings management 
of listed companies and found that companies tend to overstate their profits. To avoid 
delisting risk, firms delay losses and concentrate on recognizing them for a year. 
Wang Y(1999) found that earnings management of listed companies was related to the 
regulatory policies of the government. Chen X(2000) found that listed companies 
carried out earnings management in order to meet the regulations of regulatory 
authorities on rights allocation through studying rights allocation, etc. 
However, the results of many previous studies are not consistent with those of western 
studies. For example, the setting of independent directors in China does not have a 
significant impact on earnings management. In contrast, in western studies, the setting 
of independent directors is an effective means to curb earnings management. 
In general, when encountering such a situation, researchers usually explain the 
differences between Chinese and foreign markets, such as different government 
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regulatory policies or different levels of market development. 
However, previous researchers have long overlooked the fact that the earnings 
management measurement model they used in their study was based on the 
international accounting standards (IAS). In other words, the earnings management 
measurement models used in western countries are not necessarily applicable to the 
Chinese market, and the earnings management of companies calculated by them is not 
always accurate. This may also be the reason for the differences between Chinese and 
foreign studies. 
Earnings management plays an essential role in research on corporate governance, 
and the measurement of the company's earnings management is the most crucial 
question in the study. Most previous studies tend to use kinds of improved Jones 
model, which is developed based on the International Accounting Standard (IAS), to 
calculate the degree of the firm's earnings management. In 2007, China issued the 
new <Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises>, and because of the difference 
of the state system between China and West countries, there is much difference 
between the IAS and the Chinese new accounting standard. Hence, the calculation of 
the earnings management in the Chinese market by kinds of improved Jones model is 
not accurate. Therefore, the result of earnings management studies based on the 
Chinese market may not be accurate and rigorous. Thus, this motives me to improve 
the Jones model based on the new Chinese account standards to make sure that the 
earnings management detects in the Chinese market is accurate. And then to use the 
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new model to calculate earnings management and detect the relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings management. 
1.2 Aim and objectives 
The first objective of this study is to build a new model to detect the firm's earnings 
management in the Chinese market more accurate based on the Jones model. To 
achieve this objective, this study will compare the new Chinese accounting standards 
and the IAS and discuss the influence of these difference on the company's earnings 
management. And then, to improve the Jones model to make the calculation of the 
earnings management more accurate. 
Furthermore, this study aims to research the relationship between corporate 
governance and earnings management from two angles. The first angle is from the 
impact of the director's financial background on earnings management. Previous 
studies find that if a director with the financial professional title CPA, His supervision 
on the manager will be more effective (Jihong, Lizhu 2014) However, the CPA is not 
the only measure of the director's financial background, the director with a 
professional title like CFA, and senior economists also could to measure the director's 
financial background. Thus, the second objective of this study is to measure the 
director's financial background more accurately and then to research the impact of the 
director's financial background on the company's earnings management. 
At last, according to the previous research, as the increase of the shareholding of the 
majority shareholder. The principal contradiction of agency problem has changed 
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from the contradiction between managers and shareholders to the composition of 
major shareholders and minority shareholders (Porta, Rafael La, Lopez-de-Silanes et 
al. 1998). However, it ignored that what role of the managers play in this situation. 
Therefore, the last objective of this study is to research the impact of the relationship 
between the CEO and the controlling shareholder on earnings management. 
1.3 Research Questions 
To improve the Jones model based on the new Chinese accounting standard and make 
it suit the Chinese market. This study will focus on the following questions: 
1) What is the difference between the new Chinese accounting standard and IAS? 
2) Dose these differences affect the firms' earnings management? 
3) How to improve the Jones model to cover the effect of these difference on the 
company's earnings management. 
Moreover, to study the impact of the director's financial background on the company's 
earnings management, this study will focus on the following question: 
1) What is the effect of directors with a financial background on the company's 
earnings management? 
In order to study the impact of the relationship between the CEO and the controlling 
shareholder on the company's earnings management, this study will focus on the 
following question: 
1) If the company's CEO comes from the controlling shareholder, does the CEO will 
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to help the majority shareholder against the minority shareholders? 
1.4 Research Findings 
Through the comparison and discussion about the difference between the new 
Chinese accounting standards and the IAS, the new Chinese accounting standard 
includes investment income into the company's earnings. However, according to the 
IAS rule, investment income is into the gains but not earnings. Therefore, in the 
Chinese market, the investment income is a part of earnings, but the Jones model does 
not measure it. Thus, this study adds the cash flow from investment to calculate the 
total accruals (TA) and combines the investment income to measure the discretionary 
accruals. 
Moreover, through empirical analysis based on the investment marched Jones model, 
this study found that if the director has some financial background like professional 
title or work experience, the effect on accruals earnings management is negative. 
However, the impact on the company's real activist’s earnings management is 
positive. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the CEO and the controlling shareholder will 
change from conflict to cooperation as the increase of the controlling shareholder's 
shareholding. The relationship between the CEO and the controlling shareholder is 
conflicting when the controlling shareholder's shareholding at a low level and the 
effect on the earnings management is negative. However, as the increasing of the 
controlling shareholder's shareholding, the CEO tends to collaborate with the 
14 
controlling shareholder to manipulate the company's earnings. 
1.5 Contributions 
1.5.1Methodological contributions 
The first contribution of this study is to the research about earnings management. Previous 
research about earnings management generally based on the Jones model but did not consider the 
factor that the accounting standard may differ in different countries. And these difference may 
cause the inaccurate of the measurement of earnings management in different countries. If a 
researcher uses the erroneous result to detect the relationship between the earnings management 
and other factors, it will come to a conclusion that is not consistent with the facts and mislead 
subsequent studies. this thesis proposes to modify the model according to the local regulations, 
and improved the Jones model based on the Chinese accounting standard. It provides a more 
appropriate tool to post-location studies on Chinese earnings management. 
1.5.2Empirical contributions 
Moreover, this study has contributions to the literature. Firstly, this thesis has expanded the 
definition of the financial background beyond the CPA work experience. Then uses the empirical 
analysis based on the new modified model to find the result that a director with a financial 
background will help the company to reduce the accruals earnings management but to increase 
the real activities earnings management.Secondly, this thesis has shown that the impact of the 
relationship between the CEO and the controlling shareholder on the company's earnings 
management. When the largest shareholder's shareholding at a low level, the relationship 
between the CEO and the controlling shareholder is conflict, and the company's earnings 
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management suppressed. However, as the increase of the controlling shareholder's shareholding, 
the CEO tends to help the controlling shareholder to again with minority shareholders. 
1.5.3 Theoretical contributions 
The agency theory has thoroughly discussed the relationship between managers and shareholders, 
and later Sheleifer and Vishny (1997) further proved the contradiction between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders.However, what role do managers play in the conflict 
between large shareholders and small shareholders? Should managers help large shareholders to 
infringe the interests of small shareholders or help small shareholders to fight against and 
monitor large shareholders?The research in this aspect has been a blank of agency theory. 
Based on the setting of whether the manager works for the major shareholders. this thesis 
discusses the behaviour of the manager in the conflict between the majority shareholders and the 
minority shareholders, from the perspective of earnings management.It finds that the manager 
will help the majority shareholders to infringe the interests of the minor shareholders in the 
contradiction between the major shareholders and the minor shareholders, which makes up for 
the agency theory. 
1.6 Structure of This Thesis 
This study includes six chapters as following. 
1. Introduction, 
2. Literature review, 
3. How to measure earnings management, 
4. Directors with a financial background and earnings management, 
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5. The Influence of Relationship between the CEO and Largest Shareholder on 
Earnings Management, 
6. Conclusion. 
The first chapter is the introduction of this thesis which include the motivation, aim 
and objective, research questions, research findings and contribution. The second 
chapter is the literature review which is briefly the relevant literature about the 
earnings management research. Chapter 3 is to discuss the difference in the Chinese 
new accounting standards and improve the Jones model based on these standards. 
Chapter 4 present the empirical analysis result of the impact of the director's financial 
background on earnings management. Chapter 5 has shown the empirical analysis 
result of the impact of the relationship between the CEO and the controlling 
shareholder on earnings management. At last, chapter 6 is the conclusion of this study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
There are a great number of studies studying earnings management. Given the limited 
space of this dissertation,this study will briefly review the relevant literature about 
earnings management from the following six perspectives, 1) corporate governance 
and earnings management; 2) equity offering and earnings management; 3) ownership 
structure and earnings management; and 4) tax and earnings management. 5) directors’ 
background and earnings management; 6) models use to measure earnings 
management. 
2.1 Corporate Governance and Earnings Management 
In this section,this study briefly review literature about the relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings management from the following perspective: 1) 
the relationship between audit and earnings management; 2) the relationship between 
board characteristics and earnings management. 
2.1.1 Audit and Earnings Management 
An external independent audit can improve the quality of financial reports, reduce 
agency costs, and provide relatively reliable information for investors to make 
decisions. High-quality audit work can effectively find out earnings manipulation and 
correct it or have a restraining effect on management opportunism behaviour so that 
the financial report can reflect the company's operating performance more truly. The 
primary purpose of independent auditing is to solve the problem of information 
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asymmetry in the principal-agent system, which requires certified public accountants 
to provide high-quality auditing services to ensure the effectiveness of decisions made 
based on the information in financial reports. Internal corporate governance and 
external audit supervision interact to influence the earnings management behaviour of 
listed companies. 
From the perspective of external auditing, DeAngelo (1981) investigate the 
relationship between the size of accounting firm and the audit quality. He/she finds 
that there is a positive relationship between the size of accounting firm and the audit 
quality.He/ she argues that the quality of the audit report may be different because of 
auditors from different accounting firms, even they have the same professional ability. 
As larger firms have large number of clients, they will take more loss if they failed to 
find the abnormal earnings in clients’ annual report. The results indicate that larger 
accounting firms have more ability of prevent the earnings management. Dopuch, 
Simunic (1982), Teoh, Wong (1993), Defond, Jiambalvo (1993) and Becker, DeFond 
et al. (1998) also investigate the relationship between earnings management and 
external auditing. They find that firms’ earnings management is more likely to be 
prevented by external auditor if the audit report is issued by larger accounting firms, 
which is consistent with the study of DeAngelo (1981) 
Defond, Jiambalvo (1993) find that auditors are more sensitive to positive earnings 
management rather than negative earnings management. In addition, the quality of 
audit report is also affected by the industry expertise of auditors, and the relationship 
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between earnings management and industry expertise of auditors is negative (Bonner, 
Lewis 1990; O'Keefe, Simunic et al. 1994, Deis Jr, Giroux 1992, Bedard, Biggs 1991) 
From the perspective of internal auditing, some studies find that earnings 
manipulations are negatively related to whether a firm has audit committee in board 
(McMullen 1996). In other words, firms are less likely to manipulate their earnings if 
they have audit committee in their boards. Beasley (1996), Dechow, Sloan et al. 
(1996), Cheng, Farber (2008)point out that if there are some professional auditors in 
audit committee, and earnings manipulation can be prevented. Bedard, Johnstone 
(2004) has shown that the number of independent directors sitting in audit committee 
will influence on firm’s earnings management. Particularly, Bedard, Johnstone (2004) 
finds that with the increase in the number of independent directors sitting in audit 
committee, the degree of firm’s earnings management will decrease. 
A high-quality external audit can effectively restrain accrual earnings management, 
but at the same time, the motivation of earnings management does not decrease. 
When earnings management of accrued profits is forced to decrease due to external 
audit, companies will turn to real earnings management, even with a high cost. 
Chi, W (2011) found that high-quality audit would restrict accrual earnings 
management when their study focuses on companies with strong earnings 
management needs. However, companies would choose more hidden real earnings 
management.When Alhadab, M (2018) studied the impact of audit on real earnings 
management during IPO, it could effectively reduce the real earnings management 
through expenses. However, the company would still conduct real earnings 
management through sales at the end of the year. 
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2.1.2 Board Characteristics and Earnings Management 
Previous studies have found that board characteristics have significant influence on 
firms’ earnings management. For example, Lipton, Lorsch (1992) point out that There 
is a negative relationship between board size and the monitoring effectiveness of the 
board. In particular, with the increase in the number of directors sitting on the board, 
the problem of the free ride will exist. Therefore, the quality of monitoring function of 
the board will decrease, which in turn, the degree of earnings management increases. 
However, according to the results documented byXie, Davidson III et al. (2003), Xie 
(2003) find that with the increase of the number of directors sitting on the board, the 
possibility that there are some directors with financial professional background sitting 
in the board increases. Thus, the quality of monitoring function may increase, which 
in turn, the extent to which firms manipulate their earnings decreases. 
Moreover,Dechow, Sloan et al. (1996) finds that independent directors can prevent the 
earnings manipulation. Klein (2002) points out that firms with high proportion of 
independent directors sitting on the board tend to prevent their earnings manipulation. 
Beasley (1996) finds a negative relationship between earnings management and board 
independence. Beasley (1996) argues that with the increase in the number of 
independent directors sitting in the board, the independence of board will improve 
(Klein 2002). Thus, the earnings management may be prevented.Xie, Davidson III et 
al. （2003) also show a negative relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors in the board and earnings management. However, Clarke, Ferris et al. (2006) 
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shows that this relationship is not significant in China. Dechow, Sloan et al. (1996) 
also points out that whether the chairman of board also works as CEO will affect 
firm’s earning management. Given that CEO is supervised and monitored by the 
board of directors, if the chairman of the board also works as a CEO of this firm, it 
tends to more likely to manipulate earnings because of lacking monitoring function. 
Based on the studies focusing on the listed companies in China, Hu Luanming, Tang 
Songlian (2008) investigate whether the independent director with financial 
background and the proportion of independent directors sitting on the board have 
impact on the degree of earnings management. Hu Luanming, Tang Songlian (2008) 
find that if the independent director has financial background, he/she will tend to 
monitor management’s manipulation behavior, which could prevent the earnings 
manipulation. 
However, Wang Bing (2007) focuses on the relationship between board independence 
and earnings management and he/she finds that there is on relationship between 
independence of the board and earnings management. Wang Jianxin (2007) point out 
that the possibility of earnings management will increase if the Chairman and the 
CEO is the same person. 
2.2 Equity Offering and Earnings Management 
In this section,this study briefly review literature about the relationship between 
equity offering and earnings management from the following perspective: 1) the 
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relationship between initial public offering and earnings management; 2) the 
relationship between public equity offering and earnings management. 
2.2.1 Initial Public Offerings 
Bernard, Thomas (1990) explore the relationship between stock price and firm’s 
earnings and they find that the relationship between share price and firm’s earnings is 
positive. Chaney, Lewis (1995) propose the same point and they argue that high stock 
prices give managers the incentive to increase earnings. Loughran, Ritter (1997) find 
that during the period of IPO, firms tend to increase the net profit through accounting 
method manipulation, and it helps firms to achieve a high price of IPO. However, 
these manipulations will cause a post-issue under-performance of IPO. Moreover, 
Cohen, Zarowin (2010) point out that firms tend to use both real activities and 
discretional accruals to increase earnings during the period of equity issues. In 
addition, Anthony, Bettinghaus et al. (2006)examine the relationship between issuing 
size and the possibility of earnings management and they find a positive relationship 
between issuing scale and possibility of earnings management. 
2.2.2 Secondary Equity Offering 
Loughran, Ritter (1995), and Spiess, Affleck-Graves (1995) use American listed firms 
as sample to analyze the relationship between share price and earnings management. 
The results show that the post-equity offering stock price is negatively related to the 
pre-equity offering earnings management. In addition, they also find that post-equity 
offering firm performance is negatively related to pre-equity offering earnings 
management. In other words, after secondary equity offering, both share price and 
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performance will decrease if firms manipulate their earnings before secondary equity 
offering. In following studies, Pierre (2000), Kang, Kim et al. (1999), Allen, Soucik 
(2000) all find the similar results in France, Japan, and Austral respectively.Cohen, 
Dey et al. (2008) investigate whether firms use discretional accruals or real activities 
to manipulate earnings during the period of equity issuing. The results show that 
earnings management through discretional accruals and real activities both exist. 
However, managers are more like to use real activities manipulation to adjust earnings. 
At last, Cohen, Zarowin (2010) point out that firms tend to use both real activities earnings 
management and accruals earnings management to increase earnings during the period of equity 
issues. Especially after Sarbanes-Oxley Act was introduced, the degree of real earnings 
management has been significantly improved.This is because the SOX significantly increases the 
cost of accrual earnings management. 
2.3 Ownership Structure and Earnings Management 
In this section,this studybriefly review literature about the relationship between 
ownership structure and earnings management from the following perspective: 1) the 
relationship between ownership concentration and earnings management; 2) the 
relationship between managerial shareholding and earnings management; 3) the 
relationship between SOE shareholding and earnings management. 
2.3.1 Ownership Concentration and Largest Shareholding 
Previous studies have documented the effect of ownership concentration, and 
ownership property on earnings management. Hindley (1970)argues that for firms 
with diffuse ownership structure, the management team has a larger control of firm. 
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Therefore, managers have more incentive to manipulate earnings to achieve their own 
self-interest.Dechow, Sloan et al. (1996) point out that for those firms which the 
earnings manipulation exist, the ownership structure is more spread/dispersed than 
that of other firms. Donnelly, Lynch (2002)find that firms with diffuse outside 
ownership have more possibility to manipulate their earnings. However, Demsetz, 
Lehn (1985)provide the opposite views based on their research. According to their 
findings, there is a positive relationship between ownership concentration and the 
possibility of earnings management, which indicates that a diffuse ownership 
structure may prevent a firm to manipulate its earnings. 
In addition,Porta, Rafael La, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (1998) find a positive 
relationship between the proportion of largest shareholding and earnings 
management,Bushman, Chen et al. (2000)andFan, Wong (2002) propose the same 
view and Bai Chongen, Liu Qiao et al. (2005)also draw the same conclusion based on 
Chinese market. However, Li, Guan (2004) find a non-liner relationship between 
proportion of largest shareholding and earnings management. In particularly, the 
degree of firm’s earnings management will increase as the increase of shareholding of 
the largest shareholder. However, beyond certain threshold, firm’s earnings 
management will decrease with the increase of shareholding of the largest 
shareholder.Lu Chuang, Liu Junyong et al. (2011)finds the opposite result. In 
conclusion, based on previous studies, the relationship between earnings management 
and the shareholdings owned by the largest shareholder is not conclusive. This might 
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be caused by the different samples used in their studies. 
2.3.2 Managerial Shareholding 
Previous studies document the effect of ownership property on earnings management, 
Dempsey, Hunt III et al. (1993) point out that if a firm has a low proportion of 
shareholding by management, and it tends to manipulate its earnings through 
non-recurrent item. Warfield, Wild et al. (1995)argue that managerial shareholding 
will reduce the cost of agent. Therefore, the possibility of earnings manipulation by 
management team may decrease. Moreover, Yeo, Tan et al. (2002)find a non-linear 
relationship between management shareholding and the quality of earnings 
information. Particularly, the earnings information quality increases when the 
proportion of management shareholding rises. However, beyond certain threshold, the 
quality of earnings information will decline when the proportion of managerial 
shareholdings keeps increasing. 
2.3.3 SOE Shareholding 
Regarding the relationship between earnings management and shares owned by SOE, 
Qian, Weingast (1994)argue that SOE may get more financial and policy supports 
from the government like taxation preference policy or bank loan, it may reduce the 
incentive of firm’s earnings management.Li Zengfu, Dong Zhiqiang et al. (2011) find 
that with the increase of proportion of SOE shareholding, firms tend to increase the 
earnings through discretional accruals and real activities. However, Li Zengfu, Dong 
Zhiqiang et al. (2011) find that the relationship between discretionary current accruals 
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and proportion of SOE shareholding is negative. 
2.3.4Institutional investors  shareholding 
The purpose of institutional investors is to hope that the market value of listed 
companies can fluctuate within the normal range and get high returns in the stock 
market with the growth of the company's performance. If institutional investors are 
inclined to value investment, their shareholding ratio will increase with the 
improvement of the company's performance. At this time, institutional investors have 
the motivation to manage the company's earnings. If institutional investors tend only 
to capture short-term spreads, they have no incentive to maintain earnings 
management practices.Compared with individual investors, they have more funds and 
more professional knowledge, so they can supervise listed companies more 
effectively by voting with their feet and restrict the earnings management of listed 
companies. 
Koh(2007) proved that listed companies might increase the motivation of earnings 
management when institutional investors hold lower stocks. On the contrary, when 
institutional investors hold more shares, listed companies will weaken the motivation 
of earnings management. DeFond(1991) confirmed that when the shareholding ratio 
of institutional investors approached 5% or so, the earnings management of the 
company will reduce. Che (2010) found that investment institutions would supervise 
listed companies only when the profit pressure was low. 
In the study of the Chinese market, the supervisory role of institutional investors is 
not as significant as that of western markets. For those listed companies with majority 
shareholders, like especially state-owned companies, institutional investors are not 
active in improving corporate performance. Zengfu Li(2013) found that institutional 
investors inhibited earnings management of non-state-owned enterprises more 
obviously. Moreover, institutional investors have different motivations for supervising 
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corporate earnings management due to their different nature (Yuan, 2014). Investment 
funds, securities, insurance and other investors have a more obvious constraint on 
earnings management because they place more emphasis on the value of the 
company. 
2.4 Tax and Earnings Management 
Guenther (1994) examines the effect of tax rate on firm’s earnings management. In 
1986, America promulgated the tax law reform regulation (TRA), which declines the 
corporate income tax rate from 46 percent to 34 percent. As the result of this tax rate 
change, Guenther (1994)argues that the change of corporate income tax rate will lead 
firms to manipulate their earnings. Guenther (1994) find that if the corporate income 
rate expected to decrease, the company tend to delay its earnings from this accounting 
year to the next accounting year. Therefore, its tax-free may be smaller because the 
tax-free is calculate by a lower corporate income tax rate. 
Wang Yuetang, Wang Liangliang et al. (2009) use the sample of listed companies in 
China and explore the relationship between corporate income tax rate and earnings 
management. In 2007, China promulgated a new corporate income tax law, the Firms 
Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, and this law was implemented on 
January 1, 2008. Wang Yuetang, Wang Liangliang et al. (2009) find that there is a 
positive relationship between the corporate income tax rate and firms’ earnings 
management when the corporate income tax rate declines for some companies. 
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However, different from the results of David’s research, Wang Yuetang, Wang 
Liangliang et al. (2009) find that there is no significant relationship between the 
corporate income tax rate and firms’ earnings management when the corporate income 
tax rate rises for some companies. The reason provided by Wang Yuetang, Wang 
Liangliang et al. (2009) is that the magnitude of corporate income tax rate increase for 
some companies might not large enough for firms to manipulate their earnings. 
Following this research, Li Zengfu, Dong Zhiqiang et al. (2011) investigate whether 
firms use real activities to manipulate earnings rather than use accounting method to 
manipulate. Li Zengfu, Dong Zhiqiang et al. (2011) find that when the corporate 
income tax rate increase, the relationship between corporate income tax rate and real 
activities manipulate is positive and significant as well, which means firms tend to use 
real activities manipulate rather than to use accounting method to manipulate. 
In addition, Lin, Lu et al. (2012) test the effect of governance characteristics, and the 
proportion of shares owned by state-owned enterprises (SOE) on firms’ earnings 
management accounting methods when the corporate income tax rate changes. They 
find that when the corporate income tax rate change, the incentive of accounting 
method tends to be less for those firms with a high proportion of shares held by SOE. 
Moreover, better governance characteristics also tend to limit the incentive of 
earnings management accounting `methods when the corporate income tax rate 
changes. However, Lin, Lu et al. (2012) did not study the effect of other ownership 
structure and firm’s characteristics on firm’s earnings management accounting 
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methods, and the effect of those factors on firm’s real activities manipulate. 
2.5 Directors’ Background and earnings management 
Executives with “CPA Work Background” may have supervisory governance effects 
on earnings management. Executives with “CPA Work Background” have received 
systematic and professional training in the accounting firm. They have experience in 
handling complex accounting business and transactions, auditing clients from 
different industries and firms, and that giving them the industry expertise (Beasley, 
Carcello et al. 2000, Imhoff Jr 1978) 
DeFond, Francis (2005) found that when a professional accounting financial expert 
entered the audit committee, the market response was significantly positive. However, 
when a financial expert without accounting experience entered the audit committee, 
the market response was not significant. This result indicating that professional 
accounting knowledge and skills of executives could enhance the quality of financial 
reporting and corporate governance, and increased the value of shareholders. 
The study byXie, Davidson III et al. (2003)also found that the company has lower 
current discretionary accruals when audit committee members included experts with 
financial skills. Therefore, hiring executives with “CPA work background” can benefit 
the company such as limit earnings management and improve the quality of financial 
reporting. 
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As accrued earnings management, real earnings management is also an important 
means of exaggerating reported earnings (Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen, Dey et al. 
2008, Gunny 2010, Zang 2012), and external monitoring of high-quality audit report 
can be reduced the company's accruals and real earnings management simultaneously. 
Chen Songsheng, Dong Jinsheng et al. (2012). Therefore, executives with a CPA 
working background can limit the company's accruals and real earnings management. 
In the study ofZhao Wenping, Zhang Yinan et al. (2015), the financial work 
experience of senior managers can significantly inhibit the real earnings management. 
The higher the proportion of executives with financial work experience in the 
management team, the lower the real earnings management level of the company will 
be. However, the influence of financial education background on earnings 
management is not significant. 
However, there is no significant evidence that the experience and skills of CPA 
executives significantly oversee and limit the company's earnings management 
behaviour Jihong, Lizhu (2014). Their study has found that “office associations” (the 
executive with a CPA working background was/is working in the accounting firm 
which issue the audit report) give executives the ability to perform additional accrued 
earnings management, that allows auditors to accept higher levels of accrued earnings 
management and made the company's audit supervision more lenient. That let the 
company has not turned to higher-cost real earnings management and has a lower 
level of real earnings management. This shows that in China's listed companies, the 
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executive with work skills and experience of CPA has not benefited the company. Not 
only did they not play their due role in the management of earnings, but they “helped 
to abuse”, which made the company have higher levels of accruals earnings 
management (Jihong, Lizhu 2014). 
Firms’ managers have sufficient motivation to conduct earnings management to meet 
the requirements of creditors on relevant financial indicators(Liu yixuan 2016). Senior 
managers with banking background have a good external relationship network, and a 
clearer understanding of the debt decision-making and approval process can increase 
enterprises' access to key information and resources, which may help them implement 
earnings management to obtain more credit financing. 
Research on the literature of independent directors' restraining earnings management 
shows that the financial background will affect the supervision effect of independent 
directors, and independent directors with financial background have a greater 
supervision effect on earnings management. Xie, Davidson III et al.'s(2003) study 
showed that independent directors with financial background have a better 
understanding of the means of earnings management, which can significantly inhibit 
the degree of accrued earnings management. 
Wang Bing (2007) studied Chinese listed companies from 2002 to 2004 and found 
that independent directors did not improve earnings quality, but independent directors 
with financial background could significantly improve earnings quality. 
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Hu Luanming, Tang Songlian (2008) examined the relationship between independent 
directors and earnings information quality of listed companies in China from 2002 to 
2006, and found that when with a high proportion of independent directors with 
financial background in the board of directors, the quality of accrued earnings 
information of companies was better.2.6 Summary 
An external audit can effectively inhibit the accrual earnings management of 
companies. However, when the external audit is too strict, companies will turn to 
more covert real earnings management, even if the cost is increased. 
Moreover, the supervisory role of the board of directors is equally important, 
especially for independent directors. Since there is no directly related interest with the 
company, the independent director can better exercise the supervision function. 
In terms of ownership, due to less pressure from external supervision, the degree of 
earnings management of state-owned enterprises is relatively high. Furthermore, for 
both shareholders and management, a higher shareholding ratio will bring higher 
earnings management. Because the higher the shareholding ratio is, the higher the 
motivation to obtain excess returns through earnings management will be. Finally, 
institutional investors hold enough money and can choose to vote with their feet, thus 
exerting a restrictive effect on earnings management. 
When companies issue additional shares in the market, whether IPO or SEO, 
companies want to attract investors as much as possible. Therefore, earnings 
management is particularly common during the issuance period of shares, and accrual 
earnings management and real earnings management exist at the same time. 
The impact of taxation on earnings management is also obvious. When the tax rate 
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changes, the company will take the initiative to adjust the earnings to the annual 
recognition with a low tax rate. 
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Chapter 3:Earnings management detect model review 
3.1 Healy Model 
Healy (1984) research focused on the managements' incentives on earnings 
management and the setting of his study is when the marginal bonus is "out of 
money". In his research, the manager's compensation package included a base salary 
and a piecewise bonus as the chart. 
The manager's payment is based on the company's earnings. Healy has divided the 
manager's compensation is three zones: 1) the zones left of B’, 2) the zones between 
B’ and C, 3) the zones right of C. Suppose if the real earnings fall in area of the left of 
B’ or the right of C, the manager will have no incentive to do any earnings 
management as he couldn't get a higher compensation. However, if the real earnings 
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fall in the zone between B’ and C, thus the manager tends to increase the report 
earnings to increase his current bonus. 
Therefore, Healy defiend discretionary accruals as follows: 
DA = ΔWORK -DEP-X2D1 -(TP +D1) *D2 
where 
DA = discretionary accruals, which are equated with total accruals; 
Δ WORK = the change in select accruals from working capital: the increase in 
accounts receivable (ΔAR) plus the increase in inventory (ΔINV) plus the decrease in 
accounts payable (ΔAP); 
DEP= depreciation; 
X2 = extraordinary items; 
D1 = dummy variable; D1=1 (0) if bonus plan earnings are defined after (before) 
extraordinary items; 
ΔTP = the change in income tax payable; 
D2 = dummy variable; D2=1 (0) if bonus plan earnings are defined after (before) 
income tax. 
In Healy’s model, he uses the change in select accruals from working capital as the 
total accruals. After that, he removes the depreciation from the total accruals because 
the depreciation is non-discretionary accruals. Moreover, if the CEO’s bonus plan 
earnings are defined before the extraordinary items, thus there is on impact of the 
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extraordinary items on CEO’s payment. Therefore, D1 is defined 0 if the bound plan 
earnings are defined before extraordinary items. As the same reason, the D2 is defined 
0 if the bound plan earnings are defined before the income tax payment. 
The contribution to earnings management research of Healy is he has mentioned that 
the total accruals include the discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals. 
The interpretation of his study is that the NDA is not 0, and the TA = NDA +DA. The 
positive DA in the real earnings subset between B’ and C. 
According to Healy's 
accruals as follows: 
 ul im     
 l  t 
l 
defines non-discretionary accruals as the deflated long-run 
(1) 
Where 
TAt:is the total accruals of year t; 
NDAt+1:is the none-discretionary accruals of year t+1. 
At-1: is the lagged assets. 
In most applications, the average is calculated over 5 years. 
3.2 Deangelo Model 
(DeAngelo 1986) study is focused on the transaction price. As the price setting is 
related to the firm's value which tends to increase after the buyout. Therefore, the 
management has the incentive to downward the earnings to reduce the price before 
the buyout. DeAngelo (1986) predicts that the non-discretionary accruals following a 
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random walk. The DeAngelo model uses the total accruals of previous as the 
non-discretionary accruals, and uses the difference of total accruals between current 
year t and previous year to measure the earning quality DeAngelo (1986). The 
assumption of this model is: the firm’s non-discretionary accruals of current year t are 
equal to the firm’s total accruals of the previous year. However, the DeAngelo model 
cannot control the impact of the change of the state of operation to none-discretionary 
accruals. 
NDAt=/At-1 (2) 
This characterization fits a constant growth mean reverting or random-walk processes. 
The expected accruals this year is equal to those of last year, and thus all changes in 
accruals are discretionary. 
3.3 Jones Model 
Jones (1991) points out that there is a common feature of Healy model and DeAngelo 
model that both ignore the influence of firm’s size on non-discretionary accruals. As 
the change of firm’s size, the accrued profit subjects will change such as receivables, 
payables and accumulative depreciation. For example, the change of operating 
revenue will lead to the change of accrued profits, and the fixed assets tend to 
decrease the accrued profits as the depreciation. Therefore, the none-discretionary 
accruals are related with the firm’s operation revenue and fixed assets (Jones 1991). 
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If the operating revenue and the fixed asset are stable, the accrued profits will remain 
stable. Therefore: 
NDAt = β1 + β2REVt +β3PPEt (3) 
Where is: NDAt is the non-discretionary accruals of year t. 
If the operating revenue and the fixed asset are changed, the accrued profits will 
change; 
NDAt = β1 + β2ΔREVt +β3ΔPPEt (4) 
Where is: NDAt is the non-discretionary accruals of year t, ΔREVt is the change of 
revenue between year t and year t-1, ΔPPEt is the change of original value of fixed 
assets between year t and year t-1. 
Items which related to the operating revenue are receivables, inventory, and accounts 
payable, etc. If these items didn’t change, the non-discretionary accruals which related 
to the operating revenue are 0 (Jones 1991). Therefore, the non-discretionary accrual 
is related to the change in operating revenue. However, items which related to the 
fixed asset is depreciation. The depreciation exists in every accounting year, even the 
fixed assets don’t change. Thus, the non-discretionary accruals are related to fixed 
assets rather than the change of fixed assets (Jones 1991). 
Therefore: 
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NDAt = β1 + β2ΔREVt +β3PPEt(5) 
Where is: NDAt is the non-discretionary accruals of year t, ΔREVt is the change of 
revenue between year t and year t-1, PPEt is the original value of fixed assets between 
year t and year t-1. 
Then, Jones model using the change of operation revenue and the original value of 
fixed assets as independent variables to build a model as following to measure the 
discretionary accruals: 
































i    (9) 
The regression is regressed by each year and industry, respectively. 
Where is: TAt is the total accruals of year t; NItis the net profit of year t; CFOt is the 
cash flow from operating of year t; NDAt is the none-discretionary accruals of year t; 
At-1is the total assets of year t-1; ΔREVtis the change of operation revenue between 
year t and year t-1; PPEt is the original value of fixed assets; DAtis the discretionary 
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accruals of year t. 
According to the Jones model functions, it could find that the NDA is the  l , and 
the DA is the residue error of the TA. 
In previous studies, some research has found that if some variable correlated 
with ΔREV +PPE are omitted, or the linear model is misspecified, the DA value will 
be measured overestimated or underestimated. 
The overestimated found in previous research with candidate samples like firms with 
extreme performance, or random samples. If the firm's accrual with extreme 
performance, the solution is to add a control variable for performance, like cash flows 
deflated by lagged assets (Dechow, Sloan et al. 1996, Kothari, Leone et al. 2005, Jeter, 
Shivakumar 1999). Another way is matching firms with others by industry and a 
performance criterion like ROA or revenue growth (Dechow, Sloan et al. 1996, Ye 
2007). However, if the firm is in a random sample which is large enough, its earnings 
management may be offset by other firm's earnings management with different 
directions (Barua, Legoria et al. 2006, Jacob, Jorgensen 2007). 
The uniderestimated is found in previous research by using the sample that the 
earnings management is known to take place. The first situation is the samples of 
companies which is GAAP violator (Dechow, Hutton 1995, Beneish 1997). Beneish 
(1997) choose a 64-firm sample, and there are 59 firms which are GAAP violators, 
but the Jones model just detected 15 GAAP violators. The other kind sample is the 
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random sample with deliberate manipulate (Dechow, Hutton 1995). In that sample, 
Dechow, Hutton, and Sweeney find that Jones model could only detect the abnormal 
accrual that the earnings management is 5% of the total asset or higher. 
3.4 Improved Jones model 
According to the above problem of Jones model, nowadays studies tend to focus that 
how to reduce both errors. Most research concern to reduce the error I as that error I is 
more urgent than error II, because error I will reduce the significant of the 
results(McNichols, Maureen F. 2000). Later researchers present various 
improvements to the Jones model as follows: 1) the modified Jones model (Dechow, 
Sloan et al. 1996); 2) the cash-flows model (Dechow, Dichev 2002); 3) the linear 
performance-match Jones model (Kothari, Leone et al. 2005). 
3.4.1 The Modified Jones Model 
Dechow, Sloan et al. (1996) point out that the Jones model did not consider the impact 
of receivable on accruals and it will cause the overvalue of firm’s operation revenue. 
If the firm does not manage earnings in the previous period but manipulate the 
receivable in the event period. Thus, the firm’s credit sales will normal in the 
estimation period but abnormal in the event period. Thus, they present the Modified 












i    (10) 
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NDA is the  l , and the DA is the residue error of the TA. 
The regression is regressed by each year and industry, respectively. 
In their test, the modified Jones model is less susceptible to error II then the Jones 
model. Moreover, in cross-sectional analysis, the change in the accounts receivable is 
subtracted from the change in revenues for the estimations of parameters of normal 
accruals (Subramanyam 1996, DeFond, Park 1997, Dechow, Richardson et al. 2003, 
Kothari, Leone et al. 2005). That is, the difference between two versions of the Jones 
model affects both stages of the earnings management detection procedure: estimation 
of normal accruals and identification of the abnormal accruals. The following 
definitions summarize the model. 
Definitions: the time-series modified Jones model following the first stage of the 
Jones model, but it estimates DA in the event period as following: 
 Ro  m      t             m i    i    (11) o tm o tm o tm o tm 
Where the     is the change of receivable. 
The cross-sectional modified Jones model replace the changes in revenues with the 
changes in cash revenues for the estimation of both normal accruals and DA. 
3.4.2The cash-flows Jones model 
According to the financial analysis research advocates detecting earnings 
43 
management by comparing the patterns of accruals and cash flows (Healy, Palepu 
2003), cash flow be known as a natural candidate for the performance control. To 
illustrate the Jones model with such a control to reduce the error I, consider (Jeter, 
Shivakumar 1999), who adapt the Jones model as follows: 
 Ro     m 
m i   
      i   
     i   ∗   ∗  㓈ᔙ   (12) 
o tm o tm o tm o tm o tm 
NDA is the l , and the DA is the residue error of the TA. 
Where the CFO is the cash flows from operations, and the indicator function Ij-2 
which take the value of 1 if the firm’s CFO places it in the j-2 quintile and 0 
otherwise. 
Since cash follows are defined as the difference between earnings before 
extraordinary items and accruals including contemporaneous cash flows as a regressor 
may induce a simultaneity problem, especially if the research design uses the 
statement of cash-flows approach to calculate accruals. Thus, until Dechow, Dichev 
(2002), most studies did not control for this performance measure. 
3.4.3 Performance Matched Jones Model 
Kothari, Leone et al. (2005) present that the limitation of Jones model and adjusted 
Jones model are still existing. The main limitation is both models are misspecified 
when applied to stratified random samples especially the sample firm with extreme 
financial performance or extreme forecasts of long-term earnings growth.Kothari, 
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Leone et al. (2005)， develop the performance-matching model aims to address the 
non-linear relationship between normal accruals and performance. 
They offer two different approaches. The first involves matching similar firms, which 
alleviates the need to use an OLS estimate of DA. They detect earnings management 
by comparing the accruals of firms that are other wise almost identical. The second, 
the linear-performance-matching model, embodies two modifications of the Jones and 
the modified Jones models: an intercept, and an additional control for the lagged rate 
of return on assets, ROAt-1. 
In order to measure discretionary accruals based on a random and stratified random 
sample. Based on Jones model and Modified Jones model, (Kothari, Leone et al. 
2005)propose the Performance Matched Jones Model as follows: 
 o  m      t             m i    i    i     l i    (13) o tm o tm o tm o tm 
NDA is the  l , and the DA is the residue error of the TA. The regression is 
regressed by each year and industry, respectively. 
However, the limitation of performance matched Jones model is still existing. Firstly, 
the ROA is a financial ratio, rather than accruals. The impact of ROA on accruals is 
the value of β like the year and industry, but not as the component of accruals. As it 
not the component of accruals, it will make the regression error of the model when it 
is used to measure the non-discretionary accruals. Secondly, according to the 
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empirical results, when it uses the regression to measure the β value of performance 
matched Jones model by each year and industry, in some year and industry, the ROA 
has been omitted because of the collinearity. Then, the performance matched Jones 
model will equal to the modified Jones model as the ROA has been omitted. 
3.4.4 Lu jianqiao model 
Based on the Chinese market, Lu (1999) point out that the Jones model and modified 
Jones model did not consider the impact of intangible assets and other long-term 
assets on accruals. As intangible assets and long-term asset are related to amortization, 
then the non-discretionary accruals are related to intangible assets and long-term 
assets (Accounting standards for business enterprises No. 6- Intangible Assets, Article 
17,2006). According to the change of《Accounting standards for business enterprises》 
in 2007, the item long-term assets has been cancelled, it was dividends by Financial 
assets available for sale and held-to-maturity securities. Thus, before 2007, the other 
long-term assets are measured as long-term assets, and after 2007 the other long-term 
assets is measured as Financial assets available for sale + held-to-maturity securities + 
Long-term investment on stocks (CSMAR). 
Therefore, Lu (1999) present the Lu jianqiao model as 
 o  m      t            o    m i    i    i β4 i    (14) o tm o tm o tm o tm o tm 
Where is: the IAt is the intangible assets and long-team assets in year t. 
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NDA is the  l , and the DA is the residue error of the TA. The regression is 
regressed by each year and industry, respectively. 
3.4.5 Real earnings management 
Roychowdhury (2006) points out that enterprises manage the real earnings through 
three area: manipulate sales (increase the sales discount, ease the restrictions on the 
conditions of sale or creditor terms); manipulate production (increase output to 
decline the unit product cost); manipulate discretionary expenditure (research and 
development expenditure, advertising expenditure and maintenance costs). Those 
three manipulations can be measured by net abnormal operating activities cash flow, 
abnormal product cost and abnormal discretionary expenditure. 
The calculation of normal part: 
Based on the research ofDechow, Hutton (1995), the cash flow of operating (CFO) 
can be calculated as: 
     = α0 + α1 
m + β1
 l ⺁    + β2 
 SALESt +εt (15)  l tm  l tm  l tm TAtt1 
Where CFOt is the cash flow of operating in t year; SALESt is the sales in t year; 
ΔSALESt is the change of sales in t year. 
The cost production is equal to the cost of goods sold plus the change of inventory, 
and the cost of goods sold is: 
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  h   =α0 + α1 
1 + β1
 l ⺁    + εt (16)  l tm TAtt1  l tm 
The change of inventory is: 
     = α0 + α1 
m + β1
  l ⺁    + β2
  l ⺁   tm + εt (17)  l tm  l tm  l tm  l tm 
Therefore, the cost of production is: 
   u  = α0 + α1 
1 + β1
 l ⺁    + β2
  l ⺁    + β3
  l ⺁   tm + εt (18)  l tm TAtt1  l tm  l tm  l tm 
Where the COGSt is the cost production in t year; ΔINVt is the change of inventory in 
t year; PRODt is the cost of production in t year. 
Moreover, the discretionary expenditure is:
u  ⺁.    = α0 + α1 
1 + β1
 l ⺁   tm + εt (19)  l tm TAtt1  l tm 
Where DISEXPt is the discretionary expenditure in t year. 
The calculation of abnormal part: 
Based on these above formulas, it can get the fitted value through OLS. The abnormal 
part of can be calculated as: 
EM_CFOt = – (20) 
Where the EM_CFOt is the abnormal cash flow of operating in t year; the is 
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the fitted value of cash flow of operating in t year. Then the abnormal cost of 
production (EM_PRODt) and the abnormal discretionary expenditure (EM_DISEXPt) 
in the same way. 
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Chapter 4: How to Measure Earnings Management 
for Chinese Listed Firms 
Abstract 
Previous research about earnings management uses the Jones model and various 
Jones-based model (like modified Jones model, performance-adjusted model) to 
measure company's earnings management. These models were developed based on 
the Western accounting principles, which is different from the Chinese accounting 
standards. There is some measurement error when using these models to measure the 
company's earnings management in the Chinese market. In this study,this study 
develop a new model based on the Chinese new accounting standards which was 
issued in 2007. The results indicate that the new model developed is better than 
previous models used in literature. 
4.1 Instruction 
According to the 《 Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises》 (2006), firms 
should make accounting confirmation, measurement and report on the accrual basis 
(Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises: Basic Standard, Article 9.2006). 
Based on the accrual basis, for the current income, whether received or not, should be 
confirmed as the current income. Thus, the firm’s income can be divided into two 
parts: The first part is cash receipts have been made, and this part of income is 
confirmed as revenue. The other part is the income which not be realized by the cash 
inflow, and this part of income is confirmed as receivables. This part of income is 
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defined as the total accrual profit (Dechow, Sloan et al. 1995). 
As the revenue is actually happening in the firm’s business activities and cash receipts 
have been made, so it is difficult to manipulate (Jones 1991). Therefore, previous 
studies assumed that firms could only manipulation the accrued profit (McNichols, 
Maureen, Wilson 1988). However, not all the accrued profits could be manipulated. 
For example, like the depreciation of fixed assets, if the fixed assets are determined, 
the depreciation will be determined and cannot be changed (Accounting Standards for 
Business Enterprises No. 4 – Fixed Assets, Article 17,2006). Like the depreciation of 
the fixed asset, some of the accrual profits is enforced by the accounting standard and 
cannot be manipulated and this part of accrued profits has been defined as 
non-discretionary accrual. On the other hand, like the receivables and payables, these 
items could be manipulated by confirming in advance or defer, and this part of accrual 
profits has been defined as discretionary accrued. Therefore, the total accruals could 
be divided by non-discretionary accrual and discretionary accrual. 
According to the above assumes: 
TAt= NIt – CFOt (21) 
DAt= TAt - NDAt (22) 
Where is: TAt is the total accruals of year t; NItis the net profit of year t; CFOt is the 
cash flow from operating of year t; DAtis the discretionary accruals of year t; NDAtis 
the none-discretionary accruals of year t. 
51 
The measurement of NDA, from Healy model to various Jones models, has been 
improved step by step, and each model has been modified based on the shortcomings 
of the former: 
Compare different earnings management measurement models 
Healy model  ᫺ t1  �᫺       t ᫺ 
Healy model use the 
average of the total 








Deangelo model use 
the last year’s total 
accruals as the 
non-discretionary 
accruals 
Jones model  ul  m   ⺁       ⺁    m i    i   l tm l tm l tm l tm 
Compare Healy and 
Deangelo models, 
Jones model consider 




 ul  m   ⺁     t   ⺁       ⺁    m i    i   l tm l tm l tm l tm 
Based on the Jones 
model, the modified 
Jones model consider 







 ul  m   ⺁     t   ⺁       ⺁   l    m i    i    i   l tm l tm l tm l tm l tm 
Based on the modified 
Jones model, the 
performance matched 
model consider about 
the impact of the 




 ul  m   ⺁     t   ⺁       ⺁  l    m i    i    i   l tm l tm l tm l tm l tm 
Based on the modified 
Jones model, the Lu 
Jianqiao model 
consider about the 
impact of the long-term 
assets and intangible 
assets on company’s 
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earnings management. 
4.2 The impact of new accounting standards on earnings 
management 
4.2.1 Reduce the space of earnings management 
4.2.1.1 Inventory (Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises No.1 - Inventories,2006) 
According to the old accounting standards, the valuation for inventory issue includes 
specific identification, average cost, first-in-first-out method (FIFO) and 
last-in-first-out method (LIFO). Firms could choose one of these methods according 
to their needs. According to a different valuation method, the sales cost is different, 
and there is an impact on earnings. 
The so-called last-in-first-out method refers to the cost accounting of firms, and the 
reference is the recent purchase of raw materials prices. The first-in-first-out rule 
refers to the price of the first raw materials purchased. When the purchase inventory 
price changed during the period, different algorithms will have an impact on the 
accounting profit. When the inventory price presents a downward trend, the adoption 
of the last-in-first-out method will increase the accounting profit, and adopting the 
first-in-first-out method will reduce the accounting profit. When the inventory prices 
rise, the last-in-first-out method will reduce the accounting profit, and when using the 
first-in-first-out method will increase the accounting profit. According to the new 
accounting standard, <Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises No.1 -
Inventories >(2006)criterion using the first-in-first-out method, canceled the 
last-in-first-out method. The actual cost measurement of issued inventory is limited to 
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the advanced first-out method, weighted average method and individual valuation 
method, which limits the earnings management of enterprises to a certain extent. 
4.2.1.2 Impairment of assets (Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises No. 8 -
Impairment of Assets,2006) 
According to the <Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises No. 8 - Impairment 
of Assets>(2006), that the provision for impairment of assets accrued cannot be turned 
back during subsequent accounting periods, allowing only accounting treatment at the 
disposal of assets. It limits listed firms use the provisions and turns back of 
impairment of assets to adjust earnings. This rule solves the listed firms use 
impairment provision and turn back to manipulate earnings problem. 
The provision of asset impairment and turn back used to be a convenient means of 
earnings management for listed firms. According to the old accounting standard, if 
there are signs that factors of the previous for the impairment of assets are change, 
which makes the recoverable amount of assets is higher than its book value, the 
provision for impairment assets should have been turned back. Therefore, some listed 
firms usually make a significant amount of asset impairment provision in a particular 
year, causing a significant loss in that year, and then turn it back in the next year to 
manipulate earnings. New asset impairment accounting standards will effectively curb 
the use of impairment provisions to manipulate earnings. 
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4.2.1.3 Business Combinations (Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 20 - Business 
Combinations,2006) 
Some listed firms are used to manipulate their earnings by compiling consolidated 
financial statements. According to the <Provisional Regulation of Consolidated 
Statement>(2006)which issued by The Ministry of Treasury in 1995, any invested 
entity that can be controlled by the parent firm belongs to its scope of the merger. 
Firms can achieve the purpose of earnings management by reducing or increasing the 
investment proportion of subsidiaries with different operating conditions. 
The basic merger theory based on the <Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 20 -
Business Combinations >(2006) has changed from the parent company theory to the 
entity theory. The parent company will need to incorporate all the subsidiaries it can 
control, rather than using the investment ratio as the sole measure. This change makes 
some firms by reducing or raising the operating conditions of different subsidiary 
investment ratio to achieve the purpose of earnings management become null and 
void. The merger of firms under different control is a voluntary transaction between 
both parties, measured according to fair value, to avoid the occurrence of earnings 
management by firms using the merger of firms under the same control. Although this 
regulation cannot eliminate earnings management, it is beneficial to standardize 
earnings management behavior and improve the credibility of corporate profits. 
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4.2.1.4 Disclosure of Affiliated Parties (Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 36 -
Disclosure of Affiliated Parties,2006) 
According to the <Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 36 - Disclosure of 
Affiliated Parties>(2006) new accounting standards on the definition of a related party 
that the firm has the control, joint control or significant impact on the three types of 
firms affiliated parties. Moreover, points out that whether the affiliated party 
transactions occur or not, as long as there is a relationship between control and related 
firms should be in the notes to disclose on the relationship between the mother and 
child company. Also, it should uncover the relationship between the level to specific 
to the parent company, final control, the minimum of the financial statements of the 
public to provide an intermediate holding company. At the same time, the new 
standard also canceled the choice of the ways of disclosure of the related-party 
transactions amount or ratio, and disclose the trading amount of the firm, such as 
significant trading shall disclose the trading amount and traded in the class as a 
proportion of the total turnover, then such as the project is required to disclose 
detailed information and not settlement amount. 
The proceeds from the explicitly illegal related transactions shall be recognized as 
capital reserves and recorded in the accounts, and cannot be included in the current 
profits and losses. To get rid of the restriction of this standard, the listed company 
interrelated substantively related transactions. Alternatively, before the relevant 
transaction, the related party terminates its related relations in name by selling the 
relevant equity or suspending the transferee's relevant equity. To this, the current 
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accounting standards to a specific extension, the extension of the affiliated party in 
standards, the principal individual investors, key management personnel directly or 
indirectly control, shared control, significant other firms, which belongs to the related 
parties. Therefore, it can be seen that enterprises cannot reduce the space for earnings 
management by de-linking related transactions. 
4.2.2 Expand the space of earnings management 
4.2.2.1 Fair value 
The new standard system introduces fair value as a measurement attribute. Fair value 
means that assets and liabilities are carried at the amount for which an asset could be 
exchanged, or a liability settled, between knowledgeable, willing parties in an arm ’s 
length transaction. However, if there is no active market, the fair value will lose the 
recognition standard and be difficult to confirm. Companies may use fair value as a 
tool to manipulate earnings. Moreover, the new accounting standards introduce fair 
value into most regulations, which further expands the space for companies to 
manipulate earnings. For example, if the firm bought a property in 2015 for 10 million 
yuan. As property prices have risen in recent years, the property is worth as much as 
15 million yuan. According to the old standard, if the firm replaces the property with 
others, it would still be worth 10 million yuan as the book value. However, using the 
fair value of the new standard would yield a profit of 5 million yuan. 
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4.2.2.2 Debt Restructuring (Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 12 - Debt 
Restructuring,2006) 
There are three significant changes in the debt restructuring of the new standard. 
Firstly, the benefits of a debt restructuring range from "capital reserves" to 
"non-operating income", and this increased profit should only disclose in the notes, 
but not need to deducted when calculating the earnings per share index. Secondly, 
when firms repay the debt by a non-cash asset, it needs to confirm that debt 
restructuring gains and confirm the transfer of non-cash assets gains and losses, and 
the profit or loss of transfer of assets should recognize as profit and loss of sale. At 
last, in the old standard, when debt restructuring is carried out on the condition that 
other debts are modified, future receivables or payables shall be determined in the 
past by future profits as set out in the agreement. However, as the new standard, it is 
based on the fair value of future cash flows. 
According to the <Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 12 - Debt 
Restructuring>(2006), debt restructuring gains due to concessions by creditors could 
record in current profits and losses (revised from capital reserves by old standard). 
Therefore, listed companies can use the debt restructuring criteria to conduct earnings 
management through debt exemption from related parties and obtain huge profits. 
4.2.2.3 Intangible Assets (Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises No. 6 - Intangible 
Assets,2006) 
According to <Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises No. 6 - Intangible 
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Assets >(2006), the research and development of intangible assets of the enterprise 
have been divided into two stages, and the standard allows the capitalization of 
development expenditures, the development expenditure will be included in intangible 
assets for periodic amortization. Compared with the old standard which includes the 
development expenditure to the total management costs, it reduces the impact on 
current profits. 
However, it expands the space of earnings management for firms. As the complicated 
and risky of the intangible assets research and development, it will be difficult to 
divide the two stages of research and development. Therefore, the cut-off point of the 
expense and capitalization of research and development expenditure depends on how 
to divide the research stage and development stage, and firms could use this to 
achieve the purpose of manipulating profits and conducting earnings management. 
Moreover, the amortization of intangible assets by enterprise accounting standards is 
no longer limited to the straight-line method, and the amortization period is no longer 
fixed. Therefore, firms could manipulate their earnings by adjusting the intangible 
assets amortize fixed number of year or method, to manipulate the firm's profits. 
4.2.2.4 Borrowing Costs (Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 17 - Borrowing 
Costs,2006) 
<Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 17 - Borrowing Costs > expand the scope 
of assets capitalization of borrowing costs. Including the fixed assets, investment real 
estate and an inventory which need after a long time to reach the state for use or sale. 
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For example, ships and aircraft are building for a very long time. Thus the related 
borrowing costs are allowed to capitalize. On the other hand, the new standard has 
expanded the scope for capitalized borrowing costs. Loans which can be capitalized 
are no longer limited to special loans, but also include general loans for the 
production of "capitalized assets". 
These two regulations may lead to firms to expand the scope of interest capitalization 
to achieve the purpose of increasing the earnings. Firms could use a specific way to 
make the borrowing costs of general loans meet the requirements of "capitalized 
assets" to achieve the purpose of increasing the earnings. 
4.3Comparison between the New Chinese accounting standard and 
International Accounting Standard 
4.3.1 The comparison of conceptual frameworks 
International accounting standards and most developed countries have a conceptual 
framework as a reference to guide the development of accounting standards. 
The basic standards of Chinese accounting share some similarities with the 
conceptual framework of financial accounting of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards Board and the United States, including the basic concepts and 
principles of accounting assumptions, objectives, the definition of elements, 
recognition and measurement, etc. 
However, there are also differences, and the main ones are listed below. 
Comparison of the new standards with IAS's <Framework for the Preparation of Financial Statements> 
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IAS New Chinese accounting standard 
Name Framework for the Preparation of 
Financial Statements 
Accounting Standard for Business 
Enterprises No. 1- Basic Accounting 
Standard 
Legal status Does not belong to the accounting 
standard component, has no legal effect 
It is a part of the accounting standard, 
belongs to the department regulation 
category, is a legal norm 
Purpose Is the basis for the presentation of 
financial statements prepared by external 
users 
To standardize the formulation of 
specific accounting standards, there 
are no specific accounting standards 
to standardize the accounting 
treatment of transactions or events 
structure It is divided into nine parts: preface, 
introduction, objective of financial 
statement, basic assumption, quality 
characteristics of financial statement, 
elements of financial statement, 
recognition of elements of financial 
statement, measurement of elements of 
financial statement, concept of capital and 
capital preservation 
It is divided into general provisions, 
accounting information quality 
requirements, assets, liabilities, 
owners' equity, income, expenses, 
profits, financial reports, and 
supplementary provisions in ten 
chapters. 
Objectives of The financial statements also reflect the The objectives of financial 
financial fiduciary responsibility of the resources statements are not mentioned in the 
statements entrusted to it by management or the 
implementation of the economic 
responsibility. 
basic standards and are explained in 
the corresponding specific 
accounting standards for financial 
statements. 
The “accounting information quality 
Requirements" clearly indicate that 
enterprise accounting should 
truthfully provide useful information 
about the financial status, operating 
performance, cash flow and other 
aspects of the enterprise to meet the 
information needs of all aspects. 
It helps users to make economic 
decisions and supervise the 




The accrual basis and the going concern 
assumptions are discussed and no other 
accounting assumptions are involved. 
accounting subject, accounting period. 




Assets, liabilities, equity, income and 
expenses are defined separately 
Assets, liabilities, owner's equity, 
income, expenses and profits. 
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statements 
Recognition of Recognition refers to the process in which It is basically the same as the 
financial items are included in the asset statement conceptual framework of 
statement and income statement to meet the criteria international accounting standards 
elements of element definition and recognition. 
The confirmation of five accounting 
elements is discussed in detail. 
Measurement of The process of determining the monetary All assets and liabilities of an 
elements of amount for the purpose of identifying and enterprise shall be measured at their 
financial presenting the elements of the financial actual cost when they are acquired. 
statements statements in the balance sheet and income 
statement. 
Four measurement bases of historical cost, 
current cost, realizable value and present 
value are discussed. 
Except for the replacement cost 
permitted by laws, administrative 
regulations and accounting standards, 
enterprises shall not adjust their book 
value by themselves except for the 
measurement of net realizable value 
and fair value. 
4.3.2 Differences in the content of the accounting standards 
Differences in the content of the accounting standards 
IAS New Chinese accounting standard 
Accounting International accounting standards classify Chinese accounting standard does not 
factor gains and incomes as income and losses have income element, charge is 
classification and expenses as expenses. narrow category, much profit 
difference Income and expense factors are related to 
measurement of business performance. 
The difference between revenue and 
expenses is profit and there is no separate 
profit item. 
element. 
Assets include fixed assets, current 
assets, intangible assets, long-term 
assets and other assets. 
Liabilities are divided into long-term 
liabilities and current liabilities. 
Owners' equity includes surplus 
reserve, invested capital, 
undistributed profit and capital 
reserve, etc. 
Profit, expense and income are 
dynamic factors. 
Inventory International accounting standards take the 
minimum of net realizable value and cost 
as the initial measurement of inventory. 
On the purchase cost, the international 
general "net price method", 
Use the continuous historical cost 
method. 
Use the lump-sum method for 
purchasing costs. 
Fixed assets 1. International accounting standards take 
the working measure method, the 
1.Also includes the sum of years 
method. 
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decreasing balance method and the 
straight line method as the fixed assets 
depreciation method. 
2. The fixed assets shall be priced at the 
end of the period based on revaluation and 
accumulated depreciation. 
3. Conditionally capitalization the repair 
costs of fixed assets. 
2. Exclude revaluation. 
3.The fixed assets repair cost as a 
whole income. 
Ending valuation 1. In IFRS, the end of the period for 1.The ending valuation of short and 
of investment short-term investments is marked by the 
"mark-to-market method" or the 
"mark-to-market method" 
2. For long-term investments, the ending 
valuation is based on a revaluation of 
amount or a revaluation of cost, or a lower 
cost/market valuation of equity securities, 
with book value deducted in the event of a 
non-temporary decline 
medium term investments is based on 
the lower market/cost model 
approach only 
2. The ending valuation method of 
long-term investment shall be 
whichever is lower: recoverable 
amount or book price 
Enterprise Legal rights and interests. Therefore, on There are no accounting standards for 
merger the purchase date, the acquirer shall 
confirm the liabilities and identifiable 
assets. The merger scope of the 
subsidiaries, the exemption scope of the 
parent company's financial statement 
preparation and the listing of equity are 
also changed. 
business combinations. 
The interim <Provisions on 
Consolidated Financial Statements> 
adopt the purchase method in 
consolidated financial statements and 
enterprise merger, but the reality is 
the joint method of equity. 
At the same time, based on the book 
value as the measurement basis, 
according to the appraisal value 
reconciliation narrative 100 percent 
of the equity acquisition. 
Intangible assets International accounting standards deal Research and development costs are 
and other assets with R&D expenses as follows: intangible 
assets are not recognized in the research 
stage. Therefore, expenses are expensed 
and are referred to as gains and losses. 
The development phase may be 
considered as an intangible asset, but the 
expense shall be capitalized and the 
amortization period shall be less than 20 
years. 
To expense start-up costs directly at 
start-up. 
expensed, legal fees, registration fees 
can be considered as actual costs, and 
less than 10 years amortization 
period. 
Collect start-up company fees into 
"long-term deferred expenses" until 
the business is expensed. 
Debt According to international accounting In China, it is capital reserves, and 
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restructuring standards, the difference between debtor's 
debt-servicing assets and debt 
restructuring book value is income and is 
classified as profit. In addition, 
international accounting standards require 
creditors to obtain assets that should be 
initially measured in accordance with fair 
value. 
debtors cannot make profits in debt 
restructuring. 
The assets acquired by the creditor 
shall be initially measured at book 
value. 
Disclosure of International accounting standards classify The guidelines set limits on items 
association as profit and income matters that are that can be counted as income. 
relationships and recognized in accordance with profit and In the transaction, the related debts, 
transactions revenue conditions. 
The exemption of related party transaction 
pricing and inter-enterprise transaction 
disclosure should be abolished. 
expenses, asset sales, transfer of 
receivables and abnormal commodity 
sales cannot be counted as income, 
and the collection of capital 
occupation fees, normal commodity 
sales, related transactions, and the 
amount that can form profit and 
income, etc., are also strictly limited. 
Transactions between state-owned 
enterprises are exempted. 
Borrowing cost 
criteria 
International accounting standards do not 
consider the use of borrowing; borrowing 
costs are clearly defined as expenses. 
Based on satisfying the capitalization 
conditions, borrowing costs may be 
capitalized and other costs expended. 
Borrowing costs may be capitalized 
if they meet the conditions for 
capitalization. 
Income tax The balance sheet liability method is the 
application of income tax in international 
accounting standards, the deferred method 
is banned and the tax payable law is 
abolished. 
No income tax accounting standards, 
but according to the relevant 
provisions, tax payable method is 
optional, tax impact accounting 
method may also be optional. More 
enterprises adopt the tax payable 
method. 
(<Accounting Standards for Enterprises>, 2006, <International Accounting 
Standards>,1984) 
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4.4Developing the Jones model model to measure EM based on the Chinese accounting 
standards 
4.4.1. Developing the measure of total accruals 
According to the 《 Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 30 - Presentation of 
Financial Statements,2006》, the net income is calculated as follows: 
Operating profit = operating revenue – (operating cost + business tax and surcharges 
+ selling expenses + administration expense+ financial expense+ assets impairment 
loss) + (the profits and losses on the changes in fair value + the investment gains) 
(23) 
Net income = operating profit + non-business income - non-business expenditure – 
income tax (24) 
In the cash flow statement, firm’s cash flow is divided into three parts: cash flow from 
operating, cash flow from investment and cash flow from financing (Accounting 
standards for enterprises No.31- Cash flow statements, Article 4,2006). The income 
from investing is calculated in cash flow from investment but not cash flow from 
operating (Accounting standards for enterprises No.31- Cash flow statements, Article 
13,2006). Thus, in Jones model and modified Jones model, the income from investing 
has been calculated as total accruals (TA). 
Moreover, as the income from investing is not belonging to the operating revenue, so 
they are calculated as discretionary accruals (DA). However, the income from 
65 
investment is determined by cash basis, and this part of earnings has been realized by 
cash inflow. According to the assumption of earnings management, the income from 
investing does not belong to total accruals. 
Therefore. this study presents: 
TAt= NIt – CFOt – CFIt (25) 
Where is: TAt is the total accruals of year t; NTt is the net profit of year t; CFOt is the 
cash flow from operating of year t; the CFIt is the cash flow from investing of year t. 
4.4.2 Developing the measure of NDA 
Like operating revenue, fixed assets, intangible assets and long-term assets, there are 
some items related to income from investing like the benefits of fair value change, 
dividend receivable and interest receivable. As stipulated in the new accounting 
standards, if there is a short-term investment, like the investment of real estate or 
share, the profit will be calculated as income from investing when the short-term 
investment has been sold (Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 23 - Transfer of 
Financial Assets, Article 13,2006). If the firm keeps holding the short-term investment, 
the change of market value will be calculated as the benefits of fair value change at 
the end of the accounting year (Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 23 -
Transfer of Financial Assets, Article 12,2006). Which meaning, the non-discretionary 
accruals are related to an investment in revenue. Moreover, as a part of firm’s revenue, 
like the operating revenue, if the firm’s income from investing is stable, the 
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non-discretionary will remain stable. Thus, the non-discretionary accruals are related 
to the change of income from investing. 
Therefore, this study presents the investment matched Jones model and investment 
matched Lu jianqiao model. 
The investment matched Jones model presents as: 
 l     m 
m i   
  ⺁   t  ⺁    i   
  ⺁ i   
   ⺁   (26) 
l tm l tm l tm l tm l tm 
NDA is the l , and the DA is the residue error of the TA. The regression is regressed by each 
year and industry, respectively. 
Where is: TAt is the total accruals of year t; NTtis the net profit of year t; CFOtis the 
cash flow from operating of year t; CFItis the cash flow from investing of year t; 
NDAtis the none-discretionary accruals of year t; At-1is the total assets of year t-1; 
ΔREVt is the change of operation revenue between year t and year t-1;ΔRECt is the 
change of receivable between year t and year t-1; PPEtis the original value of fixed 
assets; DAtis the discretionary accruals of year t. ΔINVtis the change of income from 
investing between year t and year t-1. 
The investment matched Lu jianqiao model presents as: 
 l     m 
m i   
  ⺁   t  ⺁    i   
  ⺁   i    
 l  i   
   ⺁  27) 
l tm l tm l tm l tm l tm  l tm
NDA is the l , and the DA is the residue error of the TA. The regression is regressed by each 
year and industry, respectively. 
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Where is: AItis the intangible assets and other long-term assets of year t, before 2007, 
the other long-term assets is measured as long-term assets, and after 2007 the other 
long-term assets is measured as: Financial assets available for sale + held-to-maturity 
securities + Long-term investment on stocks. 
4.4.3 Compare the now model with previous improved Jones models 
According to the assumption of the Jones model, the total accruals is the amount 
remaining from the total profit after subtracting the revenue to be realized (cash flow). 
As IAS and the new accounting standards on the measurement of profits in different 
ways, the net income is bound to be different. The main reason is the recognition of 
loss and gain. Under the IAS rule, losses and gains are not included in current profits 
and thus they are do not affect total accruals. However, under the rules of new 
Chinese accounting standards, losses and gains are recorded as part of the total profits 
of the current period. 
If the income is realized, it will be included in the cash flow from the investment 
(CFI). If the researcher is still used the Jones model to calculate the total accruals 
(TA=NI-CFO), the cash flow recorded in the CFI will not be excluded from the total 
accrual. In other words, under the rules of new Chinese accounting standards, the 
Jones model does not measure the total accruals accurately. 
If the company's CFI is positive, then the Jones model measures total accruals as 
higher than the actual value, and if the company's CFI is negative, then the Jones 
model measures total accruals as lower. This is the Jones model's first weakness in the 
Chinese market. 
Second, the investment is also not conceded when the Jones models measure NDA. 
Since it is not estimated, the CFI that was not excluded from total accruals in step 1 
will be fully classified as DA in this step. If the CFI of the company is positive, then 
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the DA measured by the Jones model is higher than the actual value; if the CFI of the 
company is negative, then the total accruals measured by the Jones model is lower 
than the actual value. This is The second weakness of Jones in the Chinese market. 
In view of the above two weaknesses, the newly established model eliminated CFI 
from the total accruals in the first step (TA= NI-CFO-CFI) and introduced the 
variable change of income from investment in the second step to solving the second 
weakness of the Jones model. 
Therefore, in theory, the new model under the rules of the Chinese market is superior 
to the Jones model. 
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4.5 Model Specification 
4.5.1Sample selection 
This study uses all Chinese listed firms from 2001 to 2016 as the research sample and 
eliminates firms with missing data. The total sample is 28429 firm-years observations. 
All data come from firms’ balance statement, income statement and cash flow 
statement, and all statement comes from the CSMAR database. Table1 is the summary 
statistics of variables used to estimate discretionary accruals. 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of Variables Used to Estimate Discretionary Accruals 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Median Max 
TAt/At-1 28463 -0.01099 0.104601 -0.35767 -0.01431 0.384791 
TA’t/At-1 28463 0.068957 0.16128 -0.35557 0.047238 0.746714 
1/At-i 28463 0.738511 0.609932 0.029116 0.585396 3.71315 
ΔREVt/At-1 28463 7.63E-10 9.13E-10 3.70E-12 4.80E-10 5.80E-09 
(ΔREVt-ΔRECt)/At-1 28463 0.085899 0.244731 -0.48762 0.045434 1.42938 
PPEt/At-1 28463 0.289982 0.208272 0.002725 0.250477 0.955096 
AIt/At-1 28463 0.142231 0.16077 0 0.086673 0.890694 
ROAt 28463 0.051335 0.222801 -1.5 0.0269 1.08 
ΔINVt/At-1 28463 0.001607 0.020661 -0.07932 0 0.110297 
Where is: TAt is the discretionary accruals of year t which measured by TA= NI-CFO; TA’t is the discretionary accruals of year t 
which measured by TA= NI-CFO-CFI; At-1 is the total assets of year t-1; ΔREVt is the change of operation revenue between year t and 
year t-1; ΔRECt is the change of receivable between year t and year t-1; PPEt is the original value of fixed assets of year t. AIt is the 
intangible assets and other long-term assets of year t, before 2007, the other long-term assets are measured as long-term assets, and 
after 2007 the other long-term assets are measured as: Financial assets available for sale + held-to-maturity securities + Long-term 
investment on stocks. ΔIVEt is the change of income from investment between year t and t-1year. 
In Table 4.1, both the mean and median of TAt/At-1 is negative. The mean of is 
-0.01099, and the median is -0.01431. It is shown that in Chinese market most firms 
are in a deficit state. However, when the cash flow form investment has been moved 
from the total accruals, the total accruals changed from negative to positive. The mean 
of TA’t/A t-1 is 0.068957 and the median of TA’ t/A t-1 is 0.047238. This result proves 
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that the payment of investment and cash paid for the purchase and construction of 
fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets are much larger than the 
income of the investment. Firms tend to use investment and purchase assets to 
downward their earnings. 
Compare the value of fixed assets and the intangible assets and other long-term assets. 
The mean of AI t/A t-1 is 0.142231 and the mean of PPE t/A t-1 is 0.289982, the value of 
the mean of AI t/A t-1 is about half of the value of the mean of PPE t/A t-1. For the 
median, the median of AI t/A t-1 is 0.086673 and the median of PPE t/A t-1 is 0.250477, 
the value of the median of AI t/A t-1 is about one-third of the value of the median of 
PPE t/A t-1. It is shown that in Chinese market firm’s intangible assets and other 
long-term assets is an essential component of firm’s assets. Thus, it clouds expected 
that the Lu jianqiao model could improve the power of Jones model to detect the 
firm’s earnings management. 
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4.5.2 Empirical results 
4.5.2.1 Non-discretionary accruals 
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 are the non-discretionary accruals measured by different 
models. Table 4.2 is using the TAt to regression betas of above models, and the Table 
4.3 is using the TA’t to regression betas of above models. These models’ betas are 
regression by year and industry, respectively. Especially, for the performance-matched 
Jones model, according to the collinearity between ROAt and 1/At-1, in some year and 
industry, the beta of ROAt is omitted. The same result also be found in other research 
(Wang Shengnian, Bai Jun 2009). For this reason, in some year and industry, the 
non-discretionary accrual measured by performance-matched Jones model is as same 
as modified Jones model. 
In Table 4.2, it shows that the mean of non-discretionary of modified Jones model is 
higher than another model. The reason is modified Jones model is ignoring the 
amortization and depreciation of intangible assets, other long-term assets, and 
long-term investment. The Lu jianqiao model is considered the amortization and 
depreciation of intangible assets and other long-term assets. The investment-matched 
model considers the amortization and depreciation of long-term investment. 
Comparing to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, the non-discretionary actuals of Table 4.3 is 
higher than the non-discretionary accruals of Table 4.2. It shows that as the exist of 
cash flow form investment in total accruals, the discretionary accruals have been 
over-valuation. 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics of the Non-Discretionary Accruals Measured by Different Models 





Jones model 28429 -0.01197 0.034579 0.001196 -0.10695 -0.03219 -0.0125 0.005916 0.102788 
Modified Jones model 28429 0.003596 0.066089 0.004368 -0.2013 -0.03307 0.005878 0.036524 0.230472 
Performance-matched Jones model 28429 -0.01138 0.073198 0.005358 -0.27621 -0.04545 -0.00476 0.024605 0.208362 
Lu Jianqiao model 28429 0.002999 0.066904 0.004476 -0.20186 -0.03413 0.005219 0.036402 0.230684 
Investment-matched Jones model 28429 0.002961 0.068405 0.004679 -0.21014 -0.0337 0.005526 0.037484 0.230776 
Investment-matched Lujianqiao model 28429 -0.01392 0.039314 0.001546 -0.13249 -0.03558 -0.0134 0.005552 0.122737 
The total accruals are measured by TAt = NIt – CFOt; where the TAt is the total accruals, NIt is the net income, CFOt is the cash flow from the operating. 
Table 4.3: Summary Statistics of the Non-Discretionary Accruals Measured by Different Models 





Jones model 28429 0.06521 0.051479 0.00265 -0.05614 0.033988 0.059475 0.088522 0.270571 
Modified Jones model 28429 0.058028 0.057618 0.00332 -0.07003 0.02249 0.050165 0.083569 0.303739 
performance-matched Jones model 28429 0.058559 0.074003 0.005476 -0.2471 0.024295 0.054247 0.089602 0.330447 
Lu Jianqiao model 28429 0.062644 0.059715 0.003566 -0.0766 0.027771 0.055467 0.087842 0.312636 
Investment-matched Jones model 28429 0.058256 0.060914 0.003711 -0.09446 0.022431 0.051451 0.08542 0.308542 
Investment-matched Lujianqiao model 28429 0.06267 0.062736 0.003936 -0.09705 0.027257 0.056028 0.088998 0.319337 
The total accruals are measured by TA’t = NIt – CFOt – CFIt; where the TAt is the total accruals, NIt is the net income, CFOt is the cash flow from the operating, CFIt is the cash flow from investing of 
year t. 
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4.5.2.2 Discretionary accruals 
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 are the discretionary accruals measured by different models. 
Table 4.4 is using the TAt to regression betas of above models to measure the 
non-discretionary accruals and use TAt/At-1 – NDAt/At-1 to measure the discretionary 
accruals, and Table 4.5 is using the TA’t to regression betas of above models to 
measure the non-discretionary accruals and use TA’t/At-1 – NDAt/At-1 to measure 
discretionary accruals. 
From Table 4.4, it shows that the mean and median of discretionary accruals of 
modified Jones model, Lu jianqiao model and investment-matched model are negative. 
Which mean firms tend to downward their accruals. However, as the research of 
frequency division of firms' ROE, firms have an incentive to upward their earnings, 
especially the ROE is less than 0 and 6%. These two results contradict each other. 
Overall, the result of investment-matched Lu jianqiao model coincides with the result 
of frequency division. 
In Table 4.5, this study can find that when this study removed the cash flow from 
investing from total accruals, the mean of discretionary accruals of all models are 
positive and the median of discretionary accruals are negative. The result shows that 
most firms tend to upward their earnings which coincide with the result of frequency 
division. 
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics of the Discretionary Accruals Measured by Different Models 





Jones model 28429 0.000699 0.092943 0.008638 -0.30833 -0.42572 0.000267 0.043846 0.314602 
Modified Jones model 28429 -0.01443 0.108253 0.011719 -0.34405 -0.69241 -0.01371 0.039908 0.332726 
Performance-matched Jones model 28429 0.000503 0.098378 0.009678 -0.28751 -0.05208 -0.00262 0.048379 0.337124 
Lu Jianqiao model 28429 -0.01376 0.107567 0.011571 -0.34093 -0.06801 -0.01335 0.039873 0.332073 
Investment-matched Jones model 28429 -0.01373 0.106026 0.011242 -0.33709 -0.06835 -0.01322 0.039414 0.326869 
Investment-matched Lujianqiao model 28429 0.002746 0.089827 0.008069 -0.29146 -0.09494 0.001831 0.044985 0.301659 
Thetotal accruals are measured by TAt = NIt – CFOt; where the TAt is the total accruals, NIt is the net income, CFOt is the cash flow from the operating. 
Table 4.5: Summary Statistics of the Discretionary Accruals Measured by Different Models 





Jones model 28429 0.002572 0.144189 0.02079 -0.35859 -0.08069 -0.01116 0.069997 0.508467 
Modified Jones model 28429 0.009767 0.143724 0.020657 -0.35617 -0.07312 -0.00282 0.079123 0.511835 
performance-matched Jones model 28429 0.009545 0.133962 0.017946 -0.31458 -0.0708 -0.00557 0.07212 0.484983 
Lu Jianqiao model 28429 0.004973 0.140604 0.019769 -0.35658 -0.07685 -0.00716 0.073256 0.487862 
Investment-matched Jones model 28429 0.009622 0.141787 0.020104 -0.3481 -0.07327 -0.00287 0.078189 0.50284 
Investment-matched Lujianqiao model 28429 0.005047 0.138907 0.019295 -0.34927 -0.07665 -0.00673 0.072404 0.482855 
Thetotal accruals are measured by TA’t = NIt – CFOt – CFIt; where the TAt is the total accruals, NIt is the net income, CFOt is the cash flow from the operating, CFIt is the cash flow from investing of 
year t. 
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4.6 Frequency division test 
4.6.1 Expected frequency division of ROE 
If Xt is true earnings of the listed company, according to the central limit theorem, in 
large sample cases, Xt obey normal distribution, the distribution characteristics are the 
closer from the mean, the higher frequency distribution; the farther away from the 
mean, the lower frequency distribution. If the probability density function of Xt is 
F(Xt), the Xt is subject to N [μ, σ2], this function obeys normal distribution and has 
continuity in the distribution interval. Assuming that the firm has a kind of incentives 
to manipulate its earnings, the expected reporting earnings is Xr, and the value of 
manipulated earnings is Xd, then it is: 
Xd = Xr– Xt (28) 
Due to the incentives of listed firms to manipulate earnings are different, some firms 
tend to upward their earnings and some firms tend to downward their earnings, 
obviously Xd distribution function F(Xd) on the spatial distribution is discontinuous, 
finally led to the earnings after the earnings management Xr on the frequency 
distribution of discontinuous. 
For the test of the effect of above models, this study will use the discretionary 
accruals to adjust firms ROE. If the measure of discretionary accruals is effective, the 
frequency division of adjusted ROE will be a normal distribution. 
Firstly, this study will use the net income to minus discretionary accruals to get the 
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adjusted net income as: 
Adjusted net income = net income – discretionary accruals (29) 
After that, it will measure the adjusted ROE as: 
Adjusted ROE = Adjusted net income / equity (30) 
As the research of frequency division, Gu Zhenwei, Qin Mo et al. (2008) proved that 
in the Chinese market, firms with negative ROE have an incentive to upward their 
earnings. according to the announcement of Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen 
stock exchange in 1998, there is a “special treatment” for the listed firm which with 
an abnormal financial condition. For the listed firm with a deficit in two consecutive 
years, it's stock name will be prefixed with "ST", and if the listed firm with a deficit in 
three consecutive years, it's stock name will be prefixed with "*ST" and be warned 
with delisting. Thus, the frequency of firms with negative ROE will abnormally low 
and the frequency of slightly above 0 will be abnormal high. 
Moreover, according to the《 Measures for the Administration of the Issuance of 
Securities by Listed Companies》(2000), for the secondary equity offering, the average 
of ROE of three years must above 6% after 2001. Therefore, the firm which ROE is 
slightly less than 6% has an incentive to upward their earnings and the frequency of 
firms' ROE slightly higher than 6% will abnormally high. 
At last, for the listed firm with a high return, there is an incentive to downward their 
earnings as the tax burden (Li Jun 2005, Zhou Zejiang 2012). Firms tend to downward 
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their earnings by increasing their investment as buy new assets or increasing research 
and development cost (Li Zengfu, Dong Zhiqiang et al. 2011). Thus, the number of 
firms with a high value of ROE will lower than the number of firms with low ROE. 
According to above discussion, there are two peak point expected in the area above 0 
and 0.06, respectively. A cross point of ROE and adjusted ROE has been expected at 
the right area of peak point 0, and the other cross point of ROE and adjusted ROE has 
been expected at the left area of pear point 0.06. 
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4.6.2 Frequency division test 
Table 4.6: Summary Statistics of ROE and ROE adjusted by discretionary accruals of different models 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Lower Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile Max 
ROE 28463 0.053115 0.18443 0.034015 -1.10803 0.024561 0.065544 0.113909 0.654396 
Jones model adjusted ROE 28463 -0.01388 0.244711 0.059883 -1.22677 -0.07289 0.002098 0.072316 0.826411 
Modified Jones model adjusted ROE 28463 -0.04 0.286805 0.082257 -1.41364 -0.11837 -0.01817 0.068064 0.916927 
performance-matched Jones model 
adjusted ROE 28463 -0.00584 0.24409 0.05958 -1.03749 -0.08673 -0.00267 0.084363 0.904506 
Lu Jianqiao model adjusted ROE 28463 -0.03634 0.284355 0.080858 -1.36223 -0.11551 -0.01764 0.06816 0.951129 
Investment-matched Jones model 
adjusted ROE 28463 -0.03835 0.280846 0.078875 -1.37036 -0.11713 -0.01768 0.067039 0.900461 
Investment-matched Lujianqiao model 
adjusted ROE 28463 -0.00533 0.235996 0.055694 -1.14724 -0.06777 0.004566 0.075296 0.838118 
Thetotal accruals are measured by TAt = NIt – CFOt; where the TAt is the total accruals, NIt is the net income, CFOt is the cash flow from the operating. 
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Table 4.7: Summary Statistics of ROE and ROE adjusted by discretionary accruals of different models 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Variance Min Lower Quartile Median 
Upper 
Quartile Max 
ROE 28463 0.053115 0.18443 0.034015 -1.10803 0.024561 0.065544 0.113909 0.654396 
Jones model adjusted ROE 28463 0.06188 0.366847 0.134577 -1.39986 -0.07216 0.075993 0.214822 1.43607 
Modified Jones model adjusted ROE 28463 0.043025 0.366559 0.134366 -1.42648 -0.08899 0.060484 0.195915 1.42392 
performance-matched Jones model 
adjusted ROE 28463 0.039969 0.398103 0.158486 -1.71449 -0.09089 0.066817 0.204338 1.49824 
Lu Jianqiao model adjusted ROE 28463 0.05335 0.363862 0.132395 -1.39319 -0.07786 0.068605 0.203078 1.47053 
Investment-matched Jones model 
adjusted ROE 28463 0.042376 0.36528 0.133429 -1.43439 -0.09033 0.060989 0.196406 1.392 
Investment-matched Lujianqiao model 
adjusted ROE 28463 0.052667 0.362223 0.131205 -1.40455 -0.07889 0.068682 0.202622 1.43446 
Thetotal accruals are measured by TA’t = NIt – CFOt – CFIt; where the TAt is the total accruals, NIt is the net income, CFOt is the cash flow from the operating, CFIt is the cash flow from investing 
of year t. 
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Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 are summary statistics of ROE and ROE adjusted by 
discretionary accruals of different models. Table 4.6is using the TAt to regression 
betas of above models to measure the non-discretionary accruals and use TAt/At-1 – 
NDAt/At-1 to measure the discretionary accruals. The Table 4.7 is using the TA’t to 
regression betas of above models to measure the non-discretionary accruals and use 
TA’t/At-1 – NDAt/At-1 to measure discretionary accruals. 
Figure 4.1 is the frequency division of ROE. Figure 4.1 has shown that most firms 
ROE are between point 0 and point 0.2. In the frequency division of the area from 
point 0.02 to point 0, there is an abnormal discontinuous that the value is decreasing 
from 3218 firms to 329 firms. It proves that firms upward their earnings from less 
than 0 to slightly above 0. The mean of ROE is 0.053 and the peak value is 3493 firms 
between point 0.08 and point 0.06, and there is a sharp increase between point 0.3 and 
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point 0.08, the value is from 125 firms to 3493 firms. It proves that firms with high 
return tend to downward their ROE and keeping it slightly above 0.06. The result is as 
expect 
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Figure 4.2 is the frequency division of ROE and Jones model adjusted ROE. The series 1 is the frequency division 
of ROE, and the series 2 is the frequency division of Jones model adjusted ROE. The Jones model is using the TAt 
= NIt – CFOt to regression betas to measure the non-discretionary accruals and use TAt/At-1 – NDAt/At-1 to measure 
the discretionary accruals. 
After adjusted by the discretionary accruals of Jones model, the discontinuous of the 
negative area has been removed, the peak value is 2438 firms between point 0 and 
point -0.02. The change from the point 0 to negative points is more smooth than the 
frequency division of ROE. The cross point of series 1 and series 2 is between point 0 
and point 0.02 which meaning that that firms with negative ROE tend to upward their 
earnings to above 0. However, above point 0.06, there is no cross between the series 1 
and series 2, which mean the discontinuous above point 0.06 to point 0.3 is not as 
83 
firms with high return downward their earnings, but as firms with a slight return or 
negative return upward their earnings. 
In conclusion, Figure 4.2 shown that in the Chinese market, Jones model could detect 
the earnings management of firms with a slight or negative return. For high returns 
firms, Jones model is failed to detect the earnings management. 
Figure 4.3 is the frequency division of ROE and modified Jones model adjusted ROE. The series 1 is the frequency 
division of ROE, and the series 2 is the frequency division of modified Jones model adjusted ROE. The modified 
Jones model is using the TAt = NIt – CFOt to regression betas to measure the non-discretionary accruals, and use 
TAt/At-1 – NDAt/At-1 to measure the discretionary accruals. 
After adjusted by the discretionary accruals of modified Jones model, the peak value 
of ROE is changed from 3493 firms between point 0.08 and point 0.06 to 1947 firms 
between point 0 and point -0.02. The cross point of series 1 and series 2 is between 
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point 0 and point 0.02. The change from above point 0 to negative points is more 
smooth than the frequency division of ROE and Jones model adjusted ROE. It is 
shown that the modified Jones model could detect earnings management of firms with 
a slight or negative return better than Jones model. However, as same as Jones model, 
the modified Jones model also fails to detect firms’ earnings management in the area 
of high value of ROE. 
Figure4.4 is the frequency division of ROE and modified Jones model adjusted ROE. The series 1 is the frequency 
division of ROE, and the series 2 is the frequency division of modified Jones model adjusted ROE. The modified 
Jones model is using the TAt = NIt – CFOt to regression betas to measure the non-discretionary accruals, and use 
TAt/At-1 – NDAt/At-1 to measure the discretionary accruals. 
When this study regressing betas of performance matched Jones model, according to 
the collinearity between ROAt and 1/At-1, in some year and industry, the beta of 
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ROAtis omitted. The same result also is found in other research (Wang Shengnian, Bai 
Jun 2009). As betas of performance matched Jones model is regression by year and 
industry, respectively. There are 261 year-industry groups, the beta of ROAt is omitted 
in 132 year-industry groups. According to the missing value of beta, in these 132 
year-industry groups, the performance matched Jones model is same as modified 
Jones model. 
After adjusted by performance matched Jones model, the peak value of ROE is 
changed from 3493 firms between point 0.08 and point 0.06 to 2126 firms between 
point 0 and point -0.02. The cross point of series 1 and series 2 is between point 0 and 
point 0.02. Moreover, there is a cross between the series 1 and series 2 at point 0.26, it 
is shown that firms tend to downward their earnings which ROE is higher than 0.26. 
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Figure4.5 is the frequency division of ROE and Lu jianqiao model adjusting ROE. The series 1 is the frequency 
division of ROE, and the series 2 is the frequency division of Lu jianqiao model adjusting ROE. The Lu jianqiao 
model is using the TAt = NIt – CFOt to regression betas to measure the non-discretionary accruals, and use TAt/At-1 
– NDAt/At-1 to measure the discretionary accruals. 
After adjusted by the discretionary accruals of Lu jianqiao model, the peak value of 
ROE is changed from 3493 firms between point 0.08 and point 0.06 to 1960 firms 
between point 0 and point -0.02. The cross point of series 1 and series 2 is between 
point 0 and point 0.02. However, as same as Jones model and the modified Jones 
model, the series 1 has not cross with series 2 at the area of high ROE. The Lu 
jianqiao model also fails to detect firms’ earnings management in the area of high 
value of ROE. 
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Figure 4.6 is the frequency division of ROE and investment matched Jones model adjusted ROE. The series 1 is 
the frequency division of ROE, and the series 2 is the frequency division of investment matched Jones model 
adjusted ROE. The investment matched Jones model is using the TAt = NIt – CFOt to regression betas to measure 
the non-discretionary accruals, and use TAt/At-1 – NDAt/At-1 to measure the discretionary accruals. 
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After adjusted by the discretionary accruals of invest matched Jones model, the peak 
value of ROE is changed from 3493 firms between point 0.08 and point 0.06 to 1982 
firms between point 0 and point -0.02. The cross point of series 1 and series 2 is 
between point 0 and point 0.02. There is no cross point of series 1 and series 2 in the 
area above point 0.However, the investment matched Jones model also fails to detect 
firms’ earnings management in the area of high value of ROE. 
Figure 4.7 is the frequency division of ROE and investment matched Lu jianqiao model adjusted ROE. The series 
1 is the frequency division of ROE, and the series 2 is the frequency division of investment matched Lu jianqiao 
model adjusted ROE. The investment matched Lu jianqiao model is using the TAt = NIt – CFOt to regression betas 
to measure the non-discretionary accruals, and use TAt/At-1 – NDAt/At-1 to measure the discretionary accruals 
After adjusted by the discretionary accruals of invest matched Jones model, the peak 
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value of ROE is changed from 3493 firms between point 0.08 and point 0.06 to 2463 
firms between point 0 and point -0.02. The cross point of series 1 and series 2 is 
between point 0 and point 0.02. There is no cross point of series 1 and series 2 in the 
area above point 0. As same as above models, investment matched Lu jianqiao model 
is failed to detect earnings management of firms with high earnings. 
According to the above frequency division test, in conclusion, both models could 
detect earnings management of firms with low earnings or negative earnings. For 
firms with high earnings, the effect of both models is weak. The reason for this result 
is the undervaluation of total accruals. As the incentive of tax avoidance, high 
earnings firms tend to down their taxable income through purchase and construction 
of fixed assets or make equity investment (Li Zengfu, Dong Zhiqiang et al. 2011). 
However, the cash paid for purchase and construction of fixed assets and payment for 
investment does not belong to cash flow from operating but cash flow from investing. 
When this study measure total accruals as net income minus cash flow from operating, 
the cash flow from investing will be measured part of total accruals and due to an 
error for measure discretionary accruals. For firms with slight earnings or negative 
earnings, above models are worked to detect firm’ s earnings management because the 
behaver of investment is less and the error is small. As the increase in earnings, the 
behaver of investment is increasing and the error is bigger. Thus, above models are 
failed to detect earnings management of firms with high earnings. 
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Figure 4.8 is the frequency division of ROE and ROE adjusted by Jones model. The series 1 is the frequency 
division of ROE, and the series 2 is the frequency division of ROE adjusted by Jones model. The Jones model is 
using the TA’t = NIt – CFOt - CFIt to regression betas to measure the non-discretionary accruals, and use TA’t/At-1 – 
NDAt/At-1 to measure the discretionary accruals. 
In figure 4.8, the frequencydivision of ROE adjusted by Jones model which measured 
by TA’ shown that the peak point moved from 3493 firms between point 0.06 and 
point 0.08 to 1170 firms between point 0.08 and point 0.1. There are two cross points 
of series 1 and series 2. The first cross point of series 1 and series 2 is between point 0 
and point 0.02. It shown that firms with negative earnings tend to upward their 
earnings to above 0. The second cross point of series 1 and series 2 is between point 
0.16 and point 0.18. In figure 4.8, at the left area of point 0.18, series 2 is above series 
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1 which meaning firms with high earnings tend to downward their earnings. The 
result of frequency division of ROE adjusted by Jones model is as expected. 
Figure 4.9 is the frequency division of ROE and ROE adjusted by modified Jones model. The series 1 is the 
frequency division of ROE, and the series 2 is the frequency division of ROE adjusted by modified Jones model. 
The modified Jones model is using the TA’t = NIt – CFOt - CFIt to regression betas to measure the 
non-discretionary accruals, and use TA’t/At-1 – NDAt/At-1 to measure the discretionary accruals. 
In Figure 4.9, the frequencydivision of ROE adjusted by modified Jones model which 
measured by TA’ shown that the peak point moved from 3493 firms between point 
0.06 and point 0.08 to 1212 firms between point 0.08 and point 0.1. There are two 
cross points of series 1 and series 2. The first cross point of series 1 and series 2 is 
between point 0 and point 0.02. It shown that firms with negative earnings tend to 
upward their earnings to above 0. The second cross point of series 1 and series 2 is 
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between point 0.18 and point 0.2. figure 4.9, at the left area of point 0.18, series 2 is 
above series 1 which meaning firms with high earnings tend to downward their 
earnings. The result of frequency division ROE and ROE adjusted by modified Jones 
model is as expected. 
Figure 4.10 is the frequency division of ROE and ROE adjusted by performance matched Jones model. The series 
1 is the frequency division of ROE, and the series 2 is the frequency division of ROE adjusted by performance 
matched Jones model. The performance matched Jones model is using the TA’t = NIt – CFOt - CFIt to regression 
betas to measure the non-discretionary accruals, and use TA’t/At-1 – NDAt/At-1 to measure the discretionary 
accruals. 
Figure 4.10, the frequencydivision of ROE adjusted by performance matched Jones 
model which measured by TA’ shown that the peak point moved from 3493 firms 
between point 0.06 and point 0.08 to 1059 firms between point 0.06 and point 0.08. 
There are two cross points of series 1 and series 2. The first cross point of series 1 and 
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series 2 is between point 0 and point 0.02. It shown that firms with negative earnings 
tend to upward their earnings to above 0. The second cross point of series 1 and series 
2 is between point 0.18 and point 0.2. It shown that firms with high earnings tend to 
downward their earnings. The result of frequency division ROE and ROE adjusted by 
performance matched Jones model is as expected. 
Figure 4.11 is the frequency division of ROE and ROE adjusted by Lu jianqiao model. The series 1 is the 
frequency division of ROE, and the series 2 is the frequency division of ROE adjusted by Lu jianqiao model. The 
Lu jianqiao model is using the TA’t = NIt – CFOt - CFIt to regression betas to measure the non-discretionary 
accruals, and use TA’t/At-1 – NDAt/At-1 to measure the discretionary accruals. 
In figure 4.11, the frequencydivision of ROE adjusted by Lu jianqiao model which 
measured by TA’ shown that the peak point moved from 3493 firms between point 
0.06 and point 0.08 to 1249 firms between point 0.08 and point 0.1. There are two 
94 
cross points of series 1 and series 2. The first cross point of series 1 and series 2 is 
between point 0 and point 0.02. It shown that firms with negative earnings tend to 
upward their earnings to above 0. The second cross point of series 1 and series 2 is 
between point 0.18 and point 0.2. It shown that firms with high earnings tend to 
downward their earnings. The result of frequency division ROE and ROE adjusted by 
performance Jones model is as expected. 
Figure 4.12 is the frequency division of ROE and ROE adjusted by investment matched Jones model. The series 1 
is the frequency division of ROE, and the series 2 is the frequency division of ROE adjusted by investment 
matched Jones model. The investment matched Jones model is using the TA’t = NIt – CFOt - CFIt to regression 
betas to measure the non-discretionary accruals, and use TA’t/At-1 – NDAt/At-1 to measure the discretionary 
accruals. 
In Figure 4.12, the frequencydivision of ROE adjusted by investment matched Jones 
model which measured by TA’ shown that the peak point moved from 3493 firms 
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between point 0.06 and point 0.08 to 1196 firms between point 0.08 and point 0.1. 
There are two cross points of series 1 and series 2. The first cross point of series 1 and 
series 2 is between point 0 and point 0.02. It shown that firms with negative earnings 
tend to upward their earnings to above 0. The second cross point of series 1 and series 
2 is between point 0.18 and point 0.2. It shown that firms with high earnings tend to 
downward their earnings. The result of frequency division ROE and ROE adjusted by 
investment matched Jones model is as expected. 
Figure 4.13 is the frequency division of ROE and ROE adjusted by investment matched Lu jianqiao model. The 
series 1 is the frequency division of ROE, and the series 2 is the frequency division of ROE adjusted by investment 
matched Lu jianqiao model. The investment matched Jones model is using the TA’t = NIt – CFOt - CFIt to 
regression betas to measure the non-discretionary accruals, and use TA’t/At-1 – NDAt/At-1 to measure the 
discretionary accruals. 
In figure 4.13, the frequencydivision of ROE adjusted by investment matched Lu 
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jianqiao model which measured by TA’ shown that the peak point moved from 3493 
firms between point 0.06 and point 0.08 to 1220 firms between point 0.08 and point 
0.1. There are two cross points of series 1 and series 2. The first cross point of series 1 
and series 2 is between point 0 and point 0.02. It shown that firms with negative 
earnings tend to upward their earnings to above 0. The second cross point of series 1 
and series 2 is between point 0.18 and point 0.2. It shown that firms with high 
earnings tend to downward their earnings. The result of frequency division ROE and 
ROE adjusted by investment matched Lu jianqiao model is as expected. 
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Table4.8: The statistics results of ROE and adjusted ROE by various models 
Std. Skewness Kurtosis Variance Dev. 
ROE -3.11282 21.82084 0.185164 0.034286 
Jones model adjusted ROE -1.28629 11.87498 0.236046 0.055718 
Modified Jones model adjusted ROE -1.18904 10.59345 0.277092 0.07678 
performance-matched Jones model adjusted ROE -0.32112 8.774709 0.234643 0.055058 
Lu Jianqiao model adjusted ROE -1.04351 10.23306 0.27533 0.075807 
Investment-matched Jones model adjusted ROE -1.12148 10.33368 0.271038 0.073462 
Investment-matched Lujianqiao model adjusted ROE -1.03005 11.25331 0.228566 0.052243 
Thetotal accruals are measured by TAt = NIt – CFOt; where the TAt is the total accruals, NIt is the net income, CFOt is the cash flow from the 
operating. 
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Table 4.9: The statistics results of ROE and adjusted ROE by various models 
Std. Skewness Kurtosis Variance Dev. 
ROE -3.11282 21.82084 0.185164 0.034286 
Jones model adjusted ROE -0.35027 7.860083 0.359999 0.129599 
Modified Jones model adjusted ROE -0.37631 8.019962 0.358466 0.128498 
performance-matched Jones model adjusted ROE -0.76286 9.195141 0.390257 0.152301 
Lu Jianqiao model adjusted ROE -0.28906 8.171685 0.354976 0.126008 
Investment-matched Jones model adjusted ROE -0.42528 7.929932 0.358293 0.128374 
Investment-matched Lujianqiao model adjusted ROE -0.35035 8.091513 0.354666 0.125788 
Thetotal accruals are measured by TA’t = NIt – CFOt – CFIt; where the TAt is the total accruals, NIt is the net income, CFOt is the cash flow from the operating, CFIt is the cash flow from investing 
of year t. 
Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 present the statistics results of ROE and adjusted ROE by each model. 
The value of the distribution’s peak point is more close to the mean of ROE when the 
skewness value is more close to zero. The distribution is more close to the normal distribution 
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when the kurtosis value is more close to three. When the kurtosis value equals to three, 
the distribution is the normal distribution. In Table 4.8, the skewness value of 
performance-matched Jones model adjusted ROE -0.32112 is the smallest one and its 
kurtosis value 8.774709 shows that the distribution of performance-matched Jones 
model adjusted ROE is the one closest to the normal distribution. Table 4.8 presents 
that the performance matched Jones model is the most effective model to detect the 
firm’s earnings management as performance matched Jones model has a weak power 
to detect earnings management of the firm with high return. In Table 4.9, the 
skewness and kurtosis values of all modified REO except performance-matched Jones 
model adjusted ROE decrease obviously. It proves that when the cash flow from 
investing is eliminated, most of the models become more effective in detecting the 
earnings management of firm with high ROE. Finally, this study decides to use the 
Investment-matched Lujianqiao model. The Investment-matched Lujianqiao model is 
more precise because it excludes long-term assets, intangible assets and the change of 
income from investment. 
Figure 4.14 and figure 4.15 is the frequency division of the ROE and the ROE adjusted by 
each model. In figure 4.14, both model's TA measured by NI-CFO, and in figure 4.15, both 
model's TA measured by NI-CFO-CFI. 
Compared with figure 4.14 and figure 4.15, in figure 4.14, when the company's ROE at a high 
level, there is no cross point above the 0.08 percentage, which is not as expected. However, 
in figure 4.15, this study could find the cross point at 0.2 point, which is as expected. 
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Therefore, when considering the impact of the investment on the detect earnings management, 
the model detects the earnings management at a high ROE level is better. 
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Appendix: 
Relevant articles of the《Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises》 
“Recognition, measurement and reporting for accounting purposes shall be on an accrual basis.” 
--Accounting Standard for Business Enterprises: Basic Standard, Article 9 
“An enterprise shall reasonably select a depreciation method for a fixed asset in accordance with 
the expected form for the realization of the economic benefits concerning the fixed asset. 
The available depreciation methods consist of the straight-line method, unit of production method, 
double declining balance method, sum of the years’ digits method, etc. 
Once an enterprise ascertains the method of depreciation of the fixed asset, it shall not change it 
randomly, except that the provisions of Article 19 of these Standards are meet” 
--Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 4 – Fixed Assets, Article 17 
“With regard to intangible assets with limited service life, its amortization amount shall be 
amortized within its service life systematically and reasonably. 
An enterprise shall amortize intangible assets from the time when it is available for use to the time 
when it is not confirmed as the intangible assets any more. 
The method chosen by an enterprise for the amortization of intangible assets shall reflect the 
expected realization pattern of the economic benefits which relevant to the intangible assets. If it is 
unable to determine the expected realization pattern reliably, intangible assets shall be amortized 
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by the straight-line method. 
Generally, the amortized amount of intangible assets shall be recorded into profit or loss for the 
current period, unless there are other accounting standard.” 
--Accounting standards for business enterprises No. 6- Intangible Assets, Article 17. 
“If the transfer of an entire financial asset satisfies the conditions for stopping recognition, the 
difference between the amounts of the following 2 items shall be recorded in the profits and losses 
of the current period: 
(1) The book value of the transferred financial asset; 
(2) The sum of consideration received from the transfer, and the accumulative amount of the 
changes of the fair value originally recorded in the owner's equities (in the event that the financial 
asset involved in the transfer is a financial asset available for sale). 
Where an enterprise obtains a new financial asset or undertakes a new financial liability due to the 
transfer of a financial asset, it shall, on the date of transfer, recognize the financial asset or liability 
according to its fair value (including the call option, put option, guaranteed liability, future 
contract, interchange, etc.), and shall treat the net amount as an integral part of the aforesaid 
consideration through deducting the financial liability from the financial asset. 
Where an enterprise concludes a service contract with the transferee of a financial asset on 
providing relevant services (including receiving cash flow of the financial asset and delivering the 
received cash flow to the fund preservation institution as designated), it shall recognize a service 
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asset or liability based on the service contract. The service liability shall be subject to the initial 
measurement according to its fair value and shall be treated as anintegrate part of the aforesaid 
consideration.” 
--Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 23 - Transfer of Financial Assets, Article12 
“If the transfer of partial financial asset satisfies the conditions to stop the recognition, the entire 
book value of the transferred financial asset shall, between the portion whose recognition has been 
stopped and the portion whose recognition has not been stopped (under such circumstance, the 
service asset retained shall be deemed as a portion of financial asset whose recognition has not 
been stopped), be apportioned according to their respective relative fair value, and the difference 
between the amounts of the following 2 items shall be included into the profits and losses of the 
current period : 
(1) The book value of the portion whose recognition has been stopped; 
(2) The sum of consideration of the portion whose recognition has been stopped, and the portion 
of the accumulative amount of the changes in the fair value originally recorded in the owner's 
equities which is corresponding to the portion whose recognition has been stopped (in the event 
that the financial asset involved in the transfer is a financial asset available for sale). 
The portion of the accumulative amount of changes in the fair value originally recorded in the 
owner's equities which corresponds to the portion whose recognition has been stopped, shall be 
recognized after the apportionment of the accumulative amount according to the relative fair 
values of the portion of financial asset whose recognition has been stopped and the portion of 
104 
financial asset whose recognition has not been stopped.” 
--Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 23 - Transfer of Financial Assets, Article13 
“The profit statements shall at least separately present items reflecting the following information: 
(1) the business incomes; (2) the business costs; (3) the business taxes; (4) the sale expenses; 
(5) the administrative expenses; (6) the financial expenses; (7) the investment gains; (8) the profits 
and losses on the changes in fair value; (9) the losses on the asset impairment; (10) the profits and 
losses on the disposal of non-current assets; (11) the income tax expenses; and (12) the net profits. 
The financial enterprise may, according to its particularities, present the items in the profits. The 
benefits of fair value change include the fair value change of investment real estate, debt 
restructuring, non-currency exchange and trading financial assets.” 
--Accounting Standards for Enterprises No. 30 - Presentation of Financial Statements, Article 27 
“Cash flows statements shall be reported for operating activities, investing activities and financing 
activities, respectively.” 
--Accounting standards for enterprises No.31- Cash flow statements, Article 4 
“The term “investing activities” refers to those activities of an enterprise, such as the purchase and 
construction of long-term assets and the investments and disposal activity that are not considered 
to be cash equivalents” 
--Accounting standards for enterprises No.31- Cash flow statements, Article 12 
“At least, the items reflecting the following information for the cash flows arising from investing 
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activities shall be presented separately: (1) Cash received from returns of investments;(2) Cash 
received from returns on investments;(3) Net cash received from the disposal of fixed assets, 
intangible assets and other long term assets;(4) Net cash received from the disposal of subsidiaries 
and other business entities;(5) Other cash received relating to investing activities;(6) Cash paid for 
the purchase and construction of fixed assets, intangible assets and other long term assets;(7) Cash 
paid for investment;(8) Net cash paid for the acquisition of subsidiaries and other business entities; 
and(9) Other cash payments relating to investing activities.” 
--Accounting standards for enterprises No.31- Cash flow statements, Article 13 
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Chapter 5: Directors with Financial Background and 
Earnings Management 
Abstract 
From the impact of the director's financial background on earnings management. 
Previous studies find that if a director with the financial professional title CPA, his 
supervision on the manager will be more effective (Jihong, Lizhu 2014) However, the 
CPA is not the only measure of the director's financial background, the director with a 
professional title like CFA, ACCA or senior accountantalso could to measure the 
director's financial background. Thus, this section’s objective of this study is to 
measure the director's financial background more accurately and then to research the 
impact of the director's financial background on the company's earnings management. 
5.1 Introduction 
Based on the new model developed about how to measure earnings management for 
Chinese listed companies,this study investigate the impact of the director's financial 
background on the company's earnings management. The results show that the impact 
on the company's accrual earnings management is negative, the impact on the 
company's accrual earnings management is negative, while the impact on the 
company's real activists earnings management is positive when the director has some 
financial education or work experience. These results indicate that directors with 
financial background tend to help the controlling shareholder to manipulate earnings 
through real activities rather than accruals. 
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5.2 Literature Review 
Executives with “CPA Work Background” may have supervisory governance effects 
on earnings management. Executives with “CPA Work Background” have received 
systematic and professional training in the accounting firm. They have experience in 
handling complex accounting business and transactions, auditing clients from 
different industries and firms, and that giving them the industry expertise (Beasley, 
Carcello et al. 2000, Imhoff Jr 1978). 
DeFond, Francis (2005) found that when a professional accounting financial expert 
entered the audit committee, the market response was significantly positive. However, 
when a financial expert without accounting experience entered the audit committee, 
the market response was not significant. This result indicating that professional 
accounting knowledge and skills of executives could enhance the quality of financial 
reporting and corporate governance, and increased the value of shareholders. 
The study by Xie, Davidson III et al. (2003) also found that the company has lower 
current discretionary accruals when audit committee members included experts with 
financial skills. Therefore, hiring executives with “CPA work background” can benefit 
the company such as limit earnings management and improve the quality of financial 
reporting. 
As accrued earnings management, real earnings management is also an important 
means of exaggerating reported earnings (Roychowdhury 2006, Cohen, Dey et al. 
2008, Gunny 2010, Zang 2012), and external monitoring of high-quality audit report 
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can be reduced the company's accruals and real earnings management simultaneously. 
(Chen Songsheng, Dong Jinsheng et al. 2012). Therefore, executives with a CPA 
working background can limit the company's accruals and real earnings management. 
In the study of Zhao Wenping, Zhang Yinan et al. (2015), the financial work 
experience of senior managers can significantly inhibit the real earnings management. 
The higher the proportion of executives with financial work experience in the 
management team, the lower the real earnings management level of the company will 
be. However, the influence of financial education background on earnings 
management is not significant. 
However, there is no significant evidence that the experience and skills of CPA 
executives significantly oversee and limit the company's earnings management 
behaviour (Jihong, Lizhu 2014). Their study has found that “office associations” 
(the executive with a CPA working background was/is working in the accounting firm 
which issue the audit report) give executives the ability to perform additional accrued 
earnings management, that allows auditors to accept higher levels of accrued earnings 
management and made the company's audit supervision more lenient. That let the 
company has not turned to higher-cost real earnings management and has a lower 
level of real earnings management. This shows that in China's listed companies, the 
executive with work skills and experience of CPA has not benefited the company. Not 
only did they not play their due role in the management of earnings, but they “helped 
to abuse”, which made the company have higher levels of accruals earnings 
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management (Jihong, Lizhu 2014). 
Firms’ managers have sufficient motivation to conduct earnings management to meet 
the requirements of creditors on relevant financial indicators (Liu yixuan 2016). 
Senior managers with banking background have a good external relationship network, 
and a clearer understanding of the debt decision-making and approval process can 
increase enterprises' access to key information and resources, which may help them 
implement earnings management to obtain more credit financing. 
Research on the literature of independent directors' restraining earnings management 
shows that the financial background will affect the supervision effect of independent 
directors, and independent directors with financial background have a greater 
supervision effect on earnings management. Xie, Davidson III et al. ’s（2003) study 
showed that independent directors with financial background have a better 
understanding of the means of earnings management, which can significantly inhibit 
the degree of accrued earnings management. 
Wang Bing (2007) studied Chinese listed companies from 2002 to 2004 and found 
that independent directors did not improve earnings quality, but independent directors 
with financial background could significantly improve earnings quality. 
Hu Luanming, Tang Songlian (2008) examined the relationship between independent 
directors and earnings information quality of listed companies in China from 2002 to 
2006, and found that when with a high proportion of independent directors with 
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financial background in the board of directors, the quality of accrued earnings 
information of companies was better. 
In conclusion, previous studies were focus on the impact of executives’ CPA work 
background on firm’s earnings management. However, there are two problems have 
been ignored. 
5.3 Hypothesis 
Firstly, as Beasley, Carcello et al. (2000) explain, the CPA work background could 
give executives the experience in handling complex accounting business and 
transactions and different industries expertise, and that could help executive to 
manipulate firm’s earnings. However, the CPA work experience is not the only way to 
get skills about earnings management. There are some other titles like CFA, ACCA or 
senior accountant also have ability to manipulate firm’s earnings. Moreover, for the 
normal executives, there is no necessary to have different industries experience to do 
earnings management. They could manipulate their firm’s earnings just with know 
well their own firm’s industry laws and regulations. Thus, this study will expand the 
definition of “financial background”, not only the “CPA work background”, but also 
the relevant professional, such as economists, senior accountant, senior auditor etc. 
Moreover, Beasley’s (2000) study was focusing on the CEO’s financial background 
but not the director’s. Since directors also have supervisory functions, directors with 
financial background should be able to better exercise their supervisory functions and 
inhibit the earnings management of the company. Therefore, to verify whether the 
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previous conclusion is still valid after expanding the definition of directors' financial 
background. This study proposes the hypothesis: 
H1: directors with financial background can limit the firm's earnings management. 
According to the agency theory, directors, as representatives of shareholders, have the 
motivation to supervise senior executives. Besides, compared with independent 
directors, non-independent directors are usually nominated by majority shareholders. 
Compared with independent directors, non-independent directors have a more 
relevant relationship with shareholders and are even the representatives of majority 
shareholders on the board of directors.As a result, they have a greater incentive to 
monitor whether managers hurt shareholders, while financial background can make 
directors' oversight more effective.In other words, if directors with financial 
background work for shareholders, they will have a stronger incentive to corporate 
earnings management and a more significant restraint on corporate earnings 
management. 
Therefore, this paper puts forward the hypothesis: 
H2： if the director with financial background is duality in the largest shareholder’s 
firm, the firm’s earnings management will be limited. 
5.4 Methodology 
In order to investigate H1 and H2, this study will use 5 models to measure the firm’s 
discretionary accruals, respectively: 1) modified Jones model; 2) Lujianqiao model; 3) 
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investment marched modified Jones model; 4) investment marched Lujianqiao model. 
5) the real activity earnings management. 
5.4.1 Data 
Table 5.1:Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables and Independent 
Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Fd 12573 2.047 1.911 0 13 
Fdratio 12573 0.224 0.206 0 1 
dum_Fd 12573 0.754 0.431 0 1 
Fdtop1 12573 0.516 0.860 0 6 
Fd_duality 12573 0.700 1.003 0 7 
BSIZE 12573 9.127 1.884 5 15 
BSHL 12573 0.013 0.058 0 0.373 
IND 12573 3.322 0.699 1 8 
CEO_duality 12573 0.143 0.350 0 1 
TOP1 12573 0.237 0.183 0.003 0.632 
SOE 12573 0.105 0.189 0 0.75 
MSHL 12573 0.005 0.027 0 0.188 
ROA 12573 0.028 0.069 -0.437 0.200 
LNA 12573 22.204 1.400 18.687 25.796 
CFO 12573 0.043 0.080 -0.203 0.257 
LEV 12573 1.586 1.921 -3.435 12.959 
Fd: is the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there 
are some financial directors setting on the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. 
Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents 
the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: 
representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s 
total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s 
return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from 
operating. 
This study uses all Chinese listed firms in the mainboard of Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2016 as the research sample. The 
original sample is 13215 firm-years. this study eliminate 385 sample as data 
unavailable, eliminate 345 sample of financial industry firm, eliminate 20 sample of 
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educational industry firms and health and social work industry firms. The total sample 
size is 12573. All data come from CSMAR and firms’ annual report. All variables are 
winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent to control for potential outlier influence. 
Table 5.1 presents the summary of descriptive statistics of all variables. In Chinese 
market the board size of firms is from 5 directors to 15 directors, and there are 9 
directors set in board in average. In average, there are 2 directors with financial 
background, and the maximum is 13. For these directors with financial background, 
there are 0.7 directors is working for shareholders and 0.5 directors is working for the 
largest shareholder. 
5.4.2 Model specification 
In order to investigate H1, this study use the regression model as follow: 
DA= α + β1 Fd+  t  㤲Controls+ ε (31) 㤲   
tDA= α + β1 Fdratio +  㤲    㤲Controls+ ε (32) 
tDA= α + β1 Dum_Fd +  㤲    㤲Controls+ ε (33) 
tDA= α + β1 Fdtop1 +  㤲    㤲Controls+ ε (34) 
tDA= α + β1 Fd_duality +  㤲    㤲Controls+ ε (35) 
5.4.2.1 The dependent variable 
DA: represents the level of earnings management of the firm i at year t and measured 
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by the Jones model, modified Jones model, Lujianqiao model, investment marched 
modified Jones model and investment marched Lujianqiao model and into absolute 
value, respectively. 
EM_Real : represents the level of real earnings management of the firm i at year t, 
and measured by abnormal cash flow from operating, abnormal cost of production, 
abnormal discretionary expenditure, and abnormal real earnings management, 
respectively. 
5.4.2.2 Key Independent Variables 
Fd: is the number of financial directors setting on the board. 
Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board 
Dum_Fd: is the dummy variable that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board, 0 is other. 
Fd, Fdratio and Dum_Fd are using to test the H1 that whether the financial director 
could limit the firm’s earning management or not. 
Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. 
Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 shareholders. 
Fdtop1 and Fd_duality is using to test the H2 that whether the financial director could 
limit the firm’s earning management or not, if the financial director is working for 
shareholders. 
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5.4.2.3 Control variables 
Bsize represents board size. Lipton, Lorsch (1992) point out that there is a negative 
relationship between board size and earnings management. In particular, with the 
increase in the number of directors sitting on the board, the quality of monitoring 
function will decrease, and the degree of earnings management increases. However, 
according to the results documented by Xie, Davidson III et al. (2003), he find that 
with the increase of the number of directors sitting on the board, the possibility that 
there are some directors with financial professional background sitting in the board 
increases. Thus, the quality of monitoring function may increase, and the extent to 
which firms manipulate their earnings decreases. 
IND represents the percentage of independent directors sitting on the board. A high 
proportion of independent directors on the board could increase the board 
independence (Beasley 1996), and the supervision from the board can be more 
effective (Klein 2002). Therefore, the coefficient of the proportion of independent 
directors on the board is expected to be negative (Dechow, Sloan et al. 1996, Xie, 
Davidson III et al. 2003). However, there some researches show that the relationship 
is not significant (Clarke, Ferris et al. 2006) 
CEO_duality represents CEO duality. Dechow, Sloan et al. (1996) points out that 
whether the chairman of the board also works as CEO will affect the firm’s earning 
management. Given that CEO is supervised and monitored by the board of directors, 
if the chairman of the board also works as a CEO of this firm, it tends to more likely 
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to manipulate earnings because of lacking monitoring function. Wang Jianxin (2007) 
point out that the possibility of earnings management will increase if the Chairman 
and the CEO is the same person. 
TOP1 represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio. n the one hand, the 
largest shareholder could supervise and prevent the firm’s earnings management. On 
the other hand, the largest shareholder may infringe small shareholders’ interest 
through earnings management. In previous studies, the relationship between earnings 
management and the largest shareholding is inconsistent, and that may be caused by 
the difference of samples selected. Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silane et al. (1998) found a 
positive relationship between the proportion of largest shareholding and earnings 
management, Bushman, Chen et al. (2000) and(Fan, Wong (2002) have proposed the 
same view and Lee, Xiao (2002) also got the same conclusion based on the Chinese 
market. However, from the research of (Li, Guan 2004), there is a non-linear 
relationship between the proportion of the largest shareholding and earnings 
management. Firm’s earnings management will increase as the rise of the largest 
shareholding if the proportion keeps rising, the firm’s earnings management will 
decrease. However, Lu Chuang, Liu Junyong et al. (2011) gets the opposite results. 
SOE represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. As firm shares 
hold by government, firms may get more supports in financial and political from the 
government. Those supports will influence on firm’s earnings management.Li Zengfu, 
Dong Zhiqiang et al. (2011) document that the relationship between the proportion of 
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SOE shareholding and earnings management is positive, but Lin, Lu et al. (2012) find 
that the relationship is negative. 
MSHL is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of the firm. As 
the increase of shares held by managers, the motivation of managers for the dividend 
will increase. This will push managers to raise the firm’s earnings through account 
method manipulate Loebbecke, Eining et al. (1989). Otherwise, a high proportion of 
managers’ shareholding may decrease the agent cost and managers’ income will 
consistent with the value of firms. Thus, it may reduce the level of earnings 
management (Jensen, Michael C., Meckling 1976, Warfield, Wild et al. 1995). In 
previous studies, the proportion of managers’ shareholding is negative with 
discretionary current accruals (LI, GUAN 2004, Eng, Mak 2003). They argue that the 
negative relationship may because of low proportion managers’ shareholding raising 
the level of information disclosure. 
ROA is the firm’s return on total assets. Based on the management compensation 
hypothesis of positive accounting theory, since managers’ remuneration is tied up with 
firm’s performance, managers are willing to increase the account earnings (Watts, 
Zimmerman 1978, Zmijewski 1984). In addition, managers of firms with poor 
performance tend to raise earnings to prevent being fired (Siwei 2012, Roychowdhury 
2006). However, for those firms with good performance, due to the high demand of 
high share price and investment, they tend to raise their earnings (Jha 2013, Sajadi, 
Dastgir et al. 2011, Xu, Ji 2016). Therefore, the relationship between firm 
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performance and earnings manipulate is not clear andthis study will test in the 
following section. 
LNA is the natural log of assets. On the one hand, large firms have the incentive to 
increase their earnings to increase their share prices (Lin, Lu et al. 2012). On the other 
hand, as positive accounting theory, large firms tend to decline accrual earnings 
because of the political cost hypothesis (Watts, Zimmerman 1978, Zmijewski 1984). 
Thus, this indicates that a positive relationship between firm size and discretionary 
current accruals is expected(Barth, Elliott et al. 1999, Harry, DeAngelo et al. 1996, 
Chin, Pengal 2009) since accruals will be reflected in the share price. However, for 
the real activities manipulation, Sajadi, Dastgir et al. (2011) found a negative 
relationship between abnormal discretionary expenditure and the firm’s size. 
Abnormal cash follows from operating and abnormal production also are negatively 
related to firm size, although the abnormal discretionary expenditure has a positive 
relationship with firm size (Roychowdhury 2006). However, Li Zengfu, Dong 
Zhiqiang et al. (2011) point out that the abnormal production is positively associated 
with firm size. Overall, the positive relationship between firm size and discretionary 
current accruals is expected, and the negative relationship between firm size and 
abnormal cash follow from operating as expected. At last, the relationship between 
firm size and abnormal production and abnormal discretionary expenditure are not 
clear and it is an empirical test. 
LEV is the firm’s leverage ratio. Based on the debt-equity hypothesis of positive 
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accounting theory, a higher level of debt to equity ratio will urge managers to push the 
accounting performance through accounting manipulates (Watts, Zimmerman 1978, 
Zmijewski 1984). Roychowdhury (2006) argues that firms with high leverage have 
incentives to increase their earnings to evade the debt crisis, previous researches have 
shown a positive relationship between firm financial leverage and discretionary 
current accruals (Li Zengfu, Dong Zhiqiang et al. 2011). In addition, creditors have 
the incentive to supervise a firm’s performance and prevent earnings management. 
Thus, high leverage may cause a low level of earnings management. (Li Zengfu, 
Dong Zhiqiang et al. 2011) found a negative relationship between abnormal 
discretionary expenditure and financial leverage. In addition, the negative relationship 
between abnormal cash follow from operating and financial leverage is also expected 
(Roychowdhury 2006). 
The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled in regression and the 
robust standard errors have applied. 
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5.5 Empirical analysis 
5.5.1Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity refers to the fact that the explanatory variables in the linear regression model are 
distorted or difficult to estimate accurately due to the accurate or highly correlated relationship. 
Table 5.1: Correlation Matrix 
Fd Fdratio dum_Fd Fdtop1 Fd_duality BSIZE BSHL IND 
Fd 1.000 
Fdratio 0.955 1.000 
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dum_Fd 0.612 0.622 1.000 
Fdtop1 0.553 0.529 0.343 1.000 
Fd_duality 0.819 0.777 0.505 0.688 1.000 
BSIZE 0.235 0.013 0.153 0.151 0.215 1.000 
BSHL -0.053 -0.040 -0.009 -0.107 -0.058 -0.065 1.000 
IND 0.178 0.002 0.132 0.095 0.150 0.795 -0.043 1.000 
CEO_duality -0.024 -0.002 -0.022 -0.067 -0.037 -0.125 0.138 -0.103 
TOP1 0.018 0.020 0.003 0.099 0.020 0.009 -0.062 0.043 
SOE 0.077 0.051 0.052 0.083 0.100 0.140 -0.113 0.117 
MSHL -0.053 -0.043 -0.017 -0.096 -0.051 -0.047 0.801 -0.033 
ROA 0.031 0.024 0.021 0.049 0.050 0.046 0.066 0.025 
LNA 0.134 0.084 0.122 0.149 0.132 0.260 -0.025 0.299 
CFO 0.038 0.023 0.040 0.052 0.045 0.077 0.010 0.043 
LEV 0.004 -0.004 -0.003 0.012 -0.003 0.047 -0.047 0.052 
CEO_duality TOP1 SOE MSHL ROA LNA CFO LEV 
CEO_duality 1.000 
TOP1 -0.066 1.000 
SOE -0.081 -0.436 1.000 
MSHL 0.213 -0.065 -0.095 1.000 
ROA -0.014 0.039 0.045 0.064 1.000 
LNA -0.101 0.313 0.083 -0.028 0.144 1.000 
CFO -0.027 0.034 0.057 0.009 0.299 0.072 1.000 
LEV -0.026 0.054 0.000 -0.056 -0.177 0.203 -0.149 1.000 
Fd: is the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on the board. Fdtop1: is 
the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 shareholders. Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: 
represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the largest 
shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: 
is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
According to the correlation matrix, there is a high correlation between Fd, Fdratio, dum_Fd, 
Fdtop1 and Fd_duality. The correlation coefficient is higher than 0.5, and the highest correlation 
coefficient is 0.955 with is the correlation between Fd and Fdratio. To test whether there is 
multicollinearity in the sample, this study will detect the variance inflation factor (VIF). 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) is a measure of the severity of multiple (multiple) collinearity 
in a multiple linear regression model. It represents the ratio of the variance of the regression 
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coefficient estimator to the variance assuming that the independent variables are not linearly 
correlated. The calculation formula is: VIF =1/ (1-R2) 
The larger the VIF, the more serious the display collinearity. The empirical judgment method 
shows: when 0<VIF<10, there is no multicollinearity; when 10≤VIF<100, there is strong 
multicollinearity; when VIF≥100, there is severe multicollinearity. 
Table 5.2 The variance inflation factor 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
Fd 27.85 0.035913 
Fdratio 27.04 0.036987 
duality_Fd 5.19 0.192574 
Fdtop1 4.32 0.231696 
BSIZE 4.26 0.235006 
MSHL 2.86 0.349263 
BSHL 2.82 0.354365 
IND 2.78 0.359803 
dum_Fd 1.72 0.581397 
Top1 1.54 0.649282 
SOE 1.44 0.696672 
LNA 1.39 0.717897 
ROA 1.17 0.853742 
CFO 1.13 0.887368 
LEV 1.12 0.894863 
CEO_duality 1.08 0.922174 
Mean VIF 5.48 
Fd: is the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial 
directors setting on the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial 
directors working for top 10 shareholders. Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage 
of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: 
represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is 
the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
According to the table5.2, there is a strong multicollinearity between the Fd and the Fdratio. To 
eliminate the effect of multicollinearity on the regression results, the Fd and the Fdratio will be 
regressed by different models. 
5.5.3 Auto-correlation 
Autocorrelation refers to the correlation between the expected values of random error terms 
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(Gujarati,2009). When the random error term of the linear correlation model has autocorrelation, 
using OLS (ordinary least squares) to estimate the parameters will cause the following influences. 
According to the proof process of Gauss-Markov theorem that only under the conditions of 
homoscedasticity and non-autocorrelation, OLS estimation has minimum variance. When the 
model has autocorrelation, OLS estimation is still unbiased, but it is no longer valid. It is the same 
as the situation when there is heteroscedasticity, indicating that there are other parameter 
estimation methods whose estimation error is smaller than that of OLS estimation (William, 
2000). 
(1) Autocorrelation does not affect the linearity and unbiasedness of the OLS estimator but makes 
it invalid. 
(2) The coefficient estimator of the autocorrelation will have a considerable variance. 
(3) The T-test of the autocorrelation coefficient is not significant. 
(4) The prediction function of the model fails. 
This study suing the Wooldridge test (Wooldridge, 2010) to analysis whether there is a 
autocorrelation exists by STATA. 
Table5. 3: Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F (1, 1134) = 14.300 
Prob > F =0.0002 
According to the result of the Wooldridge test that the p-value of F-test is 0.0002 and reject the H0. 
Therefore, the model has autocorrelation, and this study will use the FGLS to do the robust test. 
5.5.4 Heteroskedasticity 
Homoscedasticity is to ensure that the regression parameter estimator has good statistical 
properties. An important assumption of the classic linear regression model: the random error term 
in the overall regression function meets homoscedasticity, that is, they all have the same variance. 
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If this assumption is not satisfied, that is, the random error term has different variances, then the 
linear regression model is said to have heteroscedasticity (Gujarati, 2009). 
According to the assumption of the classical regression model, the ordinary least squares estimator 
is a linear, unbiased, and effective estimator, that is, among all unbiased estimates, the 
least-squares estimator has the least variance-it is an effective estimator. If other assumptions 
remain unchanged, the random perturbation term μi is allowed to have heteroscedasticity, that is, 
the variance of μi changes with the change of the observation value, which violates the 
Gauss-Markov assumption estimated by the least square method. If it continues to use the 
least-squares method to estimate the parameters, it will have the following consequences: 
(1) The parameter estimator is still linear and unbiased, but not effective. 
(2) The variance in the heteroscedasticity model no longer has the smallest variance. 
(3) The t-test loses its effect. 
(4) The predictive effect of the model is destroyed. 
Table 5. 4: White's test for H0: Homoskedasticity 
against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity 
chi2(130) = 1066.63 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
Source chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 1066.63 130 0 
Skewness 61.57 15 0 
Kurtosis 52.6 1 0 
Total 1180.81 146 0 
According to the table 4, the p-value of the White’s test is 0, and reject the H0. Therefore, there is 
heteroscedasticity. 
5.5.5 Random effect and fixed effect 
The difference between a fixed-effect model and a random-effect model is its basic assumption, 
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that is, whether the variable that the individual does not change over time is related to the 
predicted or independent variable. The fixed-effects model considers that the variables containing 
the effects of individual influences are endogenous. In contrast, the random-effects model assumes 
that all regression variables that have the random effects of individuals are exogenous (Mundlak, 
1978). 
In the introduction of variables in the model, the fixed-effects model defaults that independent 
variables that do not change with time will not affect the dependent variable, so such variables are 
not allowed to appear in the model. The random-effects model believes that some Independent 
variables of individual characteristics that do not change with time can affect dependent variables, 
allowing such variables to be introduced into the model. Under the assumption that the 
explanatory variable is exogenous, the estimator in the fixed effects model is unbiased. Also, when 
an object in the panel data has only one cross-section, it will not work in the fixed-effects model, 
that is, samples with only one period will be ignored and cause loss. When there are enough 
reasons to believe that non-observation effects are irrelevant to all explanatory variables, the 
random-effects model is more reasonable. The ideal random-effects model assumption includes all 
fixed effects assumptions and assumes nothing to do with any explanatory variables in all periods. 
In the introduction of variables in the model, the fixed effects model defaults that independent 
variables that do not change over time will not be correct. The dependent variable has an impact, 
so such variables are not allowed to appear in the model. The random-effects model believes that 
independent variables that represent certain individual characteristics but do not change with time 
can affect the dependent variable, allowing such variables to be introduced into the model. 
This study will use the Hossman test to test whether a fixed effects model or a random effects 
model should be used. 
Table 5.5 Regression by random effects model and fixed effects model 
(1) (2) 
VARIABLES RE FE 
Fd -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.617) (-0.623) 
dum_Fd 0.003** 0.003* 
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(2.129) (1.701) 
Fdtop1 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.106) (-0.327) 
duality_Fd -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.336) (-0.231) 
BSIZE 0.001*** 0.001*** 
(2.953) (2.848) 
BSHL -0.013 -0.009 
(-0.831) (-0.610) 
IND -0.000 0.000 
(-0.193) (0.014) 
CEOD 0.001 0.001 
(0.449) (0.685) 
TOP1 -0.005 0.002 
(-1.523) (0.600) 
SOE 0.013*** 0.008** 
(3.821) (2.426) 
MSHL 0.017 0.015 
(0.501) (0.441) 
ROA 0.878*** 0.890*** 
(108.501) (110.255) 
LNA 0.004*** 0.005*** 
(9.326) (9.997) 
CFO -1.058*** -1.069*** 
(-152.195) (-154.578) 
LEV -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-6.925) (-6.927) 
Constant -0.078*** -0.088*** 
(-8.390) (-9.259) 
Observations 10,251 10,251 
R-squared 0.740 0.741 
Fd: is the number of financial directors. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors 
working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 shareholders. Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: 
represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. 
TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage 
of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage 
ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
Table 5.6: Hausman test 
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
fe re Difference S.E. 
Fd -.0002618 2.74e-07 .0000242 -.0002615 
dum_Fd .0026016 .0032813 -.0006797 .0001373 
Fdtop1 -.0004023 -.000131 127 -.0002713 .0000585 
duality_Fd -.0002676 -.0003946 .000127 .000021 
BSIZE .0013533 .001416 -.0000627 .0000335 
BSHL -.0091928 -.0126399 .0034471 .0010606 
IND .0000173 -.0002413 .0002586 .0000399 
CEOD .0010686 .0007077 .000361 .0000832 
TOP1 .0022312 -.0053663 .0075975 .0013094 
SOE .0081234 .0125425 -.0044191 .0008401 
MSHL .0145177 .0166783 -.0021606 .0013728 
ROA .8897376 .8783144 .0114232 .0010725 
LNA .0046961 .0042868 .0004093 .0001212 
CFO -1.06945 -1.05789 -.0115597 .000834 
-.0019944 -.0020147 .0000204 .0000155 
_cons -.0883224 -.078291 -.0100314 .0024704 
Fd: is the number of financial directors. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors 
working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 shareholders. Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: 
represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. 
TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage 
of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage 
ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B) ^ (-1)] (b-B) = 250.67 
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
Table 5.6. is the Hausman test of the sample. As the result of the test, the value of the 
chi2(9) is 250.67, and the P-value is 0. Therefore, it rejects the null hypothesis and 
uses the fixed effect in the next regression. 
5.5.6OLS, FGLS and WGS 
OLS (ordinary least Squares) is the most basic form of regression analysis. 
The basic principle is that the optimal fitting line should minimize the sum of the 
distances from each point to the line, that is, the sum of squares between all the observed 
values on the scatter diagram and the straight regression line. 
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Suppose that the estimates for α and β obtained from this principle are  and  . 
Then the line can be expressed as: 
       i      (36) 
The    values on the line are marked    . The difference between the actual value and 
the fitted value is marked as   , known as residual, which can be regarded as an estimate 
of the random error term. 
According to the basic principles of OLS, the sum of squares of the distance between a 
line and a scatter point is minimized, which meaning, the residual sum of squares ( RSS: 
       ) is minimized.   1 
           ( t    )      (   t   t     )  (37)   m   m 
According to the first-order condition of minimization, take the partial derivatives of: and 
set them to zero, and the results can be obtained as follows: 
      t         (38) 
    
 t    
      t     (39) 
GLS (generalized least square method) is a standard method to eliminate heteroscedasticity. The 
main idea is to add weight to the explanatory variable so that the variance of the regression 
equation is the same after adding the weight. Therefore, under the GLS method, we can obtain the 
unbiased and consistent estimator of the estimator, and conduct t-test and F-test for it under OLS. 
Under linear conditions, OLS is a particular form of GLS. Specifically, GLS corrects 
heteroscedasticity and sequence correlation of linear model random items. GLS is equivalent to 
OLS in the absence of heteroskedasticity and sequence correlation. 
The GLS is a generalized regression model without the assumption that the covariance and 
sequence are related. In this case, the GLS estimator is BLUE. If the conditional variance and 
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covariance matrix of the error term is known, GLS is feasible. If this matrix is unknown, in order 
to calculate the value of GLS estimator, we must estimate the variance, covariance matrix, and 
then get FGLS. In this case, the FGLS estimator is consistent and asymptotically effective. 
At last, in general, the least square method treats all the data in the time series equally, but in fact, 
each data in the time series should have different effects on the future. 
In general, recent data have a greater impact on the future than long-term data. Therefore, it is 
more reasonable to use the weighted method to assign a larger weight to the recent data and a 
smaller weight to the long-term data. 
 tt1 Weighted least square (WLS) method adopts the exponent weight ,0<W<1, and the 
parameter estimation obtained after weighting should meet the following requirements: 
t (40) t)      (    1 t   ݉     tt1(   t   )       1 
Taking the linear model       i   as an example, its weighted residual sum of squares is: 
t       tt1(   t   t   )  (41)   1 
By taking the partial derivatives of α and β from the above equation, the standard equations are 
obtained: 
   tt1          tt1 i      tt1  (4 ) 
   tt1           tt1  i      tt1    (43) 
Solve α and β for the above equations and obtain the weighted least square linear model. With the 
weighted least square method, different values of W will result in different α and β solutions. 
Therefore, the value of W should be determined after analysis. 
Therefore, in the next section, this study will use the OLS to run the regression and use the FGLS 




5.6 Regression results 
5.6.1Discretionary accruals 
Table 5.7 to table 5.14 are results of the regression between firm’s discretionary 
accruals and financial director’s characteristics. In table 5.7 to table 5.14, the 
dependent variable is firm’s discretionary accruals which measured by modified Jones 
model, Lujianqiao model, investment matched modified Jones model and investment 
matched Lujianqiao model, respectively. 
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Table 5.7: Regression results on the relationship between discretionary accruals (Modified 
Jones model) and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES DA_MJ DA_MJ DA_MJ DA_MJ DA_MJ DA_MJ 
Fd -0.000 0.001 
(-0.273) (0.565) 
Fdratio -0.001 -0.009 
(-0.335) (-0.785) 
dum_Fd 0.001 0.003* 
(1.200) (1.827) 
Fdtop1 -0.000 0.001 
(-0.317) (0.682) 
Fd_duality -0.000 -0.001 
(-0.767) (-1.003) 
BSIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.769) (0.739) (0.658) (0.767) (0.842) (0.302) 
BSHL 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 
(0.467) (0.466) (0.446) (0.457) (0.450) (0.407) 
IND 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.240) (0.239) (0.239) (0.228) (0.196) (0.151) 
TOP1 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(-0.900) (-0.897) (-0.919) (-0.865) (-0.851) (-0.884) 
SOE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(-0.442) (-0.438) (-0.431) (-0.426) (-0.409) (-0.354) 
MSHL -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 -0.014 -0.013 
(-0.459) (-0.459) (-0.436) (-0.456) (-0.469) (-0.459) 
ROA 0.903*** 0.903*** 0.903*** 0.903*** 0.903*** 0.903*** 
(126.219) (126.219) (126.231) (126.211) (126.221) (126.226) 
LNA 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
(10.839) (10.842) (10.665) (10.833) (10.876) (10.683) 
CFO -1.104*** -1.104*** -1.104*** -1.104*** -1.104*** -1.104*** 
(-177.952) (-177.952) (-177.965) (-177.944) (-177.946) (-177.949) 
LEV -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(-5.629) (-5.630) (-5.586) (-5.628) (-5.631) (-5.575) 
Constant -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.066*** 
(-7.749) (-7.755) (-7.702) (-7.751) (-7.787) (-7.333) 
Observations 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 
Adj. R-squared 0.756 0.756 0.756 0.756 0.756 0.756 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is the 
number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on the board. 
Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 shareholders.Bsize: 
represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned 
by managers of firm; ROA:is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from 
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operating. 
Table 5.8: Regression results on the relationship between discretionary accruals (LJQ 
model) and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES DA_Lu DA_Lu DA_Lu DA_Lu DA_Lu DA_Lu 
Fd -0.000 0.001 
(-0.625) (0.680) 
Fdratio -0.002 -0.011 
(-0.747) (-0.936) 
dum_Fd 0.000 0.002 
(0.358) (1.100) 
Fdtop1 -0.000 0.001 
(-0.140) (0.779) 
Fd_duality -0.000 -0.001 
(-0.616) (-0.793) 
BSIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(1.078) (1.001) (0.973) (1.007) (1.077) (0.430) 
BSHL 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
(1.072) (1.070) (1.067) (1.068) (1.059) (1.043) 
IND 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.717) (0.715) (0.729) (0.722) (0.690) (0.676) 
TOP1 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(-0.871) (-0.865) (-0.889) (-0.864) (-0.840) (-0.897) 
SOE -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.005) (0.002) (-0.012) (-0.008) (0.013) (0.037) 
MSHL -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 
(-0.317) (-0.317) (-0.301) (-0.307) (-0.318) (-0.316) 
ROA 0.881*** 0.881*** 0.881*** 0.881*** 0.881*** 0.881*** 
(118.263) (118.265) (118.257) (118.251) (118.260) (118.244) 
LNA 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(7.974) (7.984) (7.868) (7.929) (7.973) (7.863) 
CFO -1.076*** -1.076*** -1.076*** -1.076*** -1.076*** -1.076*** 
(-166.426) (-166.428) (-166.421) (-166.417) (-166.417) (-166.408) 
LEV -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(-3.036) (-3.038) (-3.009) (-3.023) (-3.027) (-2.999) 
Constant -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.050*** 
(-5.736) (-5.718) (-5.689) (-5.699) (-5.736) (-5.318) 
Observations 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 
Adj. R-squared 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 0.730 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
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percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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Table 5.9: Regression results on the relationship between discretionary accruals 
(Investment matched Modified Jones model) and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES DA_MJinv DA_MJinv DA_MJinv DA_MJinv DA_MJinv DA_MJinv 
Fd -0.002** 0.005 
(-2.517) (1.484) 
Fdratio -0.017*** -0.069** 
(-2.876) (-2.377) 
dum_Fd -0.002 0.005 
(-0.777) (1.428) 
Fdtop1 0.000 0.006** 
(0.332) (2.108) 
Fd_duality -0.001 -0.003 
(-0.847) (-1.113) 
BSIZE 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
(0.731) (0.384) (0.421) (0.335) (0.492) (-0.693) 
BSHL 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.187*** 0.188*** 
(5.471) (5.463) (5.490) (5.484) (5.455) (5.482) 
IND -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 
(-1.290) (-1.294) (-1.227) (-1.210) (-1.283) (-1.247) 
TOP1 -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.065*** 
(-7.588) (-7.567) (-7.637) (-7.634) (-7.567) (-7.750) 
SOE 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
(3.807) (3.830) (3.747) (3.728) (3.794) (3.777) 
MSHL 0.032 0.032 0.034 0.035 0.034 0.033 
(0.429) (0.432) (0.461) (0.475) (0.456) (0.441) 
ROA 0.916*** 0.916*** 0.915*** 0.915*** 0.916*** 0.916*** 
(49.865) (49.874) (49.834) (49.835) (49.853) (49.884) 
LNA 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.020*** 
(19.340) (19.373) (19.174) (19.086) (19.201) (19.089) 
CFO -0.880*** -0.880*** -0.880*** -0.880*** -0.880*** -0.881*** 
(-55.263) (-55.270) (-55.238) (-55.246) (-55.239) (-55.313) 
LEV -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-3.590) (-3.595) (-3.548) (-3.521) (-3.535) (-3.534) 
Constant -0.342*** -0.339*** -0.338*** -0.337*** -0.339*** -0.326*** 
(-15.328) (-15.238) (-15.201) (-15.109) (-15.202) (-14.161) 
Observations 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 
Adj. R-squared 0.306 0.307 0.306 0.306 0.306 0.307 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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Table 5.10: Regression results on the relationship between discretionary accruals 
(Investment matched LJQ model) and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES DA_Luinv DA_Luinv DA_Luinv DA_Luinv DA_Luinv DA_Luinv 
Fd -0.002*** 0.005 
(-2.631) (1.482) 
Fdratio -0.017*** -0.069** 
(-3.003) (-2.389) 
dum_Fd -0.003 0.004 
(-1.038) (1.198) 
Fdtop1 0.001 0.006** 
(0.400) (2.142) 
Fd_duality -0.001 -0.003 
(-0.788) (-1.039) 
BSIZE 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
(0.808) (0.446) (0.499) (0.388) (0.544) (-0.651) 
BSHL 0.196*** 0.196*** 0.197*** 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.197*** 
(5.698) (5.690) (5.721) (5.713) (5.683) (5.720) 
IND -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(-1.113) (-1.118) (-1.046) (-1.027) (-1.100) (-1.055) 
TOP1 -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.065*** 
(-7.517) (-7.495) (-7.566) (-7.573) (-7.503) (-7.695) 
SOE 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
(3.899) (3.923) (3.833) (3.813) (3.880) (3.852) 
MSHL 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.037 
(0.478) (0.481) (0.508) (0.526) (0.508) (0.490) 
ROA 0.898*** 0.899*** 0.898*** 0.898*** 0.899*** 0.899*** 
(48.722) (48.732) (48.688) (48.691) (48.708) (48.735) 
LNA 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
(18.520) (18.556) (18.376) (18.253) (18.368) (18.282) 
CFO -0.856*** -0.856*** -0.856*** -0.856*** -0.856*** -0.857*** 
(-53.522) (-53.529) (-53.495) (-53.504) (-53.497) (-53.571) 
LEV -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-2.774) (-2.779) (-2.737) (-2.701) (-2.715) (-2.723) 
Constant -0.329*** -0.326*** -0.326*** -0.324*** -0.326*** -0.313*** 
(-14.701) (-14.604) (-14.574) (-14.469) (-14.562) (-13.542) 
Observations 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 
Adj. R-squared 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.296 0.296 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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In table 5.7, the dependent variable is the discretionary accruals which measured by 
modified Jones model. The result of regression has shown that the impact of the 
number of financial directors on the firm’s discretionary accruals is negative but not 
significant. Moreover, the influence of financial director ratio, the number of the 
financial director is working for the top 10 shareholders or the largest shareholder on 
discretionary accruals is also negative but not significant. This result has a point that 
there is no significant relationship between the firm’s discretionary accruals and the 
director’s financial background. 
In table 5.8, the dependent variable is the discretionary accruals which measured by 
Lujiaoqiao model, and this study got the same result with table 5.7. The influence of 
each main variable on the firm’s discretionary accruals is negative but not significant. 
This result has shown the same relationship between the firm’s discretionary accruals 
and the director’s financial background of table 5.7. 
However, this study find a different result when this study use revised models to 
measure discretionary accruals in table 5.9 and table 5.10. In table 5.9, the dependent 
variable is measured by investment matched modified Jones model. The result has 
shown that the influence of the number of financial directors on the firm’s 
discretionary accruals is negative and significant at 5 per cent level. The coefficient is 
-0.002 and the t-test value is -2.517. Moreover, the influence of the ratio of financial 
directors on the firm’s discretionary accruals is negative significant at 1 per cent level. 
The coefficient is -0.017 and the t-test value is -2.876. However, the financial 
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director’s duality has no impact on the firm’s discretionary accruals. 
In table 5.10, the dependent variable is measured by investment matched Lujianqiao 
model, and the result of table 5.10 is as same as table 5.9. The impact of the number 
of financial directors on firm’s discretionary accruals is negative and significant at 1 
per cent level, and the impact of the ratio of financial directors on firm’s discretionary 
accruals is negative and significant at 1 per cent level. 
In conclusion, from table 5.7 to table 5.10, the result point that firm’s discretionary 
accruals will be affected by the number of financial director setting on board. If there 
are more financial directors setting on board, the firm tends to down their 
discretionary accruals. Moreover, the ratio of financial directors setting on board also 
could effect on firm’s discretionary accruals. The high percentage of the financial 
director in the board will let firms to downward their discretionary accruals. 
However, based on above results, this study cannot confirm that the negative 
significant impact is because the discretionary accruals have been limited by financial 
directors, or financial directors help firm to downward manipulate earning as some 
special purpose like tax avoidance. 
Therefore, this study use the absolute value of discretionary accruals to replace the 
dependent variables. Thus, if the influence of the financial director’s characteristics on 
the absolute value of discretionary accruals was negative, it is meaning the firm’s 
discretionary accruals has been limited by financial directors. In contrast, if the 
influence of financial director’s characteristics on the absolute value of discretionary 
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accruals was positive, it is meaning financial director has help firm to manipulate 
earnings. 
In table 5.11 to table 5.13, the dependent variable is the absolute value of firm’s 
discretionary accruals which measured by modified Jones model, Lujianqiao model, 
investment matched modified Jones model and investment matched Lujianqiao model, 
respectively. 
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Table5.11: Regression results on the relationship between absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (Modified Jones model) and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_MJ Ab_MJ Ab_MJ Ab_MJ Ab_MJ Ab_MJ 
Fd -0.000 0.001 
(-0.687) (0.504) 
Fdratio -0.003 -0.007 
(-0.841) (-0.446) 
dum_Fd -0.003* -0.003 
(-1.779) (-1.551) 
Fdtop1 0.000 0.001 
(0.062) (0.523) 
Fd_duality -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.230) (-0.264) 
BSIZE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-3.083) (-3.212) (-3.094) (-3.204) (-3.147) (-2.834) 
BSHL 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 
(3.008) (3.005) (3.042) (3.010) (3.003) (3.059) 
IND 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.501) (0.498) (0.527) (0.520) (0.501) (0.558) 
TOP1 -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** 
(-6.766) (-6.758) (-6.765) (-6.746) (-6.750) (-6.778) 
SOE 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 
(0.815) (0.822) (0.778) (0.796) (0.812) (0.742) 
MSHL -0.067 -0.067 -0.068 -0.067 -0.067 -0.068 
(-1.600) (-1.600) (-1.614) (-1.588) (-1.592) (-1.609) 
ROA -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.076*** 
(-7.311) (-7.309) (-7.334) (-7.313) (-7.310) (-7.337) 
LNA -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
(-8.997) (-8.980) (-8.842) (-9.044) (-9.024) (-8.859) 
CFO -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.127*** -0.127*** 
(-14.123) (-14.124) (-14.109) (-14.122) (-14.120) (-14.109) 
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(1.183) (1.180) (1.147) (1.201) (1.198) (1.160) 
Constant 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.208*** 0.209*** 0.209*** 0.210*** 
(16.526) (16.600) (16.545) (16.571) (16.546) (16.128) 
Observations 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 
Adj. R-squared 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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Table 5.12: Regression results on the relationship between absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (LJQ model) and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_Lu Ab_Lu Ab_Lu Ab_Lu Ab_Lu Ab_Lu 
Fd -0.000 0.001 
(-0.586) (0.462) 
Fdratio -0.002 -0.006 
(-0.721) (-0.391) 
dum_Fd -0.002 -0.003 
(-1.531) (-1.335) 
Fdtop1 -0.000 0.001 
(-0.060) (0.385) 
Fd_duality -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.290) (-0.249) 
BSIZE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-2.976) (-3.090) (-2.988) (-3.070) (-3.017) (-2.705) 
BSHL 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 
(2.978) (2.976) (3.007) (2.975) (2.972) (3.016) 
IND 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.510) (0.508) (0.533) (0.520) (0.504) (0.551) 
TOP1 -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.032*** 
(-6.686) (-6.679) (-6.685) (-6.651) (-6.664) (-6.673) 
SOE 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(0.720) (0.726) (0.688) (0.711) (0.722) (0.666) 
MSHL -0.064 -0.064 -0.064 -0.064 -0.064 -0.064 
(-1.535) (-1.536) (-1.548) (-1.526) (-1.531) (-1.543) 
ROA -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.090*** 
(-8.730) (-8.729) (-8.750) (-8.730) (-8.727) (-8.749) 
LNA -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
(-9.289) (-9.274) (-9.151) (-9.317) (-9.303) (-9.155) 
CFO -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** -0.105*** 
(-11.721) (-11.722) (-11.708) (-11.719) (-11.717) (-11.707) 
LEV 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 
(2.099) (2.097) (2.069) (2.114) (2.112) (2.079) 
Constant 0.207*** 0.208*** 0.207*** 0.208*** 0.207*** 0.209*** 
(16.560) (16.629) (16.581) (16.588) (16.568) (16.135) 
Observations 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 
Adj. R-squared 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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Table 5.13: Regression results on the relationship between absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (Investment matched MJ model) and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_MJinv Ab_MJinv Ab_MJinv Ab_MJinv Ab_MJinv Ab_MJinv 
Fd -0.001** 0.001 
(-2.449) (0.385) 
Fdratio -0.014*** -0.029 
(-2.645) (-1.070) 
dum_Fd -0.006** -0.002 
(-2.194) (-0.638) 
Fdtop1 0.001 0.003 
(0.513) (1.258) 
Fd_duality -0.000 0.000 
(-0.152) (0.066) 
BSIZE -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003** 
(-2.258) (-2.627) (-2.491) (-2.677) (-2.587) (-2.551) 
BSHL 0.166*** 0.166*** 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.166*** 0.169*** 
(5.163) (5.155) (5.208) (5.182) (5.163) (5.242) 
IND -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(-0.132) (-0.132) (-0.062) (-0.045) (-0.084) (0.005) 
TOP1 -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.075*** 
(-9.306) (-9.289) (-9.340) (-9.360) (-9.329) (-9.463) 
SOE 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 
(3.172) (3.190) (3.095) (3.084) (3.127) (3.038) 
MSHL 0.043 0.043 0.044 0.046 0.046 0.043 
(0.618) (0.623) (0.629) (0.664) (0.658) (0.626) 
ROA 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.164*** 0.163*** 
(9.531) (9.536) (9.497) (9.513) (9.522) (9.495) 
LNA 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(3.339) (3.362) (3.372) (3.098) (3.160) (3.269) 
CFO -0.330*** -0.330*** -0.329*** -0.330*** -0.330*** -0.330*** 
(-22.109) (-22.112) (-22.086) (-22.103) (-22.098) (-22.127) 
LEV -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-3.168) (-3.170) (-3.171) (-3.099) (-3.108) (-3.173) 
Constant 0.084*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.092*** 
(4.037) (4.175) (4.142) (4.251) (4.197) (4.280) 
Observations 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 
Adj. R-squared 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.076 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
144 
Table 5.14: Regression results on the relationship between absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (Investment matched LJQ model) and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_Luinv Ab_Luinv Ab_Luinv Ab_Luinv Ab_Luinv Ab_Luinv 
Fd -0.001** 0.001 
(-2.491) (0.319) 
Fdratio -0.014*** -0.028 
(-2.677) (-1.049) 
dum_Fd -0.006** -0.002 
(-2.133) (-0.539) 
Fdtop1 0.001 0.003 
(0.547) (1.193) 
Fd_duality -0.000 0.000 
(-0.076) (0.197) 
BSIZE -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.003** 
(-2.090) (-2.463) (-2.331) (-2.518) (-2.436) (-2.407) 
BSHL 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.170*** 
(5.225) (5.217) (5.269) (5.245) (5.226) (5.303) 
IND -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(-0.107) (-0.107) (-0.037) (-0.018) (-0.054) (0.035) 
TOP1 -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.072*** -0.073*** 
(-9.201) (-9.184) (-9.237) (-9.260) (-9.230) (-9.361) 
SOE 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
(3.176) (3.195) (3.099) (3.086) (3.127) (3.042) 
MSHL 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.048 0.048 0.046 
(0.648) (0.653) (0.660) (0.695) (0.690) (0.659) 
ROA 0.154*** 0.155*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 
(9.032) (9.037) (8.999) (9.014) (9.022) (8.997) 
LNA 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(2.945) (2.968) (2.969) (2.699) (2.757) (2.865) 
CFO -0.313*** -0.313*** -0.313*** -0.313*** -0.313*** -0.313*** 
(-21.097) (-21.099) (-21.073) (-21.091) (-21.086) (-21.117) 
LEV -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-2.686) (-2.688) (-2.687) (-2.615) (-2.624) (-2.691) 
Constant 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 0.096*** 
(4.226) (4.366) (4.336) (4.445) (4.395) (4.461) 
Observations 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 12,573 
Adj. R-squared 0.071 0.072 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.072 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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In table 5.11, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
measured by modified Jones model. The result of regression has shown that the 
impact of whether there is a financial director setting on the board on the firm’s 
discretionary accruals is negative and significant at 4.11 per cent level. However, the 
firm’s discretionary accruals have nothing to do with the number of the financial 
director or the ratio of financial director setting in the board. Moreover, the firm’s 
discretionary actuals are also having no relationship with the number of shareholder 
financial directors. 
In table 5.12, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
which is measured by the Lu jianqiao model. The regression result has shown that all 
five financial director’s characteristics have no impact on the firm’s discretionary 
accruals. 
In table 5.13, when this study use the absolute value of discretionary accruals which is 
measured by investment matched modified Jones model as the dependent variable, the 
regression has shown the different result with the above tables. The impact of the 
number of financial directors setting on the board is negatively significant at 5 per 
cent level. The coefficient is -0.001 and the t-test value is -2.449. The impact of the 
ratio of financial directors setting on the board is negatively significant at 1 per cent 
level. The coefficient is -0.014 and the t-test value is -2.645. Moreover, the impact of 
the dummy variable whether there is a financial director setting on the board is 
negatively significant at 5 per cent level. The coefficient is -0.006 and the t-test value 
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is -2.194. However, the variable that the number of financial directors who are 
working for shareholder has no impact on the firm’s discretionary accruals. 
As some as the result of table 5.13, in table 5.14, this study use the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals which is measured by investment matched Lujianqiao model as 
the dependent variable. The impact of the number of financial directors setting on the 
board is negatively significant at 5 per cent level. The coefficient is -0.001 and the 
t-test value is -2.491. The impact of the ratio of financial directors setting on the board 
is negatively significant at 1 per cent level. The coefficient is -0.014 and the t-test 
value is -2.677. Moreover, the impact of the dummy variable whether there is a 
financial director setting on the board is negatively significant at 5 per cent level. The 
coefficient is -0.006 and the t-test value is -2.133. 
Based on the above results from table 5.11 to table 5.14, this study can point that if 
there is a financial director has set on the board, the firm’s discretionary accruals will 
be limited. As the number or ratio of financial directors setting on the board 
increasing, the digress of the firm’s discretionary accruals will be decreasing more 
effect. However, the duality situation of the financial directors is no impact on the 
firm's discretionary accruals, no matter the financial director is working for the top 10 
shareholders or the largest shareholder. 
In conclusion, the financial directors will prevent the firm’s earnings manipulation 
and will cause the decreasing of the firm’s discretionary accruals. 
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5.6.2 Real activity earnings management 
From table 5.7 to table 5.14, this study can find that the firm's discretionary accruals 
will be limited by financial directors. However, this study still cannot point that the 
reason is that the supervision of the financial director on executives or the firm has 
chosen the real activity earnings management will financial director’s help. As the real 
activity earnings management is concealing than discretionary accruals earnings 
management, so the financial director may help the firm to manipulate the earnings 
through real activity and abandon the discretionary accruals method. Thus, it will 
cause the decreasing of the discretionary accruals. 
Therefore, in the next section, this study use abnormal real earnings as the dependent 
variable to test whether the financial director has helped the firm to manipulate 
earnings through earnings or not. From Table 5.15 to table 5.22 are results of the 
regression between firm’s abnormal real earnings management and financial director’s 
characteristics. In table 5.15 to table 5.18, the dependent variable is the abnormal cash 
flow from operating, the abnormal cost of production, the abnormal discretionary 
expenditure and the abnormal real earnings, respectively. As same as discretionary 
accruals, from table 5.19 to table 5.22, the dependent variable is the absolute value of 
the abnormal cash flow from operating, the abnormal cost of production, the abnormal 
discretionary expenditure and the abnormal real earnings, respectively. 
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Table 5.15: Regression results on the relationship between abnormal cash flow from 
operating and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Real_CFO Real_CFO Real_CFO Real_CFO Real_CFO Real_CFO 
Fd 0.000 0.001 
(0.291) (0.938) 
Fdratio 0.000 -0.005 
(0.155) (-0.471) 
dum_Fd 0.000 0.000 
(0.082) (0.030) 
Fdtop1 -0.002*** -0.003*** 
(-3.422) (-3.413) 
Fd_duality -0.001* 0.001 
(-1.905) (1.089) 
BSIZE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.620) (-0.585) (-0.588) (-0.220) (-0.299) (-0.726) 
BSHL -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 
(-0.212) (-0.213) (-0.215) (-0.333) (-0.261) (-0.384) 
IND -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.044) (-0.047) (-0.051) (-0.242) (-0.172) (-0.219) 
TOP1 -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** 
(-5.190) (-5.187) (-5.185) (-4.760) (-5.033) (-4.599) 
SOE -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
(-4.124) (-4.122) (-4.118) (-3.898) (-4.024) (-3.827) 
MSHL -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 
(-0.508) (-0.511) (-0.512) (-0.537) (-0.549) (-0.469) 
ROA -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** -0.058*** 
(-9.448) (-9.448) (-9.446) (-9.406) (-9.424) (-9.394) 
LNA -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
(-2.508) (-2.498) (-2.488) (-2.177) (-2.325) (-2.246) 
CFO 1.054*** 1.054*** 1.054*** 1.054*** 1.054*** 1.054*** 
(197.233) (197.233) (197.223) (197.347) (197.270) (197.364) 
LEV -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(-2.755) (-2.759) (-2.760) (-2.815) (-2.782) (-2.778) 
Constant -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.014* -0.013* -0.012 
(-1.572) (-1.594) (-1.593) (-1.859) (-1.743) (-1.581) 
Observations 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 
Adj. R-squared 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.775 0.775 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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Table 5.16: Regression results on the relationship between abnormal cost of production 
and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Real_Pord Real_Pord Real_Pord Real_Pord Real_Pord Real_Pord 
Fd 0.002** 0.001 
(2.564) (0.348) 
Fdratio 0.021*** 0.030 
(2.619) (0.769) 
dum_Fd 0.003 -0.005 
(0.884) (-0.955) 
Fdtop1 -0.001 -0.002 
(-0.760) (-0.498) 
Fd_duality -0.001 -0.005 
(-0.572) (-1.289) 
BSIZE 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.313) (0.677) (0.631) (0.765) (0.765) (0.821) 
BSHL 0.100** 0.100** 0.099** 0.098* 0.099** 0.097* 
(1.987) (1.993) (1.963) (1.949) (1.961) (1.922) 
IND -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.010** 
(-2.365) (-2.368) (-2.429) (-2.462) (-2.455) (-2.517) 
TOP1 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 
(-0.692) (-0.705) (-0.640) (-0.536) (-0.584) (-0.456) 
SOE 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(0.385) (0.369) (0.444) (0.478) (0.458) (0.481) 
MSHL 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.021 0.021 0.023 
(0.245) (0.238) (0.216) (0.195) (0.190) (0.207) 
ROA -0.594*** -0.594*** -0.593*** -0.593*** -0.593*** -0.593*** 
(-23.972) (-23.977) (-23.946) (-23.945) (-23.948) (-23.955) 
LNA 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
(17.376) (17.361) (17.429) (17.613) (17.601) (17.506) 
CFO -0.636*** -0.636*** -0.636*** -0.636*** -0.636*** -0.635*** 
(-29.482) (-29.481) (-29.483) (-29.469) (-29.471) (-29.442) 
LEV 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
(10.403) (10.403) (10.362) (10.328) (10.334) (10.398) 
Constant -0.431*** -0.435*** -0.435*** -0.438*** -0.438*** -0.441*** 
(-14.232) (-14.403) (-14.406) (-14.463) (-14.447) (-14.077) 
Observations 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 
Adj. R-squared 0.222 0.222 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.222 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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Table 5.17: Regression results on the relationship between abnormal discretionary expenditure 
and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Real_Disexp Real_Disexp Real_Disexp Real_Disexp Real_Disexp Real_Disexp 
Fd -0.000 -0.001 
(-0.266) (-0.580) 
Fdratio -0.000 0.029* 
(-0.083) (1.702) 
dum_Fd -0.005*** -0.007*** 
(-2.743) (-3.528) 
Fdtop1 -0.002*** -0.001 
(-2.926) (-0.428) 
Fd_duality -0.002*** -0.003** 
(-3.170) (-1.994) 
BSIZE 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001* 
(0.800) (0.770) (0.943) (1.075) (1.226) (1.757) 
BSHL -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 
(-0.253) (-0.252) (-0.212) (-0.354) (-0.331) (-0.278) 
IND 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.291) (0.295) (0.316) (0.132) (0.094) (0.127) 
TOP1 -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
(-8.980) (-8.984) (-8.953) (-8.598) (-8.740) (-8.643) 
SOE -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
(-3.268) (-3.270) (-3.313) (-3.083) (-3.119) (-3.229) 
MSHL 0.147*** 0.147*** 0.145*** 0.146*** 0.145*** 0.143*** 
(3.087) (3.091) (3.045) (3.073) (3.033) (3.003) 
ROA 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 
(7.248) (7.247) (7.218) (7.287) (7.288) (7.228) 
LNA 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
(10.041) (10.025) (10.283) (10.275) (10.285) (10.431) 
CFO 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 
(9.509) (9.509) (9.537) (9.535) (9.535) (9.602) 
LEV -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-1.160) (-1.156) (-1.232) (-1.197) (-1.185) (-1.204) 
Constant -0.132*** -0.132*** -0.133*** -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.140*** 
(-9.996) (-10.002) (-10.098) (-10.203) (-10.227) (-10.249) 
Observations 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 
Adj. R-squared 0.039 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.041 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is the number of 
financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on the board. Fdtop1: is the 
number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. 
BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s 
shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: 
is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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Table 5.18: Regression results on the relationship between abnormal real earnings and 
financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Real_EM Real_EM Real_EM Real_EM Real_EM Real_EM 
Fd 0.002* 0.001 
(1.833) (0.256) 
Fdratio 0.018* 0.053 
(1.923) (1.157) 
dum_Fd -0.002 -0.012** 
(-0.408) (-2.080) 
Fdtop1 -0.006*** -0.005 
(-2.577) (-1.097) 
Fd_duality -0.005** -0.007* 
(-2.333) (-1.829) 
BSIZE 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.413) (0.675) (0.708) (0.952) (1.018) (1.179) 
BSHL 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.082 0.084 0.082 
(1.492) (1.497) (1.491) (1.394) (1.426) (1.394) 
IND -0.008* -0.008* -0.008* -0.009* -0.009* -0.009** 
(-1.770) (-1.772) (-1.810) (-1.955) (-1.958) (-2.005) 
TOP1 -0.067*** -0.067*** -0.066*** -0.062*** -0.064*** -0.061*** 
(-5.009) (-5.019) (-4.957) (-4.636) (-4.782) (-4.572) 
SOE -0.027** -0.027** -0.027** -0.025** -0.025** -0.025** 
(-2.171) (-2.184) (-2.144) (-1.972) (-2.025) (-2.014) 
MSHL 0.164 0.163 0.159 0.157 0.154 0.156 
(1.279) (1.274) (1.240) (1.229) (1.203) (1.219) 
ROA -0.565*** -0.565*** -0.565*** -0.564*** -0.564*** -0.565*** 
(-19.508) (-19.512) (-19.502) (-19.468) (-19.473) (-19.503) 
LNA 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
(17.673) (17.657) (17.806) (18.024) (17.997) (17.990) 
CFO 0.491*** 0.491*** 0.491*** 0.491*** 0.491*** 0.493*** 
(19.443) (19.445) (19.443) (19.465) (19.460) (19.532) 
LEV 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
(7.902) (7.903) (7.843) (7.822) (7.837) (7.886) 
Constant -0.560*** -0.564*** -0.565*** -0.572*** -0.571*** -0.578*** 
(-15.817) (-15.952) (-15.990) (-16.142) (-16.124) (-15.792) 
Observations 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 
Adj. R-squared 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.110 0.110 0.111 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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In table 5.15, the dependent variable is abnormal cash flow from operating. The result 
has shown that the abnormal cash flow from operating is related negative with the 
financial director’s duality characteristics. The impact of the number of the financial 
director working for shareholders on abnormal cash flow from operating is negatively 
significant at 10 per cent level, the coefficient is -0.001 and the t-test value is -1.905. If 
the financial director is working for the largest shareholder, the impact on abnormal 
cash flow from operating is negatively significant at 1 per cent level, the coefficient is 
-0.002 and the t-test value is -3.422. That meaning if financial directors working for 
shareholders, they tend to help the firm to reduce the abnormal cash flow from 
operating. 
In table 5.16, the dependent variable is abnormal cost of production. The result has 
shown that the abnormal cost of production is positively related to the number and ratio 
of financial directors setting on the board. the impact of the number of financial 
director on the abnormal cost of production is positively significant at 5 per cent level, 
the coefficient is 0.002 and the t-test value is 2.564. Moreover, the impact of the ratio 
of financial directors setting on the board on the abnormal cost of production is 
positively significant at 1 per cent level, the coefficient is 0.021 and the t-test value is 
2.619. It has a point that as more financial directors setting on the board, firms tend to 
increase the abnormal cost of production. 
In table 5.17, the dependent variable is abnormal discretionary expenditure. The result 
has point that the abnormal discretionary expenditure is negatively related to the 
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financial director’s characteristics. If there is a financial director setting on the board, 
the abnormal discretionary expenditure will significant decreasing at 1 per cent level, 
the coefficient is -0.005 and the t-test value is -2.473. Moreover, the impact of the 
number of the financial director working for shareholders on abnormal discretionary 
expenditure is negatively significant at 1 per cent level, the coefficient is -0.002 and the 
t-test value is -3.170. If the financial director is working for the largest shareholder, the 
impact on abnormal discretionary expenditure is negatively significant at 1 per cent 
level, the coefficient is -0.002 and the t-test value is -2.926. 
In table 5.18, the dependent variable is abnormal real earnings. The table 5.18 has 
shown the relationship between the firm’s abnormal real earnings management and the 
financial directors’ characteristics. The impact of the number of financial directors on 
abnormal real earnings is positively significant at the 10 per cent level, and the 
coefficient is 0.002, the t-test value is 1.833. The impact of the ratio of financial 
directors on abnormal real earnings is positively significant at 10 per cent level, and the 
coefficient is 0.018, the t-test value is 1.923. Thus, the abnormal real earnings will 
positively relate to the number and ratio of financial director setting on the board. In 
the other hand, the impact of the number of financial directors working for 
shareholders on abnormal real earnings is negatively significant at 5 per cent level, and 
the coefficient is -0.005, the t-test value is -2.333. The impact of the number of 
financial directors working for the largest shareholder on abnormal real earnings is 
negatively significant at 1 per cent level, and the coefficient is -0.006, the t-test value is 
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-2.577. 
Based on table 5.15 to table 5.18, the firm’s abnormal real earnings management will 
be impacted by the financial director’s characteristics. The abnormal real earnings will 
be positively related to the number and ratio of financial director setting on the board, 
more financial directors setting on the board, more abnormal cost of production 
increase. However, the abnormal real earning will be negatively related to the number 
of financial directors working for shareholders, more financial directors working for 
shareholders, more abnormal cash flow from operating and abnormal discretionary 
expenditure be reduced. 
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Table 5.19: Regression results on the relationship between the absolute value of abnormal 
cash flow from operating and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_CFO Ab_CFO Ab_CFO Ab_CFO Ab_CFO Ab_CFO 
Fd -0.000 0.001 
(-0.952) (0.908) 
Fdratio -0.003 -0.017 
(-1.268) (-1.244) 
dum_Fd -0.002* -0.002 
(-1.868) (-1.268) 
Fdtop1 0.000 -0.001 
(0.384) (-0.853) 
Fd_duality 0.001 0.002* 
(0.986) (1.904) 
BSIZE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
(-0.376) (-0.512) (-0.398) (-0.556) (-0.657) (-1.192) 
BSHL 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 
(2.992) (2.988) (3.023) (3.008) (3.020) (3.038) 
IND 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.284) (0.279) (0.318) (0.326) (0.368) (0.450) 
TOP1 -0.009** -0.009** -0.009** -0.010** -0.010** -0.010** 
(-2.353) (-2.339) (-2.352) (-2.406) (-2.443) (-2.364) 
SOE 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 0.009** 
(2.374) (2.387) (2.331) (2.329) (2.308) (2.308) 
MSHL -0.055 -0.055 -0.056 -0.055 -0.054 -0.054 
(-1.445) (-1.447) (-1.461) (-1.426) (-1.410) (-1.404) 
ROA 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 
(17.725) (17.729) (17.702) (17.714) (17.708) (17.692) 
LNA -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
(-6.757) (-6.728) (-6.618) (-6.855) (-6.907) (-6.671) 
CFO 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 
(2.546) (2.545) (2.563) (2.543) (2.539) (2.542) 
LEV 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(5.826) (5.820) (5.796) (5.856) (5.861) (5.780) 
Constant 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.132*** 
(12.053) (12.128) (12.077) (12.144) (12.192) (12.050) 
R-squared 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.068 
Adj. R-squared 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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Table 5.20: Regression results on the relationship between the absolute value of abnormal 
cost of production and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_prod Ab_prod Ab_prod Ab_prod Ab_prod Ab_prod 
Fd 0.001** 0.002 
(2.142) (0.670) 
Fdratio 0.012** 0.002 
(2.020) (0.068) 
dum_Fd -0.000 -0.007* 
(-0.173) (-1.764) 
Fdtop1 0.001 -0.000 
(0.917) (-0.139) 
Fd_duality 0.001 -0.000 
(1.177) (-0.011) 
BSIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.048) (0.351) (0.370) (0.261) (0.184) (0.044) 
BSHL 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036 
(0.905) (0.910) (0.899) (0.928) (0.926) (0.934) 
IND -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** 
(-2.169) (-2.176) (-2.217) (-2.163) (-2.139) (-2.131) 
TOP1 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(0.572) (0.566) (0.629) (0.517) (0.539) (0.592) 
SOE 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 
(4.313) (4.302) (4.348) (4.284) (4.290) (4.256) 
MSHL 0.050 0.049 0.046 0.047 0.049 0.048 
(0.596) (0.587) (0.555) (0.565) (0.580) (0.579) 
ROA 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 
(3.383) (3.380) (3.389) (3.378) (3.376) (3.355) 
LNA -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(-3.626) (-3.621) (-3.436) (-3.541) (-3.560) (-3.464) 
CFO -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.191*** -0.191*** 
(-11.578) (-11.577) (-11.575) (-11.585) (-11.586) (-11.552) 
LEV 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
(9.591) (9.586) (9.530) (9.552) (9.550) (9.556) 
Constant 0.237*** 0.234*** 0.233*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.236*** 
(10.219) (10.126) (10.078) (10.131) (10.153) (9.864) 
Observations 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 
Adj. R-squared 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.212 0.212 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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Table 5.21: Regression results on the relationship between the absolute value of abnormal 
discretionary expenditure and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_Disexp Ab_Disexp Ab_Disexp Ab_Disexp Ab_Disexp Ab_Disexp 
Fd 0.000 -0.002 
(1.358) (-1.499) 
Fdratio 0.004* 0.021 
(1.657) (1.620) 
dum_Fd 0.000 -0.002 
(0.360) (-0.960) 
Fdtop1 0.003*** 0.005*** 
(4.024) (3.654) 
Fd_duality 0.001** -0.002* 
(2.450) (-1.656) 
BSIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.757) (0.955) (0.937) (0.532) (0.593) (1.510) 
BSHL 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.023 0.022 0.024 
(1.261) (1.267) (1.251) (1.397) (1.318) (1.456) 
IND 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.726) (0.729) (0.692) (0.920) (0.850) (0.878) 
TOP1 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.007* -0.006 -0.008** 
(-1.479) (-1.494) (-1.450) (-1.898) (-1.619) (-2.031) 
SOE 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
(3.546) (3.530) (3.575) (3.312) (3.450) (3.203) 
MSHL 0.055 0.055 0.054 0.055 0.056 0.052 
(1.520) (1.520) (1.503) (1.526) (1.543) (1.447) 
ROA 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 
(10.746) (10.742) (10.753) (10.703) (10.722) (10.673) 
LNA -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(-8.957) (-8.983) (-8.869) (-9.210) (-9.056) (-9.112) 
CFO 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.054*** 
(7.554) (7.556) (7.550) (7.526) (7.537) (7.541) 
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(1.286) (1.292) (1.262) (1.312) (1.277) (1.297) 
Constant 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.104*** 
(10.645) (10.603) (10.581) (10.862) (10.739) (10.053) 
Observations 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 
Adj. R-squared 0.098 0.099 0.098 0.100 0.099 0.100 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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Table 5.22: Regression results on the relationship between absolute value of abnormal real 
earnings and financial director’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_real Ab_real Ab_real Ab_real Ab_real Ab_real 
Fd 0.002** 0.005 
(2.428) (1.321) 
Fdratio 0.014** -0.030 
(2.169) (-0.897) 
dum_Fd 0.003 -0.002 
(0.952) (-0.383) 
Fdtop1 0.003** 0.001 
(1.969) (0.409) 
Fd_duality 0.003** 0.000 
(2.092) (0.126) 
BSIZE -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
(-0.422) (-0.084) (-0.134) (-0.281) (-0.379) (-0.896) 
BSHL 0.067 0.067 0.066 0.070 0.069 0.068 
(1.583) (1.587) (1.559) (1.641) (1.625) (1.610) 
IND -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
(-0.864) (-0.874) (-0.926) (-0.808) (-0.784) (-0.798) 
TOP1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
(-0.399) (-0.403) (-0.351) (-0.562) (-0.489) (-0.469) 
SOE 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 
(4.543) (4.534) (4.599) (4.453) (4.481) (4.492) 
MSHL 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.007 
(0.072) (0.061) (0.046) (0.043) (0.069) (0.080) 
ROA -0.036* -0.036* -0.035* -0.036* -0.036* -0.036* 
(-1.720) (-1.722) (-1.700) (-1.736) (-1.736) (-1.728) 
LNA -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
(-6.876) (-6.861) (-6.773) (-6.861) (-6.863) (-6.846) 
CFO 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
(0.341) (0.342) (0.331) (0.324) (0.325) (0.335) 
LEV 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
(10.668) (10.660) (10.632) (10.638) (10.631) (10.659) 
Constant 0.330*** 0.327*** 0.327*** 0.330*** 0.330*** 0.337*** 
(12.942) (12.837) (12.825) (12.915) (12.927) (12.779) 
Observations 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 12,314 
Adj. R-squared 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147 0.147 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Fd: is 
the number of financial directors. Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 
shareholders.Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the 
board. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the 
percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s 
leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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From table 5.19 to table 5.22, the dependent variable is absolute value of abnormal 
cash flow from operating, the absolute value of abnormal cost of production, the 
absolute value of abnormal discretionary expenditure, and the absolute value of 
abnormal real earnings, respectively. 
In table 5.19, the dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal cash flow from 
operating. The result has shown that if there is a financial director setting on the board, 
the firm’s degree of abnormal cash flow from operating will be reduce. The 
significant coefficient is -0.002 and the significant level is at 10 percent. 
In table 5.20, the dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal cost of 
production. The impact of the number of financial directors setting on the board on 
the abnormal cost of production is positively significant at 5 percent level, the 
coefficient is 0.001 and the t-test value is 2.142. The impact of the ratio of financial 
directors setting on the board on the abnormal cost of production is positively 
significant at 5 percent level, the coefficient is 0.012 and the t-test value is 2.020. 
In table 5.21, the dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal discretionary 
expenditure. The impact of the ratio of financial directors setting on the board on the 
abnormal discretionary expenditure is positively significant at 10 percent level, the 
coefficient is 0.004 and the t-test value is 1.657. The impact of the number of 
financial directors working for shareholders on the abnormal discretionary 
expenditure is positively significant at 5 percent level, the coefficient is 0.001 and the 
t-test value is 2.450. Moreover, the impact of the number of financial directors 
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working for the largest shareholder on the abnormal discretionary expenditure is 
positively significant at 1 percent level, the coefficient is 0.003 and the t-test value is 
4.024. 
Based on table 5.19 to table 5.21, the degree of firm’s abnormal real earnings 
management will be impact by financial director’s characteristics. The abnormal real 
earnings will positive related with the number and ratio of financial director setting on 
the board, and the number of financial directors working for shareholders or the 
largest shareholder. Thus, more financial directors setting on the board or working for 
shareholders, more abnormal cost of production increase and abnormal discretionary 
expenditure. However, the abnormal real earning will negative related with whether 
there is a financial director setting on the board. 
The table 5.22 has shown the relationship between the firm’s abnormal real earnings 
management and the financial directors’ characteristics. The impact of the number of 
financial directors on abnormal real earnings is positively significant at 5 per cent 
level, and the coefficient is 0.002, the t-test value is 2.428. The impact of the ratio of 
financial directors on abnormal real earnings is positively significant at 5 per cent 
level, and the coefficient is 0.014, the t-test value is 2.169. Thus, the abnormal real 
earnings will positive related with the number and ratio of financial director setting on 
the board. Moreover, the impact of the number of financial directors working for 
shareholders on abnormal real earnings is positively significant at 5 per cent level, and 
the coefficient is -0.003, the t-test value is -2.092. The impact of the number of 
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financial directors working for the largest shareholder on abnormal real earnings is 
positively significant at 5 per cent level, and the coefficient is -0.003, the t-test value 
is -1.969. 
Based on results form from table 5.15 to table 5.22, the financial director is tending to 
help the firm to manipulate earnings through real activity method. Financial directors 
tend to help increase earnings by manipulating the abnormal cost of production. In the 
other hand, shareholders tend to reduce the firm’s earnings, and their financial 
directors will help them by manipulating the abnormal discretionary expenditure. 
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5.6.3 OLS, FGLS, WLS test 
Table 5.23: OLS, FGLS and WSL Regression of the relationship between Fdratio and earnings management 
Ab_mjinv Ab_Luinv 
OLS FGLS WLS OLS FGLS WLS 
Coef. P>t Coef. P>z Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>z Coef. P>t 
Fdratio -0.016 0.009 -0.016 0.008 -0.025 0.000 -0.015 0.012 -0.015 0.011 -0.015 0.011 
TOP1 -0.080 0.000 -0.080 0.000 -0.108 0.000 -0.080 0.000 -0.080 0.000 -0.080 0.000 
BSIZE -0.004 0.001 -0.004 0.001 -0.005 0.000 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.003 0.002 
BSHL 0.137 0.003 0.137 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.138 0.003 0.138 0.000 0.138 0.000 
IND 0.000 0.980 0.000 0.981 0.000 0.925 0.000 0.952 0.000 0.954 0.000 0.954 
SOE 0.015 0.102 0.015 0.067 0.006 0.493 0.014 0.122 0.014 0.084 0.014 0.084 
MSHL 0.173 0.104 0.173 0.024 0.145 0.012 0.173 0.104 0.173 0.023 0.173 0.023 
ROA 0.139 0.000 0.139 0.000 0.039 0.024 0.132 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.132 0.000 
LNA 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.009 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 
CFO -0.322 0.000 -0.322 0.000 -0.391 0.000 -0.308 0.000 -0.308 0.000 -0.308 0.000 
LEV -0.003 0.001 -0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.004 0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.001 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Variables are defined as in Appendices.Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board..Bsize: 
represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents 
the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash 
flow from operating 
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Table 5.24: OLS, FGLS and WSL Regression of the relationship between Fdratio and real earnings management 
Real_EM Ab_real 
OLS FGLS WLS OLS FGLS WLS 
Coef. P>t Coef. P>z Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>z Coef. P>t 
Fdratio 0.024 0.022 0.024 0.019 0.016 0.200 0.024 0.002 0.024 0.001 0.020 0.012 
TOP1 -0.049 0.001 -0.049 0.001 0.037 0.039 -0.010 0.362 -0.010 0.354 0.002 0.845 
BSIZE -0.001 0.686 -0.001 0.695 -0.005 0.022 0.000 0.733 0.000 0.742 -0.003 0.048 
BSHL 0.001 0.989 0.001 0.990 0.083 0.410 0.005 0.919 0.005 0.916 0.025 0.654 
IND -0.007 0.107 -0.007 0.141 -0.006 0.362 -0.002 0.588 -0.002 0.620 0.000 0.965 
SOE -0.017 0.250 -0.017 0.210 0.046 0.006 0.038 0.001 0.038 0.000 0.068 0.000 
MSHL 0.313 0.020 0.313 0.025 0.340 0.076 0.129 0.206 0.129 0.196 0.176 0.134 
ROA -0.554 0.000 -0.554 0.000 -0.584 0.000 -0.041 0.151 -0.041 0.072 0.003 0.914 
LNA 0.027 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.052 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.005 0.000 
CFO 0.478 0.000 0.478 0.000 0.307 0.000 0.000 0.984 0.000 0.980 -0.040 0.056 
LEV 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Variables are defined as in Appendices.Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board..Bsize: 
represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents 
the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash 
flow from operating 
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This party is aiming to test the steady of the result. Therefore, this party uses the OLS, 
FGLS and WLS to run the regression, respectively. 
In table 5.23, this study uses the OLS, FGLS and WSL to regression the relationship 
between the ratio of financial directors and investment matched modified Jones model, 
and investment matched Lu jianqiao model, respectively. When uses the absolute 
value of the investment matched modified Jones model as the dependent variable, the 
result of the impact of Fdratio on the company's earnings management is negatively 
significant at 1 per cent level by OLS. The coefficient of Fdratio is -0.016, and the 
p-value is 0.009. By FGLS, the coefficient of Fdratio is -0.016, and the p-value is 
0.008. The impact of Fdratio on the company's earnings management is still 
negatively significant at 1 per cent level. Moreover, through WLS regression, the 
result is as same as the OLS and FGLS. The impact of Fdratio on the company's 
earnings management is negatively significant at 1 per cent level, the coefficient of 
Fdratio is -0.025, and the p-value is 0.000. 
When it uses the investment matched Lu jianqiao model. The coefficient of Fdratio is 
-0.015, -0.015 and -0.015 respectively by OLS, FGLS and WLS. The p-value is 0.012, 
0.011 and 0.011 respectively. Therefore, the impact of Fdratio on the company's 
earnings management is negatively significant at 5 per cent level. 
In table 5.24, it uses the OLS, FGLS and WSL to regression the relationship between 
the ratio of financial directors and real earnings management, respectively. When it 
uses the absolute value of the real earnings management as the dependent variable, the 
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result of the impact of Fdratio on the company's earnings management is positively 
significant at 5 per cent level by OLS. The coefficient of Fdratio is 0.024, and the 
p-value is 0.022. By FGLS, the coefficient of Fdratio is 0.024, and the p-value is 
0.019. The impact of Fdratio on the company's earnings management is still 
positively significant at 5 per cent level. Moreover, through WLS regression, the 
result is as same as the OLS and FGLS. The impact of Fdratio on the company's 
earnings management is positively by not significant, the coefficient of Fdratio is 
0.016, and the p-value is 0.2. 
When it uses the absolute value of real earnings management, the coefficient of 
Fdratio is 0.024, 0.024 and 0.020 by OLS, FGLS and WLS, respectively. The p-value 
is 0.002, 0.001 and 0.012, respectively. Therefore, the impact of Fdratio on the 
company's earnings management is positively significant at 1 per cent level. 
In conclusion, through the different regression by OLS, FGLS and WLS, respectively. 
The result of the impact of the Fdratio on the company's earnings management is 
steady. 
5.6.4Endogeneity and 2SLS, GMM 
Endogeneity refers to the correlation between one or more explanatory variables in the model and 
the error term. 
In a model, the values of some variables are determined internally in the model, as endogenous. 
The value of variables is determined externally from the model, is exogenous. In a general model, 
the explained variable should be endogenous, while the explanatory variable should be exogenous, 
and the model cannot determine the value of the explanatory variable. The endogeneity problem is 
that the explanatory variables are not completely exogenous; they are endogenous. 
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Endogeneity can destroy the "consistency" of parameter estimation.The "consistency" of 
parameter estimation means that when the sample size is large, the parameters estimated by the 
sample will approach to the real parameters of the population indefinitely. When the parameters 
with the sample are not consistent, it is of little reference value. 
If x1, x2 and y are related as follows. 
y= α +β1x1 +β2x2 +ε（44） 
Where Cov(x1, ε), Cov(x2, ε) =0 and the explanatory variables are 
x2=γx1+ε （45） 
If x1 in (44) is omitted, then the β1x1 term in (44) neutralizes part of the linear relation of x2 by 
 1grouping 
  
   in the β2x2 term, changing the coefficient of x2. 
 1The remainder 
 
εwill be included in the error term. 
So: 
Cov(x2, ε)= Cov(γx1+ε, ε) ≠0 
Therefore, the final explanatory variable x2 will be correlated with the error term. 
In order to ensure that the results were not affected by endogeneity, this study will use 2SLS and 
GMM for robustness tests in the following part. 
Table 5.25: OLS, 2SLS and GMM Regression of the relationship between Fdratio and 
real earnings management 
Ab_mjinv Ab_luinv 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM 
Fdratio -0.019** -0.019*** -0.025*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.024*** 
(-2.140) (-2.675) (-3.203) (-3.082) (-2.582) (-3.133) 
BSIZE -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.002** -0.002 -0.002** 
(-1.090) (-1.439) (-2.352) (-2.080) (-1.312) (-2.235) 
BSHL 0.174*** 0.162*** 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.165*** 0.132*** 
(2.596) (4.044) (2.719) (2.691) (4.131) (2.751) 
IND -0.005 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 
(-1.387) (-1.173) (-0.211) (-0.272) (-1.186) (-0.188) 
TOP1 0.006 0.007 0.009** 0.009** 0.006 0.009** 
(1.177) (1.622) (2.351) (2.194) (1.522) (2.234) 
SOE -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.073*** 
(-7.037) (-7.821) (-8.636) (-8.591) (-7.795) (-8.643) 
MSHL 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.034*** 0.027*** 
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(3.391) (4.066) (3.323) (3.251) (3.901) (3.156) 
ROA 0.209 0.194** 0.152 0.154 0.193** 0.154 
(1.479) (2.224) (1.389) (1.408) (2.225) (1.408) 
LNA 0.138*** 0.140*** 0.141*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 
(4.264) (7.194) (4.772) (4.550) (6.957) (4.535) 
CFO 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 
(4.901) (5.806) (4.295) (4.160) (5.659) (4.076) 
LEV -0.330*** -0.325*** -0.301*** -0.285*** -0.312*** -0.286*** 
(-12.469) (-19.412) (-13.218) (-12.589) (-18.724) (-12.625) 
Constant -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
(-4.488) (-5.330) (-4.469) (-4.097) (-5.036) (-4.099) 
Constant -0.017 0.008 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.010 0.066*** 
(-0.462) (0.294) (2.832) (2.829) (0.356) (2.944) 
Observations 10,251 10,251 10,251 10,251 10,251 10,251 
Fd: is the number of financial directors. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors 
working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 shareholders. Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: 
represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. 
TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage 
of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; 
CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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Table 5.26: OLS, 2SLS and GMM Regression of the relationship between Fdratio and 
real earnings management 
Real_EM Ab_real 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM 
Fdratio 0.022*** 0.022** 0.022** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022** 
(3.296) (2.182) (2.182) (2.898) (3.024) (2.265) 
BSIZE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(-0.695) (-0.399) (-0.399) (-0.665) (-0.640) (-0.646) 
BSHL -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 
(-0.161) (-0.125) (-0.125) (0.157) (0.162) (0.155) 
IND -0.007* -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(-1.906) (-1.372) (-1.372) (-0.431) (-0.393) (-0.433) 
TOP1 -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 0.005 0.005 0.005 
(-2.949) (-3.075) (-3.075) (0.455) (0.463) (0.456) 
SOE -0.023 -0.023* -0.023* 0.026** 0.026*** 0.026** 
(-1.476) (-1.720) (-1.720) (2.486) (2.723) (2.488) 
MSHL 0.310** 0.310** 0.310** 0.137 0.137 0.137 
(1.972) (2.216) (2.216) (1.332) (1.364) (1.334) 
ROA -0.547*** -0.547*** -0.547*** -0.049* -0.049** -0.049* 
(-21.174) (-17.354) (-17.354) (-1.744) (-2.169) (-1.745) 
LNA 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.026*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
(8.641) (14.340) (14.340) (-6.996) (-7.297) (-6.977) 
CFO 0.471*** 0.471*** 0.471*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
(8.587) (17.049) (17.049) (-0.143) (-0.180) (-0.143) 
LEV 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
(6.291) (6.091) (6.091) (6.820) (8.357) (6.829) 
Constant -0.474*** -0.474*** -0.474*** 0.378*** 0.378*** 0.377*** 
(-7.310) (-12.095) (-12.095) (12.945) (13.436) (12.831) 
Fd: is the number of financial directors. Dum_Fd: that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on the board. Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors 
working for the largest shareholder. Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 shareholders. Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: 
represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. 
TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage 
of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; 
CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
In order to remove the impact of endogeneity on the result of the regression, this study 
uses 2SLS and GMM to test the regression result. And the result of the regression is 
steady. The impact of Fdratio on the Ab_mjinv is negative significant at the 5 percent 
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level, and the impact on the Ab_luinv is negative significant at the 5 percent level. 
The result of GMM is as same as the 2SLS. 
For the impact on real earnings management. The impact of Fdratio on the Real_EM 
is positive significant at the 1 percent level and the impact on the Ab_real is positive 
significant at the 1 percent level. The result of OLS, 2SLS and GMM is same. 
Overall. consider the endogeneity, the impact of the Fdratio on company's earnings 




In conclusion, based on the above results, the financial director will help the firm to 
manipulate earnings. Moreover, they tend to choose the real earnings management 
method, and it cause the decrease of the level of discretionary accruals. At last, 
financial directors tend manipulate the abnormal cost of production to increase firm’s 
earnings, and tend to manipulate the abnormal discretionary expenditure to reduce 
firm’s earnings. 
According to the above result, both the modified Jones model and the Lu jianqiao 
model failed to detect the impact of the director with a financial background on 
earnings management, and the result of regression is not significant. However, as the 
result of the investment matched models, if some directors are sitting on the board, the 
degree of the company's earnings management will decrease. Moreover, this director's 
function does not be affected whether the director is from the controlling shareholder 
or not. However, the impact of the financial directors on real activities earnings 
management is positive. Moreover, if these directors are from the controlling 
shareholder, they will help the controlling shareholder to do earnings management 




DA: represents the level of earnings management of the firm i at year t and measured 
by the Jones model, modified Jones model, Lujianqiao model, investment marched 
modified Jones model and investment marched Lujianqiao model and into absolute 
value, respectively. 
EM_Real : represents the level of real earnings management of the firm i at year t, 
and measured by abnormal cash flow from operating, abnormal cost of production, 
abnormal discretionary expenditure, and abnormal real earnings management, 
respectively. 
Key Independent Variables 
Fd: is the number of financial directors setting on the board. 
Fdratio: is the ratio of financial directors setting on the board 
Dum_Fd: is the dummy variable that 1 is there are some financial directors setting on 
the board, 0 is other. 
Fdtop1: is the number of financial directors working for the largest shareholder. 
Fd_duality: is the number of financial directors working for top 10 shareholders. 
Control variables 
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Bsize: represents board size. 
BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. 
IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. 
CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. 
TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio. 
SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. 
MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; 
ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; 
LNA: is the natural log of assets; 
LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; 
CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
174 
Chapter 6: The Influence of Relationship between the 
CEO and Largest Shareholder on Earnings 
Management 
Abstract 
According to the previous research, as the increase of the shareholding of the majority 
shareholder. The principal contradiction of agency problem has changed from the 
contradiction between managers and shareholders to the composition of major 
shareholders and minority shareholders (Porta, Rafael La, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 
1998). However, it ignored that what role of the managers play in this situation. 
Therefore, the last objective of this study is to research the impact of the relationship 
between the CEO and the controlling shareholder on earnings management. 
6.1 Introduction 
This study investigate the impact of the relationship between the CEO and controlling 
shareholder on the company's earnings management. Same as the above,this study use 
the new model measuring earnings management. The results show that when the 
controlling shareholder's shareholding at a low level, there is a conflict between the 
CEO and controlling shareholder. However, as the increasing of the controlling 
shareholder's shareholding, the CEO tends to collaborate with the controlling 
shareholder to manipulate the company's earnings. 
6.2 Literature Review 
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Previous studies document the effect of managerial ownership structure on earnings 
management, Dempsey, Hunt III et al. (1993) point out that if a firm has a low 
proportion of shareholding by management, and it tends to manipulate its earnings 
through non-recurrent item. Warfield, Wild et al. (1995) argue that managerial 
shareholding will reduce the cost of agent. Therefore, the possibility of earnings 
manipulation by management team may decrease. 
Moreover, Yeo, Tan et al. (2002) find a non-linear relationship between management 
shareholding and the quality of earnings information. Particularly, the earnings 
information quality increases when the proportion of management shareholding rises. 
However, beyond certain threshold, the quality of earnings information will decline 
when the proportion of managerial shareholdings keeps increasing. Moreover, Cheng, 
Warfield (2005) examined the relationship between earnings management and equity 
incentives. They argue that managers who possess more equity-related compensation 
package are more likely to manipulate earnings so that they can benefit from selling 
shares in the future. Their findings are consistent with their argument. 
Finally, Hazarika, Karpoff et al. (2012) found that the CEO turnover (but not 
voluntary turnover) are related to firm’s earnings management positively. Hazarika, 
Karpoff et al. (2012) argue that the likelihood of CEO turnover will increase if CEOs 
manipulate firm earnings aggressively. They argue that this is because higher earnings 
will attract more attention and supervision from directors and force CEOs to step 
down from the company they are working. 
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6.3 Hypothesis 
Previous studies document the agency problem about the conflict between the inside 
manager and outside investors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, as the 
mechanisms as the pyramids, the cross-shareholdings, and the multiple-class share, 
the large shareholder ’s control rights have become greater than the cash flow rights. 
Consequently, the factor of tunneling has existed, controlling shareholders tend to 
expropriate minority shareholders. Therefore, the main agency issue is no longer the 
conflict between the manager and shareholder, but the conflict between the 
controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. 
However, the manager has played an important role in the tunneling. As the manager 
is the actual operator, they hole more private information about the firm ’s operating 
and participate in major operating decision making. Thus, tunneling cannot without 
the manager ’s help. However, as with the traditional agent theory, the benefit of the 
manager is not in accordance with the controlling shareholder’s benefit. The manager’s 
pay is often tied to the firm ’ s performance, but the tunneling from controlling 
shareholders tends to reduce the firm ’s performance (Claessens et al., 2002). On the 
other hand, the controlling shareholder takes the most benefit from tunneling, and the 
manager gets little or no benefit from tunneling. Thus, for a manager with high 
pay-performance sensitivity, the cost of tunneling is more than the benefit from 
tunneling (Min Zhang, 2014). Thus, this situation will lead the manager to resist the 
tunneling rather than help controlling shareholders to achieve private interests through 
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tunneling. 
Therefore, to get help from managers, controlling shareholders tend to collude with 
managers. Controlling shareholders tend to reduce the manager’s cost in tunneling and 
rise their benefit. On one hand, controlling shareholder weaken the manager ’ s 
pay-performance and turnover-performance sensitivity (Daniel L, 2000; Wen-Hsien 
Tsai, 2006). Thus, the manager’s pay will not be impacted by worse performance. On 
the other hand, to raise the manager’s benefit, the controlling shareholder will increase 
the manager ’ s compensation in exchange for the loyalty of the manager to the 
controlling shareholder (Barontini, 2010). Hence, the manager and the controlling 
shareholder have a homogeneous utility in terms of tunneling. 
However, most previous studies focus on the relationship between controlling 
shareholder and manager (collusion or against), or the impact of the relationship 
between controlling shareholder and manager on manager ’s incentive (compensation 
and tenure). The question is, when the controlling shareholders have colluded with the 
manager or controlling shareholder and the manager have homogeneous utilities, will 
the manager to help the controlling shareholder to do tunneling? In other words, if a 
controlling shareholder wants to do tunneling, they must collude with the manager, 
but it doesn ’ t mean the collusion between controlling shareholder and manager will 
lead to tunneling, and there is no evidence to prove that there is a significant 
relationship between the collusion between controlling shareholder and manager and 
tunneling. 
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Moreover, most previous studies research the relationship between controlling 
shareholder and manager was from the angle of tunneling. However, the tunneling is 
not the only aim of collusion between controlling shareholder and manager, and the 
tunneling is not the only way to encroach on the interests of minority shareholders. 
Therefore, I tend to discuss the relationship between controlling shareholder and 
manager from the angle of earnings management, because both controlling 
shareholder and manager have the incentive to do earnings management. 
Firstly, the manager has an incentive to pushing up the firm ’ s performance through 
earnings management as the pay-performance sensitivity (Bergstresser, 2006) and the 
turnover-performance sensitivity (Hazarika et al. 2012). Based on the management 
compensation hypothesis of positive accounting theory, since managers’ remuneration 
is tied up with the firm ’s performance, managers are willing to maximize the current 
earnings to pursue a higher current compensation (Zmijewski, 1983). In addition, 
managers of firms with poor performance tend to raise the earnings to prevent them 
from fired (Roychowdhury, 2006). Dempsey et al. (1993) point out that if a firm has a 
low proportion of shareholding by management, and it tends to manipulate its 
earnings through the non-operating item. Warfield et al. (1995) argue that managerial 
shareholding will reduce the cost of an agent., and managers’ income will consistent 
with the value of firms. Therefore, the possibility of earnings manipulation by the 
management team may decrease. However, Yeo et al. (2002) find a non-linear 
relationship between management shareholding and the quality of earnings 
179 
information. The earnings information quality increases when the proportion of 
management shareholding rises. However, beyond a certain threshold, the quality of 
earnings information will decline when the proportion of managerial shareholdings 
keeps increasing. Moreover, the supervision of creditors and the government will 
restrain managers to do earnings management (Li et al. 2011). 
After that, in previous studies, the relationship between earnings management and 
controlling shareholding is inconsistent. Porta (1998) found a positive relationship 
between the proportion of controlling shareholding and earnings management, 
Bushman (2000) have proposed the same view. However, from the research of Li and 
Guan (2004), the relationship between the proportion of controlling shareholding and 
earnings management exhibiting a “U” shape. The firm’s earnings management will 
increase as the rise of the largest shareholding, if the proportion keeps rising, the firm’ 
s earnings management will decrease. 
Based on the information asymmetry theory and agent theory, the entrenchment 
hypothesis claims that as the gap of shareholding between controlling shareholder and 
minority shareholder expands, the information asymmetry and agent problem between 
controlling shareholder and minority shareholder will more serious. The information 
asymmetry gives the controlling shareholder a strong motivation and condition to do 
earnings management, and that caused a positive relationship between controlling 
shareholders ’ shareholding and the degree of earnings management (La Porta et al. 
1999). 
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However, the convergence of interest hypothesis has claimed that as the increasing of 
the controlling shareholders’ shareholding, the interest of controlling shareholder and 
the interest of the firm tend to be convergent. Therefore, the controlling shareholder 
will tend to let the firm operating better rather than encroach on the firm ’s interests 
(Claessens et al., 2000). Moreover, the alignment effects claimed that the controlling 
shareholder has the motivation to maintain the firm’s goodwill and “going concerned” 
because the interest of controlling shareholders have a connection with the firm, 
manager, and other shareholders (Wang, 2006). Therefore, the shareholder has less 
motivation to harm the firm value. These two theories have explained the negative 
relationship between controlling shareholders ’ shareholding and the degree of 
earnings management. 
Based on the above viewpoints, both managers and controlling shareholders have the 
motivation to increase or decrease the degree of earnings management. Therefore, 
when the motivation is the opposite, the controlling shareholder and manager tend to 
monitor each other. On the other hand, when the motivation of the controlling 
shareholder and manager is convergent, the controlling shareholder and the manager 
tend to collusion with each other. However, as the manager is the person who actually 
manipulates the firm ’ s earnings, so the question is what role did the controlling 
shareholders play in the collusion. The first possibility is that the controlling 
shareholder chose a “ free ride ” . The controlling shareholders do not supervise the 
manger and gain profits from earnings management, but do not participate in earnings 
management in person. Another possibility is that the controlling shareholder not only 
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does not supervise the managers but also help them so that they can manipulate the 
firm’s earnings more easily. 
Therefore, to test the above question, this study will focus on the relationship between 
controlling shareholders and managers from the angle of earnings management. 
Hence, to achieve this objective, we propose a hypothesis as follows: 
H1: If the controlling shareholder and manager collusion with each other, 
thecontrolling shareholders will help the manager to do earnings management. 
In order to examine the impact of CEO on earnings management with weak or no 
supervision. 
H2: If the CEO sits on the board,CEO tends to do earnings management. 
Thus, as the aim to test the hypothesis, this study will use the dummy variable 
CEO_top1 that 1 is the CEO working for the controlling shareholder, 0 is others to 
measure the relationship between controlling shareholder and manager. If the 
CEO_top1 is 1, the relationship between the controlling shareholder and manager is 
collusion. If the CEO_top1 is 0, the relationship between the controlling shareholder 
and the manager is not collusion. 
To address the above questions, this study will focus on Chinese listed companies. 
Firstly, the ownership structure in most Chinese listed companies is concentrated, 
which indicates that the main agency problem is the conflict between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders (Lefort, Walker 2007). Furthermore, many 
CEOs in Chinese listed companies are not from controlling shareholders, which 
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suggests that the interest of these CEOs might not be in line with the interest of 
controlling shareholders. Secondly, earnings management is pervasive in many 
Chinese listed companies. For example,Yu, Du et al. (2006) document that Chinese 
firms manipulate ROE (Return on Equity) to meet the minimal requirement of rights 
offering. Chen, Lee, and Li (2008)show that local governments in China help listed 
companies in earnings management to circumvent the central government’s regulation. 
Thus, concentrated ownership structure with prevalent earnings management in China 
provides an ideal setting to explore the relationship between corporate governance 
and earnings management from the perspective of agency issue coming from the 
conflict of controlling shareholders and managers. 
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6.4 Data and Methodology 
6.4.1 Data 
This study uses all Chinese listed firms in the mainboard of Shanghai Stock Exchange 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2016 as the research sample. The 
original sample is 13215 firm-years. this study eliminate 2547 sample as data 
unavailable, eliminate 345 sample of financial industry firm, eliminate 20 sample of 
educational industry firms and health and social work industry firms. The total sample 
size is 10303. All data come from CSMAR and firms’ annual report. All variables are 
winsorized at 1 per cent and 99 per cent to control for potential outlier influence. 
Table 6.1:Summary Statistics of Key Variables and Control Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CEO_duality 10303 0.139 0.346 0.000 1.000 
CEO_director 10303 0.913 0.282 0.000 1.000 
CEO_top10 10303 0.248 0.432 0.000 1.000 
CEO_top1 10303 0.213 0.410 0.000 1.000 
TOP1 10303 0.241 0.185 0.003 0.632 
BSIZE 10303 9.132 1.862 5.000 15.000 
BSHL 10303 0.013 0.058 0.000 0.373 
IND 10303 3.313 0.699 1.000 8.000 
SOE 10303 0.111 0.192 0.000 0.750 
MSHL 10303 0.005 0.027 0.000 0.188 
ROA 10303 0.027 0.070 -0.437 0.200 
LNA 10303 22.112 1.348 18.687 25.796 
CFO 10303 0.044 0.080 -0.203 0.257 
LEV 10303 1.559 1.905 -3.435 12.959 
CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is 
the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times 
TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of 
independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: 
represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the 
firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating.. 
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6.4.2 Methodology 
In order to investigate H1 H2 and H3, this study will use 5 models to measure the firm’s 
discretionary accruals, respectively: 1) modified Jones model; 2) Lu jianqiao model; 3) 
investment marched modified Jones model; 4) investment marched Lu jianqiao model; 
5) Real activity model. 
6.4.3 Model specification 
In order to investigate H1, this study use the regression model as follow: 
DA= α + β1CEO_duality+ Controls+ ε (46) 
DA= α + β1 CEO_director + Controls+ ε 
(47) 
DA= α + β1 CEO_top10 + Controls+ ε 
(48) 
DA= α + β1 CEO_top1 + Controls+ ε 
(49) 
DA= α + β1CEOtop1shl + Controls+ ε 
(50) 
6.4.3.1 The dependent variable 
DA: represents the level of earnings management of the firm i at year t and measured 
by the Jones model, modified Jones model, Lu jianqiao model, investment marched 
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modified Jones model and investment marched Lu jianqiao model and into absolute 
value, respectively. 
Real_EM: represents the level of real earnings management of the firm i at year t, and 
measured by abnormal cash flow from operating, abnormal cost of production, 
abnormal discretionary expenditure, and abnormal real earnings management, 
respectively. 
6.4.3.2 Key Independent Variables 
CEO_duality: representsCEO duality and it is a dummy variable that 1 is the CEO is 
duality as the chairman, 0 is others. 
CEO_director: represent CEO duality and it is a dummy variable that 1 is the CEO is 
duality as a director setting in the board, 0 is others. 
CEO_top10: represent CEO duality and it is a dummy variable that 1 is the CEO is 
working for shareholders (top10), 0 is others. 
CEO_top1: represent CEO duality and it is a dummy variable that 1 is the CEO is 
working for the largest shareholder, 0 is others. 
CEOtop1shl: is an interaction variable that equal CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest 
shareholder’s shareholding). 
Control variables 
The define of control variable is as same as in the 4.4.1.3 
6.4.4 Data analysis 
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6.4.4.1 Multicollinearity 
Table 6.2: Correlation Matrix 
CEO_duality CEO_director CEO_top10 CEO_top1 TOP1 BSIZE BSHL 
CEO_duality 1 
CEO_director 0.115 1 
CEO_top10 0.195 0.177 1 
BSHL 0.147 0.015 -0.049 -0.078 -0.065 -0.067 
IND -0.102 0.019 0.068 0.059 0.033 0.796 -0.04 
SOE -0.078 0.011 -0.01 0 -0.458 0.153 -0.114 
MSHL 0.22 0.048 -0.018 -0.054 -0.064 -0.042 0.798 
ROA -0.023 0.025 0.028 0.028 0.034 0.041 0.066 
LNA -0.11 0.067 0.125 0.135 0.296 0.29 -0.029 
CFO -0.035 0.01 0.022 0.025 0.022 0.071 0.014 
LEV -0.025 0.025 0.032 0.04 0.049 0.058 -0.056 
CEO_top1 0.166 0.161 0.906 1 
TOP1 -0.059 0.036 0.055 0.078 1 
BSIZE -0.132 0.063 0.055 0.049 0.008 1 
IND SOE MSHL ROA LNA CFO LEV 
IND 1 
SOE 0.122 1 
MSHL -0.028 -0.096 1 
ROA 0.015 0.037 0.061 1 
LNA 0.295 0.095 -0.032 0.141 1 
CFO 0.039 0.053 0.008 0.308 0.072 1 
LEV 0.06 0.006 -0.061 -0.19 0.207 -0.148 1 
CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is 
the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times 
TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of 
independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: 
represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the 
firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV:is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating. 
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Table 6.3The variance inflation factor 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
ceod10 6.53 0.153056 
ceod1 5.87 0.170244 
mshl 2.89 0.346325 
bsize 2.82 0.354251 
bshl 2.81 0.355255 
ind 2.78 0.360054 
ceod 1.89 0.529696 
top1 1.52 0.65676 
soe 1.43 0.701549 
lna 1.39 0.721395 
roa 1.17 0.853034 
cfoasset 1.13 0.88778 
lev 1.12 0.895045 
ceo_ditrecor 1.03 0.969789 
Mean VIF 2.46 
The empirical judgment method shows: when 0<VIF<10, there is no multicollinearity; when 
10≤VIF<100, there is strong multicollinearity; when VIF≥100, there is severe 
multicollinearity.According to the table 4.3, there is no multicollinearity between these variables. 
The largest VIF is 6.53 which is smaller than 10. 
6.4.4.2Heteroskedasticity 
Table 6.4 White'stest for Ho: homoskedasticity 
against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity 
chi2(110) = 1019.09 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test 
Source chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 1019.09 110 0 
Skewness 62 14 0 
Kurtosis 52.68 1 0 
Total 1133.77 125 0 
According to the table 4, the p-value of the White’s test is 0, and reject the H0. Therefore, there is 
heteroscedasticity. And this study will use the FGLS and WGL to do the robust test. 
188 
6.4.4.3 Auto-correlation 
Table 6.5 Wooldridge test for autocorrelation 
H0: no first-order autocorrelation 
F (1, 1134) = 7.963 
Prob > F = 0.0049 
According to the result of the Wooldridge test that the p-value of F-test is 0.0049 and reject the H0. 
Therefore, the model has autocorrelation, and this study will use the FGLS and WLS to do the 
robust test. 
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6.4.4.4Random effect and fixed effect 
Table 6.6 OLS with random effect and fixed effect 
VARIABLES re fe 
CEO_top1 -0.002 0.002 
(-0.411) (0.327) 
CEO_top10 0.001 -0.002 
(0.188) (-0.223) 
CEO_duality 0.003 0.004 
(1.188) (1.314) 
CEO_ditrecor -0.005** -0.007*** 
(-2.549) (-2.760) 
BSIZE 0.001** -0.001 
(2.091) (-0.785) 
BSHL -0.005 0.041 
(-0.292) (1.407) 
IND 0.000 0.001 
(0.148) (0.665) 
TOP1 -0.007* -0.013** 
(-1.758) (-2.447) 
SOE 0.012*** 0.008 
(3.275) (1.605) 
MSHL 0.011 0.028 
(0.280) (0.469) 
ROA 0.878*** 0.866*** 
(105.883) (94.504) 
LNA 0.004*** 0.003*** 
(7.217) (3.003) 
CFO -1.087*** -1.123*** 
(-152.073) (-142.570) 
LEV -0.002*** -0.001*** 
(-5.993) (-3.784) 
Constant -0.067*** -0.025 
(-5.585) (-1.119) 
Observations 10,251 10,251 
R-squared 0.745 0.745 
Adj. R-squared 0.706 0.706 
CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director setting in the board 
CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents 
the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO 
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duality. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. 
MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural 
log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating 
Table 6.7: Hausman test 
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
fe re Difference S.E. 
CEO_duality 0.002392 -0.00248 0.004871 0.004097 
CEO_director -0.00162 0.001108 -0.00273 0.00422 
CEO_top10 0.003508 0.002673 0.000835 0.001432 
CEO_top1 -0.00687 -0.0053 -0.00156 0.001359 
TOP1 -0.00061 0.00117 -0.00178 0.00054 
BSIZE 0.041057 -0.00502 0.046075 0.02352 
BSHL 0.001248 0.000215 0.001034 0.001185 
IND -0.01344 -0.00711 -0.00633 0.003706 
SOE 0.008099 0.012209 -0.00411 0.003388 
MSHL 0.027776 0.0105 0.017276 0.045728 
ROA 0.866106 0.877854 -0.01175 0.003874 
LNA 0.002996 0.004125 -0.00113 0.000816 
CFO -1.12251 -1.08703 -0.03548 0.003273 
LEV -0.00142 -0.0019 0.000479 0.000201 
_cons -0.02482 -0.06651 0.041688 0.018673 
CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is 
the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times 
TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of 
independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: 
represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the 
firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(9) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 251.32 
Prob>chi2 =0.0000 
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite) 
Table 6.7 is the Hausman test of the sample. As the result of the test, the value of 
the chi2(9) is 251.32, and the P-value is 0. Therefore, it rejects the null hypothesis 
and uses the fixed effect in the next OLS regression.6.5 Regression results 
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6.5.1 Discretionary accruals 
Table 6.8 to table 6.15 are results of the regression between firm’s discretionary accruals and 
CEO’s characteristics. In table 3 to table 6, the dependent variable is firm’s discretionary accruals 
which measured by modified Jones model, Lu jianqiao model, investment matched modified Jones 
model and investment matched Lu jianqiao model, respectively. 
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Table 6.8: Regression results on the relationship between discretionary accruals (Modified 
Jones model) and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES DA_MJ DA_MJ DA_MJ DA_MJ DA_MJ DA_MJ 
CEO_duality 0.001 0.002 
(0.626) (0.991) 
CEO_director -0.003* -0.003 
(-1.708) (-1.622) 
CEO_top10 -0.001 -0.000 
(-0.861) (-0.004) 
CEO_top1 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.006* 
(-0.962) (-2.789) (-1.701) 
CEOtop1shl 0.018*** 0.018*** 
(2.766) (2.746) 
TOP1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.007* -0.006 
(-0.664) (-0.673) (-0.706) (-0.678) (-1.723) (-1.622) 
BSIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.643) (0.731) (0.597) (0.595) (0.591) (0.779) 
BSHL -0.004 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
(-0.288) (-0.394) (-0.383) (-0.385) (-0.424) (-0.422) 
IND 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.076) (-0.013) (0.107) (0.102) (0.046) (-0.059) 
SOE -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
(-0.478) (-0.469) (-0.525) (-0.512) (-0.441) (-0.360) 
MSHL 0.006 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.007 
(0.172) (0.387) (0.316) (0.300) (0.293) (0.212) 
ROA 0.899*** 0.899*** 0.899*** 0.899*** 0.899*** 0.899*** 
(113.778) (113.803) (113.777) (113.781) (113.822) (113.835) 
LNA 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
(10.989) (11.009) (11.004) (11.013) (10.991) (11.044) 
CFO -1.100*** -1.100*** -1.100*** -1.100*** -1.100*** -1.100*** 
(-159.722) (-159.759) (-159.723) (-159.710) (-159.751) (-159.718) 
LEV -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(-5.016) (-4.991) (-5.005) (-5.001) (-4.959) (-4.939) 
Constant -0.083*** -0.080*** -0.083*** -0.083*** -0.082*** -0.081*** 
(-8.341) (-8.055) (-8.360) (-8.367) (-8.228) (-8.009) 
Observations 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 
Adj. R-squared 0.753 0.753 0.753 0.753 0.753 0.753 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s 
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cash flow from operating. 
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Table 6.9: Regression results on the relationship between discretionary accruals (LJQ 
model) and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES DA_Lu DA_Lu DA_Lu DA_Lu DA_Lu DA_Lu 
CEO_duality 0.001 0.001 
(0.551) (0.856) 
CEO_director -0.004** -0.004* 
(-1.981) (-1.948) 
CEO_top10 -0.001 0.001 
(-0.468) (0.272) 
CEO_top1 -0.001 -0.006*** -0.007** 
(-0.645) (-2.941) (-1.981) 
CEOtop1shl 0.021*** 0.021*** 
(3.193) (3.163) 
TOP1 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.010** -0.009** 
(-1.121) (-1.120) (-1.158) (-1.140) (-2.316) (-2.198) 
BSIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.912) (1.026) (0.875) (0.873) (0.867) (1.071) 
BSHL 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
(0.185) (0.073) (0.120) (0.111) (0.066) (0.058) 
IND 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 
(0.457) (0.351) (0.476) (0.476) (0.411) (0.280) 
SOE -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
(-0.851) (-0.833) (-0.886) (-0.880) (-0.799) (-0.705) 
MSHL 0.008 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.010 
(0.252) (0.471) (0.369) (0.362) (0.354) (0.300) 
ROA 0.877*** 0.877*** 0.877*** 0.877*** 0.877*** 0.877*** 
(106.686) (106.723) (106.678) (106.683) (106.737) (106.758) 
LNA 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
(8.855) (8.883) (8.844) (8.860) (8.834) (8.883) 
CFO -1.074*** -1.074*** -1.074*** -1.074*** -1.074*** -1.074*** 
(-149.852) (-149.894) (-149.853) (-149.842) (-149.896) (-149.873) 
LEV -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(-3.041) (-3.013) (-3.035) (-3.031) (-2.983) (-2.958) 
Constant -0.070*** -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.068*** -0.067*** 
(-6.771) (-6.463) (-6.765) (-6.778) (-6.620) (-6.363) 
Observations 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 
Adj. R-squared 0.727 0.727 0.727 0.727 0.728 0.728 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s 
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cash flow from operating 
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Table 6.10: Regression results on the relationship between discretionary accruals 
(Investment matched Modified Jones model) and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES DA_MJinv DA_MJinv DA_MJinv DA_MJinv DA_MJinv DA_MJinv 
CEO_duality 0.006 0.006 
(1.422) (1.370) 
CEO_director -0.005 -0.006 
(-1.067) (-1.365) 
CEO_top10 0.003 0.008 
(0.878) (1.123) 
CEO_top1 0.001 0.006 -0.001 
(0.435) (1.180) (-0.172) 
CEOtop1shl -0.019 -0.020 
(-1.149) (-1.184) 
TOP1 -0.071*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.067*** -0.065*** 
(-7.600) (-7.683) (-7.704) (-7.713) (-6.620) (-6.409) 
BSIZE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(-0.461) (-0.473) (-0.549) (-0.552) (-0.550) (-0.351) 
BSHL 0.158*** 0.153*** 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.159*** 
(4.177) (4.052) (4.145) (4.115) (4.131) (4.180) 
IND -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(-0.712) (-0.756) (-0.722) (-0.705) (-0.682) (-0.799) 
SOE 0.022** 0.022** 0.022** 0.021** 0.021** 0.022*** 
(2.554) (2.517) (2.512) (2.496) (2.466) (2.595) 
MSHL 0.129 0.155* 0.147* 0.149* 0.149* 0.131 
(1.564) (1.895) (1.800) (1.826) (1.829) (1.586) 
ROA 0.931*** 0.931*** 0.931*** 0.931*** 0.931*** 0.932*** 
(45.855) (45.854) (45.821) (45.828) (45.827) (45.851) 
LNA 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
(17.859) (17.829) (17.653) (17.691) (17.701) (17.741) 
CFO -0.889*** -0.890*** -0.890*** -0.890*** -0.890*** -0.889*** 
(-50.224) (-50.242) (-50.249) (-50.241) (-50.246) (-50.217) 
LEV -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-2.949) (-2.931) (-2.956) (-2.952) (-2.970) (-2.947) 
Constant -0.365*** -0.359*** -0.360*** -0.361*** -0.363*** -0.362*** 
(-14.298) (-13.995) (-14.127) (-14.156) (-14.195) (-13.957) 
Observations 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 
Adj. R-squared 0.310 0.310 0.310 0.310 0.310 0.310 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash 
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flow from operating 
Table 6.11: Regression results on the relationship between discretionary accruals 
(Investment matched LJQ model) and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES DA_Luinv DA_Luinv DA_Luinv DA_Luinv DA_Luinv DA_Luinv 
CEO_duality 0.006 0.006 
(1.453) (1.375) 
CEO_director -0.006 -0.007 
(-1.186) (-1.514) 
CEO_top10 0.003 0.009 
(1.055) (1.199) 
CEO_top1 0.002 0.006 -0.002 
(0.598) (1.138) (-0.248) 
CEO_top1_shl -0.016 -0.017 
(-0.974) (-1.012) 
TOP1 -0.072*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.069*** -0.067*** 
(-7.675) (-7.757) (-7.781) (-7.795) (-6.764) (-6.545) 
BSIZE -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(-0.406) (-0.411) (-0.494) (-0.497) (-0.495) (-0.285) 
BSHL 0.167*** 0.161*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.167*** 
(4.378) (4.247) (4.356) (4.325) (4.338) (4.385) 
IND -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(-0.582) (-0.633) (-0.597) (-0.579) (-0.559) (-0.687) 
SOE 0.021** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.021** 
(2.399) (2.363) (2.359) (2.341) (2.315) (2.450) 
MSHL 0.129 0.156* 0.147* 0.149* 0.149* 0.132 
(1.559) (1.903) (1.793) (1.824) (1.826) (1.587) 
ROA 0.913*** 0.913*** 0.912*** 0.912*** 0.912*** 0.913*** 
(44.754) (44.756) (44.717) (44.725) (44.723) (44.751) 
LNA 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
(17.306) (17.277) (17.084) (17.123) (17.131) (17.173) 
CFO -0.866*** -0.867*** -0.867*** -0.867*** -0.867*** -0.866*** 
(-48.717) (-48.735) (-48.745) (-48.738) (-48.741) (-48.712) 
LEV -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
(-2.343) (-2.324) (-2.351) (-2.348) (-2.363) (-2.338) 
Constant -0.356*** -0.348*** -0.350*** -0.351*** -0.352*** -0.351*** 
(-13.853) (-13.534) (-13.666) (-13.696) (-13.727) (-13.476) 
Observations 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 
Adj. R-squared 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 0.300 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
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owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash 
flow from operating 
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In table 6.8, the dependent variable is the discretionary accruals which measured by modified 
Jones model. The result of regression has shown that the impact of the CEO whether as the 
director setting on the board on discretionary accruals is negatively significant at 10 percent level 
and the coefficient is -0.003, t-test value is -1.708. Moreover, in the model (5), the interaction 
variable CEO_top1_shl is positively significant at 1percent level, the coefficient is 0.018 and the 
t-test value is 2.766. However, the variable CEO_top1 is negatively significant at 1 percent level 
and the coefficient is -0.006. This result has shown that if the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder, the firm tends to reduce their discretionary accrual. Moreover, this impact will be 
influenced by the largest shareholder’s shareholding. When the largest shareholder’s shareholding 
above 33 percent, the impact of whether the CEO is working for the largest shareholder on 
discretionary accruals will change to positive. However, the impact of the largest shareholder’s 
shareholding (top1) on discretionary accruals is negatively significant at 10 percent level which is 
contradicted with this result. 
In table 6.9, the dependent variable is the discretionary accruals which measured by Lu jiaoqiao 
model, and this study got the same result with table 3. The impact of the CEO whether as the 
director setting on the board on discretionary accruals is negatively significant at 5 percent level 
and the coefficient is -0.004, t-test value is -1.981. Moreover, in the model (5), the interaction 
variable CEO_top1_shl is positively significant at the 1 percent level, the coefficient is 0.021 and 
the t-test value is 3.193. However, the variable CEO_top1 is negatively significant at 1 percent 
level and the coefficient is -0.006, t-test value is -2.941. This result has shown that if the CEO is 
working for the largest shareholder, the firm tends to reduce their discretionary accrual, and this 
impact will be influenced by the largest shareholder’s shareholding. When the largest 
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shareholder’s shareholding above 28 percent, the impact of whether the CEO is working for the 
largest shareholder on discretionary accruals will change to positive. However, as same as table 3, 
in table 4 the impact of the largest shareholder’s shareholding on discretionary accruals is 
negatively significant at 5 percent level which is contradicted with this result. 
In table 6.10 and table 6.11, the dependent variable of table 6.10 is measured by the investment 
matched modified Jones model, and the dependent variable of table 6.11 is measured by 
investment matched Lujianqiao model. Different from table 6.8 and table 6.9, the impact of CEO’s 
characteristics on firm’s discretionary accruals are both not significant. Which meaning the firm’s 
discretionary accruals will not be influenced by the CEO’s characteristics. No matter the CEO is 
duality as the chairman or director setting on the board, or whether working shareholders, the 
firm’s discretionary accruals will not be influenced by these factors. 
In conclusion, from the results of table 6.8 and table 6.9, the resulting point that the firm’s 
discretionary accruals will be impacted by the CEO’s characteristics. If the CEO is as a director 
setting on the board, the firm will tend to reduce their discretionary accruals. Moreover, if the 
CEO is working for the largest shareholder, the firm will tend to reduce their discretionary 
accruals, but this impact will influence by the largest shareholder’s shareholding. As the increase 
in the percentage of the largest shareholder’s shareholding, the impact will decrease. If the 
percentage of the largest shareholder’s shareholding is high enough, the impact of whether the 
CEO is working for the largest shareholder on the firm’s discretionary accruals will change from 
negative to positive. 
This result has shown that, as the increase in the percentage of shareholding, the largest 
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shareholder tends to increase the firm’s discretionary accruals though CEO. However, this result is 
contradicted with the result of the influence of the percentage of the largest shareholder’s 
shareholding on the firm’s discretionary accruals. Moreover, based on the result of table 5.6 and 
table 5.7, the impact of whether the CEO is working for the largest shareholder on discretionary 
accruals is also not significant. 
Therefore, this study use the absolute value of discretionary accruals to replace the dependent 
variables to test whether the CEO’s characteristics have an influence on the level of discretionary 
accruals or not. 
In table 6.12 to table 6.15, the dependent variable is the absolute value of firm’s discretionary 
accruals which measured by modified Jones model, Lu jianqiao model, investment matched 
modified Jones model and investment matched Lu jianqiao model, respectively. 
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Table 6.12: Regression results on the relationship between absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (Modified Jones model) and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_MJ Ab_MJ Ab_MJ Ab_MJ Ab_MJ Ab_MJ 
CEO_duality 0.007*** 0.007*** 
(3.045) (3.089) 
CEO_director 0.001 0.001 
(0.513) (0.247) 
CEO_top10 -0.000 -0.003 
(-0.020) (-0.795) 
CEO_top1 0.000 0.001 0.003 
(0.214) (0.491) (0.671) 
CEOtop1shl -0.004 -0.004 
(-0.453) (-0.425) 
TOP1 -0.032*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.032*** -0.031*** 
(-6.057) (-6.267) (-6.258) (-6.262) (-5.564) (-5.404) 
BSIZE -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** 
(-3.705) (-3.938) (-3.911) (-3.909) (-3.908) (-3.703) 
BSHL 0.043** 0.039* 0.039* 0.039* 0.039* 0.042** 
(2.005) (1.839) (1.815) (1.830) (1.836) (1.978) 
IND 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(0.901) (0.961) (0.933) (0.929) (0.938) (0.949) 
SOE 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
(0.837) (0.693) (0.704) (0.706) (0.694) (0.793) 
MSHL -0.031 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.031 
(-0.670) (-0.182) (-0.151) (-0.155) (-0.154) (-0.657) 
ROA -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.098*** 
(-8.561) (-8.592) (-8.583) (-8.586) (-8.587) (-8.549) 
LNA -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
(-7.303) (-7.476) (-7.433) (-7.454) (-7.449) (-7.196) 
CFO -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.112*** -0.112*** 
(-11.216) (-11.251) (-11.249) (-11.252) (-11.253) (-11.210) 
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.465) (0.462) (0.469) (0.466) (0.459) (0.457) 
Constant 0.203*** 0.207*** 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.207*** 0.202*** 
(14.161) (14.346) (14.474) (14.490) (14.451) (13.865) 
Observations 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 
Adj. R-squared 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.092 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s 
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Table 6.13: Regression results on the relationship between absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (LJQ model) and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_Lu Ab_Lu Ab_Lu Ab_Lu Ab_Lu Ab_Lu 
CEO_duality 0.006*** 0.006*** 
(2.847) (2.825) 
CEO_director 0.002 0.001 
(0.597) (0.311) 
CEO_top10 0.000 -0.002 
(0.234) (-0.455) 
CEO_top1 0.001 0.002 0.002 
(0.343) (0.583) (0.478) 
CEOtop1shl -0.004 -0.004 
(-0.472) (-0.450) 
TOP1 -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
(-5.996) (-6.195) (-6.185) (-6.192) (-5.493) (-5.328) 
BSIZE -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-3.484) (-3.711) (-3.675) (-3.674) (-3.673) (-3.492) 
BSHL 0.042** 0.039* 0.038* 0.039* 0.039* 0.042** 
(1.980) (1.830) (1.819) (1.825) (1.832) (1.970) 
IND 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
(0.821) (0.883) (0.844) (0.844) (0.853) (0.862) 
SOE 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(0.709) (0.572) (0.590) (0.587) (0.575) (0.674) 
MSHL -0.027 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.027 
(-0.592) (-0.143) (-0.115) (-0.113) (-0.111) (-0.591) 
ROA -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111*** 
(-9.768) (-9.799) (-9.793) (-9.794) (-9.795) (-9.762) 
LNA -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
(-7.537) (-7.703) (-7.680) (-7.690) (-7.685) (-7.456) 
CFO -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.092*** 
(-9.346) (-9.379) (-9.380) (-9.382) (-9.384) (-9.342) 
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(1.142) (1.138) (1.144) (1.142) (1.134) (1.133) 
Constant 0.203*** 0.206*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.202*** 
(14.235) (14.391) (14.548) (14.554) (14.515) (13.952) 
Observations 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 
Adj. R-squared 0.090 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.090 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s 
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Table 6.14: Regression results on the relationship between absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (Investment matched MJ model) and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_MJinv Ab_MJinv Ab_MJinv Ab_MJinv Ab_MJinv Ab_MJinv 
CEO_duality 0.010*** 0.009** 
(2.610) (2.373) 
CEO_director 0.000 -0.002 
(0.097) (-0.382) 
CEO_top10 0.004 0.006 
(1.406) (0.877) 
CEO_top1 0.003 0.012** 0.005 
(1.066) (2.367) (0.615) 
CEOtop1shl -0.034** -0.034** 
(-2.160) (-2.173) 
TOP1 -0.079*** -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.073*** -0.071*** 
(-9.034) (-9.214) (-9.213) (-9.240) (-7.620) (-7.377) 
BSIZE -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
(-3.034) (-3.209) (-3.201) (-3.202) (-3.199) (-2.997) 
BSHL 0.143*** 0.137*** 0.140*** 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.145*** 
(4.007) (3.853) (3.937) (3.911) (3.941) (4.065) 
IND 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.062) (0.095) (0.050) (0.069) (0.113) (0.052) 
SOE 0.015* 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 0.014* 0.015* 
(1.865) (1.749) (1.782) (1.758) (1.703) (1.845) 
MSHL 0.141* 0.176** 0.172** 0.175** 0.175** 0.141* 
(1.817) (2.286) (2.242) (2.277) (2.284) (1.816) 
ROA 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 0.139*** 
(7.298) (7.270) (7.249) (7.256) (7.253) (7.283) 
LNA 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
(4.320) (4.187) (4.044) (4.073) (4.094) (4.240) 
CFO -0.321*** -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.322*** -0.322*** 
(-19.303) (-19.330) (-19.347) (-19.346) (-19.357) (-19.315) 
LEV -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
(-3.640) (-3.635) (-3.650) (-3.649) (-3.683) (-3.672) 
Constant 0.059** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.064*** 0.059** 
(2.446) (2.676) (2.801) (2.778) (2.672) (2.430) 
Observations 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 
Adj. R-squared 0.074 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.074 0.074 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s 
207 
cash flow from operating 
208 
Table 6.15: Regression results on the relationship between absolute value of discretionary 
accruals (Investment matched LJQ model) and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_Luinv Ab_Luinv Ab_Luinv Ab_Luinv Ab_Luinv Ab_Luinv 
CEO_duality 0.009** 0.008** 
(2.462) (2.174) 
CEO_director 0.001 -0.001 
(0.204) (-0.285) 
CEO_top10 0.005 0.007 
(1.585) (0.986) 
CEO_top1 0.004 0.012** 0.005 
(1.217) (2.398) (0.558) 
CEOtop1shl -0.032** -0.033** 
(-2.084) (-2.099) 
TOP1 -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.080*** -0.081*** -0.073*** -0.071*** 
(-9.037) (-9.209) (-9.207) (-9.238) (-7.647) (-7.412) 
BSIZE -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
(-2.932) (-3.106) (-3.088) (-3.089) (-3.086) (-2.905) 
BSHL 0.144*** 0.139*** 0.142*** 0.141*** 0.142*** 0.146*** 
(4.049) (3.909) (4.000) (3.971) (4.001) (4.120) 
IND 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.094) (0.131) (0.075) (0.096) (0.138) (0.082) 
SOE 0.014* 0.013 0.013* 0.013* 0.013 0.014* 
(1.756) (1.644) (1.683) (1.656) (1.603) (1.739) 
MSHL 0.143* 0.175** 0.171** 0.174** 0.175** 0.143* 
(1.849) (2.287) (2.243) (2.283) (2.289) (1.844) 
ROA 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 
(6.926) (6.898) (6.876) (6.883) (6.880) (6.905) 
LNA 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
(4.091) (3.963) (3.807) (3.839) (3.859) (3.988) 
CFO -0.307*** -0.307*** -0.308*** -0.308*** -0.308*** -0.307*** 
(-18.509) (-18.536) (-18.555) (-18.554) (-18.565) (-18.524) 
LEV -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-3.228) (-3.225) (-3.240) (-3.240) (-3.272) (-3.262) 
Constant 0.061** 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.062** 
(2.553) (2.755) (2.906) (2.881) (2.779) (2.546) 
Observations 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 10,303 
Adj. R-squared 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s 
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In table 6.12, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals measured by 
modified Jones model. The impact of whether the CEO is duality as the chairman on the firm’s 
discretionary accruals is positive and significant at 1 percent level. The coefficient is 0.007 and the 
t-test value is 3.045. The influence of whether the CEO is duality as a director setting on the board 
is positive but not significant. Moreover, the impact of whether the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder is also not significant. The result has shown that if the CEO is duality as the chairman, 
the firm tends to do more earnings manipulation. 
In table 6.13, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals measured by 
Lu jianqiao model. The result is as same as table 6.13, the impact of whether the CEO is duality as 
the chairman on firm’s discretionary accruals is positively significant at 1 percent level and the 
coefficient is 0.006, t-test value is 2.847. The impact of CEO_director, CEO_top10, CEO_top1 
and CEO_top1_shl on discretionary accruals are not significant. 
In table 6.14, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals which is 
measured by investment matched modified Jones model. The impact of whether the CEO is 
duality as the chairman on the firm’s discretionary accruals is positively significant at 1 percent 
level and the coefficient is 0.006, t-test value is 2.847. in the model (5), the impact of whether the 
CEO is working for the largest shareholder on firm’s discretionary accruals is positively 
significant at 5 percent level and the coefficient is 0.012, t-test value is 2.367. This result has 
shown that if the CEO is working for the largest shareholder, the firm tends to increase their 
discretionary accrual. Moreover, this impact will be influenced by the percentage of the largest 
shareholder’s shareholding. The significant level of the interaction variable CEO_top1_shl is 
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negatively at a 5 percent level, the coefficient is -0.034 and t-test value is -2.160. This result 
meaning when the largest shareholder’s shareholding above 35 percent, the impact of whether the 
CEO is working for the largest shareholder on discretionary accruals will change from positive to 
negative, Moreover, the impact of the largest shareholder’s shareholding (top1) on discretionary 
accruals is negatively significant at 1 percent level, the coefficient is -0.073 and t-test value is 
-7.620. Thus, the result is in accordance. 
In table 6.15, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals which is 
measured by the investment matched Lu jianqiao model. The impact of whether the CEO is 
duality as the chairman on the firm’s discretionary accruals is positively significant at 1 percent 
level and the coefficient is 0.009, t-test value is 2.462. in the model (5), the impact of whether the 
CEO is working for the largest shareholder on firm’s discretionary accruals is positively 
significant at 5 percent level and the coefficient is 0.012, t-test value is 2.398. This result has 
shown that if the CEO is working for the largest shareholder, the firm tends to increase their 
discretionary accrual. Moreover, this impact will be influenced by the percentage of the largest 
shareholder’s shareholding. The significant level of the interaction variable CEO_top1_shl is 
negatively at a 5 percent level, the coefficient is -0.032 and t-test value is -2.084. This result 
meaning when the largest shareholder’s shareholding above 37.5 percent, the impact of whether 
the CEO is working for the largest shareholder on discretionary accruals will change from positive 
to negative, Moreover, the impact of the largest shareholder’s shareholding (top1) on discretionary 
accruals is negatively significant at 1 percent level, the coefficient is -0.073 and t-test value is 
-7.647. Thus, the result is also in accordance. 
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In conclusion, from the results of table 6.14 and table 6.15, the resulting point that the firm’s 
discretionary accruals will be impacted by the CEO’s characteristics. If the CEO is duality as a 
chairman, the firm will tend to increase the level of their discretionary accruals. Moreover, if the 
CEO is working for the largest shareholder, the firm will tend to increase the level of their 
discretionary accruals, but this impact will influence by the percentage of the largest shareholder’s 
shareholding. As the increase in the percentage of the largest shareholder’s shareholding, the 
impact will decrease. If the percentage of the largest shareholder’s shareholding is high enough, 
the impact of whether the CEO is working for the largest shareholder on the level of firm’s 
discretionary accruals will change from positive to negative. 
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6.5.2 Real activity earnings management 
In the next section, this study use abnormal real earnings as the dependent variable to test whether 
the financial director has helped the firm to manipulate earnings through earnings or not. From 
Table 6.16 to table 6.23 are results of the regression between the firm ’ s abnormal real earnings 
management and financial director’s characteristics. In table 6.16 to table 6.19, the dependent 
variable is the abnormal cash flow from operating, the abnormal cost of production, the abnormal 
discretionary expenditure, and the abnormal real earnings, respectively. As same as discretionary 
accruals, from table 6.10 to table 6.23, the dependent variable is the absolute value of the 
abnormal cash flow from operating, the abnormal cost of production, the abnormal discretionary 
expenditure, and the abnormal real earnings, respectively. 
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Table 6.16: Regression results on the relationship between abnormal cash flow from 
operating and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Real_CFO Real_CFO Real_CFO Real_CFO Real_CFO Real_CFO 
CEO_duality 0.002 0.001 
(1.313) (1.008) 
CEO_director -0.001 -0.002 
(-0.638) (-1.072) 
CEO_top10 0.002* 0.004 
(1.869) (1.583) 
CEO_top1 0.001 0.003* -0.001 
(1.331) (1.654) (-0.259) 
CEOtop1shl -0.006 -0.006 
(-1.072) (-1.108) 
TOP1 -0.013*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
(-4.300) (-4.382) (-4.397) (-4.432) (-3.650) (-3.446) 
BSIZE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.859) (-0.898) (-0.936) (-0.937) (-0.937) (-0.787) 
BSHL 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 
(0.394) (0.302) (0.432) (0.394) (0.402) (0.463) 
IND 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.102) (0.080) (0.064) (0.090) (0.116) (0.007) 
SOE -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
(-3.552) (-3.596) (-3.569) (-3.602) (-3.630) (-3.493) 
MSHL -0.006 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.005 
(-0.196) (0.051) (-0.032) (0.002) (0.009) (-0.164) 
ROA -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.057*** 
(-8.514) (-8.512) (-8.554) (-8.545) (-8.547) (-8.520) 
LNA -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** 
(-2.403) (-2.458) (-2.636) (-2.585) (-2.573) (-2.519) 
CFO 1.054*** 1.054*** 1.054*** 1.054*** 1.054*** 1.054*** 
(179.248) (179.234) (179.223) (179.209) (179.209) (179.219) 
LEV -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
(-2.341) (-2.330) (-2.362) (-2.359) (-2.376) (-2.354) 
Constant -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 
(-1.169) (-0.964) (-0.911) (-0.949) (-1.002) (-0.936) 
Observations 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 
Adj. R-squared 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.777 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm;ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash 
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Table 6.17: Regression results on the relationship between abnormal cost of production 
and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Real_Pord Real_Pord Real_Pord Real_Pord Real_Pord Real_Pord 
CEO_duality 0.011** 0.010* 
(2.073) (1.878) 
CEO_director 0.002 -0.000 
(0.287) (-0.062) 
CEO_top10 0.004 -0.013 
(0.977) (-1.324) 
CEO_top1 0.007 0.015** 0.025** 
(1.621) (2.042) (2.156) 
CEOtop1shl -0.030 -0.029 
(-1.339) (-1.299) 
TOP1 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.009 0.010 
(0.338) (0.196) (0.202) (0.156) (0.672) (0.706) 
BSIZE -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.099) (-0.257) (-0.230) (-0.223) (-0.223) (-0.091) 
BSHL 0.041 0.035 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.044 
(0.752) (0.644) (0.694) (0.726) (0.736) (0.789) 
IND -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
(-1.532) (-1.491) (-1.535) (-1.540) (-1.508) (-1.491) 
SOE 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
(0.708) (0.611) (0.641) (0.632) (0.595) (0.628) 
MSHL -0.045 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.037 
(-0.374) (-0.052) (-0.063) (-0.056) (-0.049) (-0.305) 
ROA -0.586*** -0.587*** -0.587*** -0.587*** -0.587*** -0.586*** 
(-21.695) (-21.712) (-21.724) (-21.735) (-21.739) (-21.708) 
LNA 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 
(14.305) (14.207) (14.065) (14.006) (14.020) (14.141) 
CFO -0.641*** -0.641*** -0.642*** -0.642*** -0.642*** -0.641*** 
(-27.088) (-27.109) (-27.120) (-27.132) (-27.134) (-27.106) 
LEV 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
(8.095) (8.090) (8.083) (8.071) (8.050) (8.050) 
Constant -0.391*** -0.385*** -0.382*** -0.380*** -0.382*** -0.390*** 
(-11.432) (-11.236) (-11.184) (-11.137) (-11.191) (-11.251) 
Observations 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 
Adj. R-squared 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.213 0.213 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s 
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Table6.18: Regression results on the relationship between abnormal discretionary expenditure 
and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Real_Disexp Real_Disexp Real_Disexp Real_Disexp Real_Disexp Real_Disexp 
CEO_duality 0.005** 0.004* 
(2.259) (1.793) 
CEO_director 0.005* 0.004 
(1.747) (1.281) 
CEO_top10 0.003 -0.008* 
(1.538) (-1.830) 
CEO_top1 0.005** 0.015*** 0.022*** 
(2.455) (4.931) (4.246) 
CEOtop1shl -0.042*** -0.041*** 
(-4.318) (-4.250) 
TOP1 -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
(-6.713) (-6.911) (-6.876) (-6.944) (-4.682) (-4.692) 
BSIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.481) (0.203) (0.343) (0.353) (0.354) (0.376) 
BSHL -0.030 -0.032 -0.031 -0.030 -0.029 -0.027 
(-1.251) (-1.330) (-1.285) (-1.242) (-1.211) (-1.144) 
IND -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(-1.311) (-1.188) (-1.329) (-1.335) (-1.231) (-1.123) 
SOE -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008* -0.008* 
(-1.449) (-1.591) (-1.513) (-1.529) (-1.648) (-1.667) 
MSHL 0.290*** 0.305*** 0.308*** 0.308*** 0.309*** 0.294*** 
(5.545) (5.894) (5.949) (5.963) (5.994) (5.618) 
ROA 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 
(7.042) (6.988) (6.997) (6.984) (6.983) (6.989) 
LNA 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
(8.467) (8.324) (8.184) (8.100) (8.154) (8.287) 
CFO 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 
(7.748) (7.716) (7.701) (7.686) (7.690) (7.717) 
LEV -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 
(-1.074) (-1.097) (-1.091) (-1.109) (-1.176) (-1.194) 
Constant -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.113*** -0.112*** -0.115*** -0.121*** 
(-7.901) (-7.876) (-7.589) (-7.523) (-7.737) (-8.023) 
Observations 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 
Adj. R-squared 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.039 0.039 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Variables are defined 
as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 
is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors 
sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total 
shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of 
assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating 
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Table6.19: Regression results on the relationship between abnormal real earnings and 
CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Real_EM Real_EM Real_EM Real_EM Real_EM Real_EM 
CEO_duality 0.017*** 0.016** 
(2.825) (2.505) 
CEO_director 0.005 0.001 
(0.678) (0.181) 
CEO_top10 0.007 -0.021* 
(1.445) (-1.830) 
CEO_top1 0.012** 0.029*** 0.046*** 
(2.345) (3.415) (3.333) 
CEOtop1shl -0.066** -0.064** 
(-2.511) (-2.452) 
TOP1 -0.045*** -0.048*** -0.048*** -0.049*** -0.033** -0.032** 
(-3.065) (-3.270) (-3.257) (-3.323) (-2.063) (-2.015) 
BSIZE -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
(-0.187) (-0.423) (-0.365) (-0.355) (-0.355) (-0.198) 
BSHL 0.011 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.016 
(0.173) (0.034) (0.101) (0.145) (0.163) (0.240) 
IND -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
(-1.558) (-1.486) (-1.566) (-1.572) (-1.512) (-1.474) 
SOE -0.014 -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 
(-1.061) (-1.201) (-1.151) (-1.166) (-1.234) (-1.196) 
MSHL 0.242* 0.302** 0.302** 0.303** 0.305** 0.255* 
(1.708) (2.159) (2.158) (2.169) (2.185) (1.800) 
ROA -0.552*** -0.553*** -0.554*** -0.554*** -0.554*** -0.553*** 
(-17.371) (-17.400) (-17.412) (-17.429) (-17.438) (-17.406) 
LNA 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 
(14.386) (14.239) (14.062) (13.981) (14.011) (14.187) 
CFO 0.479*** 0.478*** 0.478*** 0.477*** 0.477*** 0.478*** 
(17.206) (17.165) (17.149) (17.136) (17.139) (17.179) 
LEV 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
(5.948) (5.938) (5.931) (5.914) (5.876) (5.874) 
Constant -0.502*** -0.494*** -0.487*** -0.484*** -0.489*** -0.502*** 
(-12.469) (-12.243) (-12.116) (-12.051) (-12.166) (-12.323) 
Observations 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 
Adj. R-squared 0.095 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.095 0.095 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s 
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In table 6.16, the dependent variable is abnormal cash flow from operating. The result has shown 
that the abnormal cash flow from operating is related negative with the CEO’s duality 
characteristics. The impact of whether the CEO is working for shareholders on abnormal cash 
flow from operating is positive significant at the 10 percent level, the coefficient is 0.002 and the 
t-test value is 1.869. When the CEO is working for the top10 shareholders, the firm tends to 
increase its abnormal cash flow from operating. However, the impact of whether the CEO is 
working for the largest shareholder is positive but not significant. 
In table6.17, the dependent variable is the abnormal cost of production. The result has shown that 
the abnormal cost of production is positively related to whether the CEO is duality as the chairman. 
The impact of whether the CEO is duality as the chairman on the abnormal cost of production is 
positively significant at 5 percent level, the coefficient is 0.011 and the t-test value is 2.073. Firms 
tend to increase their abnormal cost of production if the CEO is duality as the chairman. 
In table 6.18, the dependent variable is abnormal discretionary expenditure. The result has a point 
that the abnormal discretionary expenditure is positively related to the CEO’s characteristics. The 
impact of whether the CEO is duality as the chairman on abnormal discretionary expenditure is 
positively significant at 5 percent level, the coefficient is 0.005 and the t-test value is 2.259. The 
impact of whether the CEO is duality as a director setting in the board on abnormal discretionary 
expenditure is positively significant at 10 percent level and the coefficient is 0.005, t-test value is 
1.747. Moreover, if the CEO is working for the largest shareholder, the firm tends to increase its 
abnormal discretionary expenditure, the significant level is 5 percent and the coefficient is 0.005, 
t-test value is 2.455. According to the model (5), the impact of whether the CEO is working for the 
222 
largest shareholder on firm’s abnormal discretionary expenditure is positively significant at 1 
percent level and the coefficient is 0.015, t-test value is 4.931. The significant level of the 
interaction variable CEO_top1_shl is negatively at 1 percent level, the coefficient is -0.042 and 
t-test value is -4.318. This result meaning when the largest shareholder’s shareholding above 35.7 
percent, the impact of whether the CEO is working for the largest shareholder on abnormal 
discretionary expenditure will change from positive to negative, Moreover, the impact of the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding (top1) on abnormal discretionary expenditure is negatively 
significant at 1 percent level, the coefficient is -0.028 and t-test value is -4.682. The result is in 
accordance. 
In table 6.19, the dependent variable is abnormal real earnings. The result has a point that the 
abnormal real earnings are positively related to the CEO’s characteristics. The impact of whether 
the CEO is duality as the chairman on abnormal real earnings is positively significant at 1 percent 
level, the coefficient is 0.017 and the t-test value is 2.825. Moreover, if the CEO is working for the 
largest shareholder, the firm tends to increase its abnormal real earnings, the significant level is 5 
percent and the coefficient is 0.012, t-test value is 2.345. According to the model (5), the impact of 
whether the CEO is working for the largest shareholder on firm’s abnormal real earnings is 
positively significant at 1 percent level and the coefficient is 0.029, t-test value is 3.415. The 
significant level of the interaction variable CEO_top1_shl is negatively at the 5 percent level, the 
coefficient is -0.066 and t-test value is -2.511. This result meaning when the largest shareholder’s 
shareholding above 44 percent, the impact of whether the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder on abnormal real earnings will change from positive to negative, Moreover, the 
impact of the largest shareholder’s shareholding (top1) on abnormal real earnings is negatively 
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significant at 1 percent level, the coefficient is -0.033 and t-test value is -2.063. Therefore, the 
result is in accordance. 
Based on table 6.16 to table 6.19 the firm’s abnormal real earnings management will be impacted 
by the CEO’s characteristics. The abnormal real earnings will be positively related to whether the 
CEO is duality as the chairman and whether the CEO is working for the largest shareholder. 
Moreover, the impact of whether the CEO is working for the largest shareholder on abnormal real 
earnings will be affected by the percentage of the largest shareholder’s shareholding. 
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Table 6.20: Regression results on the relationship between the absolute value of abnormal 
cash flow from operating and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_CFO Ab_CFO Ab_CFO Ab_CFO Ab_CFO Ab_CFO 
CEO_duality 0.004** 0.003* 
(1.966) (1.771) 
CEO_director 0.001 0.001 
(0.592) (0.278) 
CEO_top10 0.001 -0.003 
(0.857) (-0.812) 
CEO_top1 0.002 0.004* 0.006 
(1.246) (1.720) (1.538) 
CEOtop1shl -0.010 -0.009 
(-1.217) (-1.182) 
TOP1 -0.011** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.009* -0.009* 
(-2.450) (-2.596) (-2.584) (-2.619) (-1.926) (-1.862) 
BSIZE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(-0.946) (-1.119) (-1.073) (-1.068) (-1.068) (-0.965) 
BSHL 0.052*** 0.050** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 
(2.647) (2.556) (2.587) (2.606) (2.615) (2.680) 
IND 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(0.763) (0.816) (0.760) (0.760) (0.789) (0.809) 
SOE 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 
(1.601) (1.502) (1.536) (1.527) (1.493) (1.530) 
MSHL -0.045 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.031 -0.043 
(-1.045) (-0.764) (-0.757) (-0.749) (-0.742) (-1.007) 
ROA 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 
(16.184) (16.151) (16.150) (16.145) (16.143) (16.159) 
LNA -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
(-5.646) (-5.762) (-5.806) (-5.842) (-5.828) (-5.673) 
CFO 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 
(2.709) (2.684) (2.675) (2.668) (2.667) (2.693) 
LEV 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
(5.288) (5.280) (5.278) (5.270) (5.251) (5.249) 
Constant 0.128*** 0.129*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.127*** 
(10.540) (10.621) (10.807) (10.835) (10.760) (10.364) 
Observations 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 
Adj. R-squared 0.065 0.064 0.064 0.065 0.065 0.065 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board.CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s 
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Table 6.21: Regression results on the relationship between the absolute value of abnormal 
cost of production and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_prod Ab_prod Ab_prod Ab_prod Ab_prod Ab_prod 
CEO_duality 0.016*** 0.016*** 
(3.910) (3.975) 
CEO_director 0.000 -0.002 
(0.021) (-0.361) 
CEO_top10 0.000 -0.024*** 
(0.059) (-3.200) 
CEO_top1 0.005 0.013** 0.033*** 
(1.401) (2.268) (3.639) 
CEOtop1shl -0.030* -0.029* 
(-1.784) (-1.695) 
TOP1 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.009 
(0.430) (0.172) (0.173) (0.133) (0.826) (0.881) 
BSIZE 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
(0.223) (-0.036) (-0.035) (-0.024) (-0.023) (0.273) 
BSHL 0.009 -0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.003 0.008 
(0.211) (-0.009) (-0.006) (0.069) (0.082) (0.184) 
IND -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
(-1.246) (-1.199) (-1.203) (-1.229) (-1.186) (-1.160) 
SOE 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
(3.415) (3.243) (3.245) (3.256) (3.207) (3.267) 
MSHL -0.008 0.051 0.051 0.049 0.050 0.003 
(-0.086) (0.557) (0.557) (0.542) (0.552) (0.028) 
ROA 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 
(2.883) (2.844) (2.844) (2.824) (2.821) (2.887) 
LNA -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
(-4.570) (-4.767) (-4.753) (-4.878) (-4.859) (-4.503) 
CFO -0.183*** -0.184*** -0.184*** -0.184*** -0.184*** -0.183*** 
(-10.082) (-10.122) (-10.122) (-10.142) (-10.144) (-10.095) 
LEV 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
(7.481) (7.478) (7.477) (7.458) (7.430) (7.439) 
Constant 0.269*** 0.279*** 0.279*** 0.282*** 0.279*** 0.268*** 
(10.273) (10.601) (10.659) (10.758) (10.655) (10.081) 
Observations 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 
Adj. R-squared 0.202 0.200 0.200 0.201 0.201 0.202 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board.CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s 
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Table 6.22: Regression results on the relationship between the absolute value of abnormal 
discretionary expenditure and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_Disexp Ab_Disexp Ab_Disexp Ab_Disexp Ab_Disexp Ab_Disexp 
CEO_duality 0.006*** 0.006*** 
(3.545) (3.173) 
CEO_director 0.004** 0.003 
(1.962) (1.468) 
CEO_top10 0.002 -0.012*** 
(1.236) (-3.609) 
CEO_top1 0.004*** 0.008*** 0.017*** 
(2.857) (3.220) (4.494) 
CEOtop1shl -0.014* -0.013* 
(-1.887) (-1.772) 
TOP1 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 
(-0.766) (-1.041) (-1.001) (-1.081) (-0.249) (-0.306) 
BSIZE 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(1.054) (0.674) (0.829) (0.844) (0.845) (0.946) 
BSHL 0.014 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.015 
(0.778) (0.635) (0.653) (0.738) (0.752) (0.844) 
IND -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(-0.671) (-0.522) (-0.666) (-0.688) (-0.642) (-0.493) 
SOE 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
(4.343) (4.142) (4.217) (4.215) (4.162) (4.125) 
MSHL 0.122*** 0.141*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.126*** 
(3.087) (3.607) (3.678) (3.679) (3.691) (3.180) 
ROA 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 
(9.936) (9.863) (9.880) (9.858) (9.856) (9.889) 
LNA -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 
(-8.358) (-8.582) (-8.619) (-8.773) (-8.752) (-8.451) 
CFO 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 
(6.555) (6.505) (6.493) (6.470) (6.470) (6.521) 
LEV 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.670) (0.644) (0.657) (0.630) (0.601) (0.578) 
Constant 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.119*** 0.112*** 
(10.141) (10.203) (10.580) (10.702) (10.595) (9.860) 
Observations 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 
Adj. R-squared 0.096 0.096 0.095 0.096 0.096 0.098 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board.CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s 
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Table 6.23: Regression results on the relationship between absolute value of abnormal real 
earnings and CEO’s characteristics 
VARIABLES Ab_real Ab_real Ab_real Ab_real Ab_real Ab_real 
CEO_duality 0.019*** 0.018*** 
(4.333) (4.033) 
CEO_director 0.006 0.003 
(1.115) (0.512) 
CEO_top10 0.005 -0.026*** 
(1.372) (-3.109) 
CEO_top1 0.010*** 0.020*** 0.041*** 
(2.774) (3.206) (4.080) 
CEOtop1shl -0.036* -0.034* 
(-1.931) (-1.832) 
TOP1 -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.001 -0.000 
(-0.538) (-0.847) (-0.825) (-0.903) (-0.068) (-0.018) 
BSIZE -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(-0.019) (-0.386) (-0.296) (-0.282) (-0.282) (-0.048) 
BSHL 0.016 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.019 
(0.351) (0.139) (0.189) (0.262) (0.276) (0.399) 
IND -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
(-0.620) (-0.510) (-0.610) (-0.627) (-0.580) (-0.506) 
SOE 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 
(4.123) (3.906) (3.965) (3.958) (3.904) (3.948) 
MSHL 0.052 0.118 0.120 0.120 0.121 0.063 
(0.508) (1.171) (1.193) (1.197) (1.208) (0.618) 
ROA -0.039* -0.041* -0.041* -0.041* -0.041* -0.040* 
(-1.725) (-1.783) (-1.783) (-1.806) (-1.809) (-1.760) 
LNA -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
(-7.398) (-7.640) (-7.713) (-7.845) (-7.825) (-7.468) 
CFO 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
(0.065) (0.011) (-0.004) (-0.026) (-0.027) (0.032) 
LEV 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
(8.329) (8.309) (8.309) (8.286) (8.257) (8.256) 
Constant 0.365*** 0.373*** 0.379*** 0.382*** 0.379*** 0.363*** 
(12.639) (12.864) (13.162) (13.269) (13.156) (12.428) 
Observations 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 10,089 
Adj. R-squared 0.138 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.138 0.139 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. 
Variables are defined as in Appendices. CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director 
setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board 
shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares 
owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s 
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From table 6.20to table 6.23, the dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal cash flow 
from operating, the absolute value of the abnormal cost of production, the absolute value of 
abnormal discretionary expenditure, and the absolute value of abnormal real earnings, 
respectively. 
In table 6.20, the dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal cash flow from operating. 
The result has shown that if the CEO is duality as the chairman, the level of firm’s abnormal cash 
flow from operating will increase. The significant level is 5 percent, the coefficient is 0.004, t-test 
value is 1.966. 
In table 6.21, the dependent variable is the absolute value of the abnormal cost of production. The 
result is as same as table 16. The impact of whether the CEO is duality as the chairman on the 
level of abnormal cost of production is positively significant at 1 percent level, the coefficient is 
0.016 and the t-test value is 3.910. Firms tend to increase the level of abnormal cost of production 
if the CEO is duality as the chairman. 
In table 6.22, the dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal discretionary expenditure. 
The result has a point that the abnormal discretionary expenditure is positively related to the 
CEO’s characteristics. The impact of whether the CEO is duality as the chairman on the level of 
abnormal discretionary expenditure is positively significant at 1 percent level, the coefficient is 
0.006 and the t-test value is 3.545. The impact of whether the CEO is duality as a director setting 
in the board on abnormal discretionary expenditure is positively significant at 5 percent level and 
the coefficient is 0.004, t-test value is 1.962. 
Moreover, if the CEO is working for the largest shareholder, the firm tends to increase its 
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abnormal discretionary expenditure, the significant level is 1 percent and the coefficient is 0.004, 
t-test value is 2.857. According to the model (5), the impact of whether the CEO is working for the 
largest shareholder on firm’s abnormal discretionary expenditure is positively significant at 1 
percent level and the coefficient is 0.008, t-test value is 3.220. The significant level of the 
interaction variable CEO_top1_shl is negatively at the 10 percent level, the coefficient is -0.014 
and t-test value is -1.887. This result meaning when the largest shareholder’s shareholding above 
57 percent, the impact of whether the CEO is working for the largest shareholder on abnormal 
discretionary expenditure will change from positive to negative. Moreover, the impact of the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding (top1) on abnormal discretionary expenditure is negative but 
not significant. 
In table 6.23, the dependent variable is the absolute value of abnormal real earnings. The result has 
a point that the level of abnormal real earnings is positive related to the CEO’s characteristics. The 
impact of whether the CEO is duality as the chairman on abnormal real earnings is positively 
significant at 1 percent level, the coefficient is 0.019 and the t-test value is 4.333. Moreover, if the 
CEO is working for the largest shareholder, the firm tends to increase the level of abnormal real 
earnings, the significant level is 1 percent and the coefficient is 0.010, t-test value is 2.774. 
According to the model (5), the impact of whether the CEO is working for the largest shareholder 
on firm’s abnormal real earnings is positively significant at 1 percent level and the coefficient is 
0.020, t-test value is 3.206. The significant level of the interaction variable CEO_top1_shl is 
negatively at the 10 percent level, the coefficient is -0.036 and t-test value is -1.931. This result 
meaning when the largest shareholder’s shareholding above 55 percent, the impact of whether the 
CEO is working for the largest shareholder on abnormal real earnings will change from positive to 
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negative. At last, the impact of the largest shareholder’s shareholding (top1) on abnormal real 
earnings is negative but not significant. 
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6.5.3 OLS, FGLS, WLS test 
Table 6.24: OLS, FGLS and WSL Regression of the relationship between CEO and earnings management 
Ab_mjinv Ab_Luinv 
OLS FGLS WLS OLS FGLS WLS 
Coef. P>t Coef. P>z Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>z Coef. P>t 
CEO_top1 0.012 0.041 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.017 0.012 0.038 0.0121 0.016 0.013 0.010 
CEOtop1shl -0.034 0.031 -0.032 0.037 -0.039 0.037 -0.032 0.037 -0.0324 0.037 -0.040 0.032 
TOP1 -0.073 0.000 -0.073 0.000 -0.087 0.000 -0.073 0.000 -0.0727 0.000 -0.087 0.000 
BSIZE -0.004 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.0034 0.002 -0.004 0.003 
BSHL 0.140 0.003 0.142 0.000 0.083 0.002 0.142 0.002 0.1419 0.000 0.088 0.001 
IND 0.000 0.906 0.000 0.890 0.001 0.819 0.000 0.884 0.0004 0.890 0.001 0.814 
SOE 0.014 0.128 0.013 0.108 0.014 0.075 0.013 0.151 0.0129 0.108 0.011 0.140 
MSHL 0.175 0.100 0.175 0.022 0.257 0.000 0.175 0.101 0.1746 0.022 0.250 0.000 
ROA 0.139 0.000 0.131 0.000 0.037 0.029 0.131 0.000 0.1309 0.000 0.045 0.008 
LNA 0.005 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.0044 0.000 0.008 0.000 
CFO -0.322 0.000 -0.308 0.000 -0.391 0.000 -0.308 0.000 -0.3078 0.000 -0.381 0.000 
LEV -0.003 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.000 -0.002 0.003 -0.0022 0.001 -0.006 0.000 
_cons 0.012 0.028 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.017 0.012 0.038 0.0121 0.016 0.013 0.010 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Variables are defined as in Appendices.CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: 
representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on 
total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating 
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Table 6.25: OLS, FGLS and WSL Regression of the relationship between CEO and real earnings management 
Real Ab_Real 
OLS FGLS WLS OLS FGLS WLS 
Coef. P>t Coef. P>z Coef. P>t Coef. P>t Coef. P>z Coef. P>t 
CEO_top1 0.029 0.002 0.029 0.001 0.008 0.424 0.020 0.004 0.020 0.001 0.020 0.001 
CEOtop1shl -0.066 0.014 -0.066 0.012 -0.055 0.095 -0.036 0.058 -0.036 0.053 -0.035 0.118 
TOP1 -0.033 0.040 -0.033 0.039 0.052 0.008 -0.001 0.946 -0.001 0.946 0.004 0.792 
BSIZE -0.001 0.714 -0.001 0.722 -0.006 0.012 0.000 0.770 0.000 0.777 -0.003 0.106 
BSHL 0.011 0.864 0.011 0.870 0.085 0.380 0.013 0.789 0.013 0.782 0.030 0.588 
IND -0.007 0.097 -0.007 0.130 -0.007 0.290 -0.002 0.525 -0.002 0.561 -0.002 0.637 
SOE -0.017 0.256 -0.017 0.216 0.043 0.009 0.038 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.063 0.000 
MSHL 0.305 0.023 0.305 0.029 0.294 0.114 0.121 0.237 0.121 0.226 0.162 0.170 
ROA -0.554 0.000 -0.554 0.000 -0.579 0.000 -0.041 0.148 -0.041 0.070 0.010 0.690 
LNA 0.027 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.052 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.005 0.002 
CFO 0.477 0.000 0.477 0.000 0.312 0.000 -0.001 0.983 -0.001 0.978 -0.046 0.028 
LEV 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 
T-test values are provided in bracket. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. The industry fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled. Variables are defined as in Appendices.CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest 
shareholder.CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: 
representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on 
total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating 
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This party is aiming to test the steady of the main result. Therefore, this party uses the 
OLS, FGLS and WLS to run the regression, respectively. 
In table 6.24, this study uses the OLS, FGLS and WSL to regression the impact of the 
relationship between the CEO and the controlling shareholder on earnings 
management. It uses the investment matched modified Jones model, and investment 
matched Lu jianqiao model as the dependent variable, respectively. When it uses the 
absolute value of the investment matched modified Jones model as the dependent 
variable, the result of the impact of CEO_top1 on the company's earnings 
management is negatively significant at 5 per cent level by OLS. The coefficient of 
CEO_top1 is 0.012, and the p-value is 0.041. The result of the impact of CEOtop1shl 
on the company's earnings management is negatively significant at 5 per cent level by 
OLS. The coefficient of CEOtop1shl is -0.034, and the p-value is 0.031. Thus, the 
coefficient of the impact of whether the CEO is working for the controlling 
shareholder on earnings management is (0.012-0.034*top1shareholding), that when 
the controlling shareholder's shareholding at a low level, the CEO has a positive 
impact on the company's earnings management. As the increase of the controlling 
shareholder's shareholding, the effect of whether the CEO is working for the 
controlling shareholder on earnings management will change to negative. 
As same as the OLS, when it is using the FGLS regression. The coefficient of the 
impact of whether the CEO is working for the controlling shareholder on earnings 
management is (0.012-0.032*top1shareholding). The p-value of CEO_top1 and 
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CEOtop1shl is 0.016 and 0.037, respectively. Moreover, when it is using the WLS 
regression. The coefficient of the impact of whether the CEO is working for the 
controlling shareholder on earnings management is (0.012-0.039*top1shareholding). 
The p-value of CEO_top1 and CEOtop1shl is 0.017 and 0.037, respectively. 
When it uses the absolute value of the investment matched Lu jianqiao model as the 
dependent variable. The result of the effect on the company's earnings management is 
as same as the investment matched modified Jones model. 
In table 6.25, this study uses the OLS, FGLS and WSL to regression the impact of the 
relationship between the CEO and the controlling shareholder on the real earnings 
management. It uses real earnings management and the absolute real earnings 
management as the dependent variable, respectively. When it uses the real earnings 
management as the dependent variable, the result of the impact of CEO_top1 on the 
company's earnings management is positive significant at 1 per cent level by OLS. 
The coefficient of CEO_top1 is 0.029, and the p-value is 0.002. The result of the 
impact of CEOtop1shl on the company's earnings management is negatively 
significant at 5 per cent level by OLS. The coefficient of CEOtop1shl is -0.066, and 
the p-value is 0.014. Thus, the coefficient of the impact of whether the CEO is 
working for the controlling shareholder on real earnings management is 
(0.029-0.066*top1’s shareholding), that when the controlling shareholder's 
shareholding at a low level, the CEO has a positive impact on the company's real 
earnings management. As the increase of the controlling shareholder's shareholding, 
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the effect of whether the CEO is working for the controlling shareholder on earnings 
management will change to negative. 
Compare with the OLS, when it is using the FGLS regression. The coefficient of the 
impact of whether the CEO is working for the controlling shareholder on earnings 
management is (0.029-0.066*top1shareholding). The p-value of CEO_top1 and 
CEOtop1shl is 0.00.01and 0.012, respectively. However, when it is using the WLS 
regression. The coefficient of the impact of whether the CEO is working for the 
controlling shareholder on real earnings management is not significant. The p-value of 
CEO_top1 and CEOtop1shl is 0.424 and 0.095, respectively. 
As same as the real earnings management, when it uses the absolute value of the real 
earnings management as the dependent variable. The effect of whether the CEO is 
working for the controlling shareholder on earnings management is positive when the 
controlling shareholder's shareholding at a low level. And it will change to negative as 
the increase of the controlling shareholder's shareholding. 
In conclusion, according to the FGLS and WLS test, the result of the effect of the 
relationship between the CEO and controlling shareholder on earnings management is 
steady. 
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6.5.4 Endogeneity and 2SLS, GMM 
In order to eliminate the influence of endogeneity on regression results, 2SLS and GMM were 
used for robustness tests respectively 
Table 6.25: OLS,2SLS and GMM Regression of the relationship between CEO and real earnings 
management 
Ab_mjinv Ab_luinv 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM 
ceod1 0.006 0.029 0.029 0.006 0.044 0.044 
(0.871) (0.192) (0.192) (0.804) (0.286) (0.286) 
ceotop1share -0.021** -0.022** -0.022** -0.019* -0.029* -0.029* 
(-2.151) (-2.248) (-2.248) (-1.951) (-1.925) (-1.925) 
bsize -0.002 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.003** -0.003** 
(-1.583) (-2.606) (-2.606) (-1.493) (-2.464) (-2.464) 
bshl 0.173*** 0.136** 0.136** 0.176*** 0.140** 0.140** 
(2.728) (2.462) (2.462) (2.801) (2.539) (2.539) 
ind -0.004 0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.001 0.001 
(-1.053) (0.187) (0.187) (-1.057) (0.275) (0.275) 
top1 -0.073*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.073*** -0.073*** -0.073*** 
(-6.643) (-2.916) (-2.916) (-6.644) (-2.837) (-2.837) 
soe 0.032*** 0.019* 0.019* 0.030*** 0.019* 0.019* 
(2.893) (1.829) (1.829) (2.750) (1.776) (1.776) 
mshl 0.232* 0.182 0.182 0.229* 0.176 0.176 
(1.741) (1.452) (1.452) (1.725) (1.401) (1.401) 
roa 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.131*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 
(4.160) (4.484) (4.484) (4.041) (4.253) (4.253) 
lna 0.008*** 0.005** 0.005** 0.008*** 0.004** 0.004** 
(4.493) (2.339) (2.339) (4.349) (2.290) (2.290) 
cfoasset -0.334*** -0.314*** -0.314*** -0.322*** -0.300*** -0.300*** 
(-12.485) (-13.498) (-13.498) (-12.085) (-12.965) (-12.965) 
lev -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-3.967) (-3.378) (-3.378) (-3.699) (-3.033) (-3.033) 
Constant -0.009 0.069 0.069 -0.007 0.065 0.065 
(-0.247) (1.191) (1.191) (-0.181) (1.140) (1.140) 
Observations 10,251 10,251 10,251 10,251 10,251 10,251 
R-squared 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.065 0.065 0.065 
Adj. 0.068 0.068 0.068 0.063) 0.063 0.063 
R-squared 
CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is the CEO is working for 
shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: 
represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. 
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TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned 
by managers of firm; ROA: is the firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV: is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating 
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Table 6.26: OLS,2SLS and GMM Regression of the relationship between CEO and real earnings management 
Real_EM Ab_real 
VARIABLES OLS 2SLS GMM OLS 2SLS GMM 
ceod1 0.022* 0.177* 0.177* 0.020** 0.191** 0.191** 
(1.743) (1.663) (1.663) (2.074) (2.039) (2.039) 
ceotop1share -0.038** -0.099** -0.099** -0.012** -0.101** -0.101** 
(-2.447) (-2.636) (-2.636) (-2.651) (-2.939) (-2.639) 
bsize -0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.004** 0.000 0.000 
(-1.478) (0.008) (0.008) (-1.998) (0.105) (0.105) 
bshl 0.067 0.043 0.043 -0.003 0.042 0.042 
(0.532) (0.541) (0.541) (-0.037) (0.704) (0.704) 
ind -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(-0.742) (-0.750) (-0.750) (0.366) (0.244) (0.244) 
top1 -0.035 -0.020 -0.020 -0.025 0.020 0.020 
(-1.614) (-0.417) (-0.417) (-1.481) (0.585) (0.585) 
SOE -0.013 -0.010 -0.010 0.017 0.040*** 0.040*** 
(-0.635) (-0.635) (-0.635) (1.108) (3.427) (3.427) 
mshl 0.012 0.222 0.222 0.042 0.045 0.045 
(0.052) (1.272) (1.272) (0.277) (0.342) (0.342) 
roa -0.648*** -0.561*** -0.561*** -0.098*** -0.049 -0.049 
(-15.717) (-14.889) (-14.889) (-2.951) (-1.602) (-1.602) 
lna 0.045*** 0.029*** 0.029*** -0.002 -0.008*** -0.008*** 
(9.224) (7.651) (7.651) (-0.742) (-3.118) (-3.118) 
cfoasset 0.670*** 0.470*** 0.470*** 0.086*** -0.004 -0.004 
(19.416) (13.113) (13.113) (2.904) (-0.137) (-0.137) 
lev 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
(3.777) (4.328) (4.328) (4.375) (5.873) (5.873) 
Observations 10,037 10,037 10,037 10,037 10,037 10,037 
R-squared 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.096 0.096 0.096 
Adj. R-squared 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.093 0.093 0.093 
CEO_duality: that 1 is the CEO is duality as the chairman. CEO_director: that 1 is the CEO is duality as a director setting in the board CEO_top10: that 1 is 
the CEO is working for shareholders (top10). CEO_top1: represent that 1 is the CEO is working for the largest shareholder. CEOtop1shl: is CEO_top1 times 
TOP1 (the largest shareholder’s shareholding).Bsize: represents board size. BSHL: represents the board shareholding ratio. IND: represents the percentage of 
independent directors sitting in the board. CEO_duality: representsCEO duality. TOP1: represents the largest shareholder’s shareholding ratio.SOE: 
represents the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by SOE. MSHL: is the percentage of a firm’s total shares owned by managers of firm; ROA: is the 
firm’s return on total assets; LNA: is the natural log of assets; LEV:is the firm’s leverage ratio; CFO: is the firm’s cash flow from operating 
In order to remove the impact of endogeneity on the result of the regression, this study 
uses 2SLS and GMM to test the regression result. And the result of the regression is 
steady. The impact of CEOtop1shl on the Ab_mjinv is negative significant at the 5 
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percent level, and the impact on the Ab_luinv is negative significant at the 10 percent 
level. The result of GMM is as same as the 2SLS. 
For the impact on real earnings management. The impact of CEO_top1 on the 
Real_EM is positive significant at the 10 percent level and the impact on the Ab_real 
is positive significant at the 5 percent level. Moreover, the impact of CEOtop1shl is 
negative significant at 5 percent level no matter on Real_EM or Ab_real. 
Overall. consider the endogeneity, the impact of the CEOtop1shl is still steady. 
6.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the characteristic of pyramid shareholding or cross-shareholding caused a 
separation of the largest shareholder’s cash-flow right and control right, and it became the 
theoretical basis of large shareholders expropriation (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes et al. 2000). As 
the separation of the largest shareholder’s cash-flow right and control right, the largest shareholder 
only needs to bear a little part of the cost and can get relatively more benefits from the firm. 
Therefore, the more separation between cash flow right and control right, the less large 
shareholders’ loss by infringing the interests of the firm. Which meaning the motivation of the 
major shareholders against the interests of minority shareholders exists. Based on the above results, 
if the CEO is employees of the largest shareholder, the control rights of the largest shareholder 
were further strengthened. It makes easier for the largest shareholder to manipulate the firm’s 
earnings to against interests of minority shareholders. Thus, when the CEO is working for the 
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largest shareholder, the level of earnings management will increase. 
However, as the increase in the percentage of the largest shareholder’s shareholding, the 
motivation of the largest shareholder against the private benefits is reduced. Because when the 
shareholder’s shareholding is high enough that they can fully control the firm, the firm itself will 
become the private interests of the largest shareholder, and the significance of against the interests 
of minority shareholders will be gradually lost. In the result, the impact of the percentage of the 
largest shareholder’s shareholding on the level of the firm’s earnings management is significant 
negative. Furthermore, this impact of whether the CEO is an employee of the largest shareholder 
on earnings management will be influenced by the largest shareholder’s shareholding. As the 
increase of the largest shareholder’s shareholding, the impact of whether the CEO is an employee 
of the largest shareholder on earnings management will reduce from positive to 
negative. 
In conclusion, if the controlling shareholder's shareholding at a low level, the 
relationship between the CEO and the controlling shareholder is a conflict with each 
other. However, as the increase of the controlling shareholder's shareholding, the CEO 
tends to cooperation with the controlling shareholder and help the controlling 
shareholder to improve the company's earnings management. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 Summary of research findings 
Through the comparison and discussion about the difference between the new Chinese accounting 
standards and the IAS, the new Chinese accounting standard includes investment income into the 
company's earnings. However, according to the IAS rule, investment income is into the gains but 
not earnings. Therefore, in the Chinese market, the investment income is a part of earnings, but the 
Jones model does not measure it. Thus, this study adds the cash flow from investment to calculate 
the total accruals (TA) and combines the investment income to measure the discretionary accruals. 
Moreover, through empirical analysis based on the investment matched Jones model, this study 
found that if the director has some financial background like professional title or work experience, 
the effect on accruals earnings management is negative. If a financial director is sitting on the 
board, the degree of the company's accruals earnings management tends to decrease. Moreover, 
the number of financial directors also effect on the degree of the firm's accruals earnings 
management. However, the impact of the financial directors on the company's real activist’s 
earnings management is positive. Furthermore, if these directors are working from the controlling 
shareholder, the degree of the company's actual activities earnings management also will rise.In 
conclusion, financial directors tend to help the controlling shareholder to shift the company's 
accrual earnings management to the more hidden actual earnings management. 
Furthermore, the relationship between the CEO and the controlling shareholder will change from 
conflict to cooperation as the increase of the controlling shareholder's shareholding. The 
relationship between the CEO and the controlling shareholder is conflicting when the controlling 
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shareholder's shareholding at a low level and the effect on the earnings management is negative. 
However, as the increasing of the controlling shareholder's shareholding, the CEO tends to 
collaborate with the controlling shareholder to manipulate the company's earnings. 
7.2Summary of the contribution 
The first contribution of this study is the Methodological contributions about earnings 
management. Previous research about earnings management generally based on the 
Jones model but did not consider the factor that the accounting standard may differ 
in different countries. And these difference may cause the inaccurate of the 
measurement of earnings management in different countries. If a researcher uses the 
erroneous result to detect the relationship between the earnings management and 
other factors, it will come to a conclusion that is not consistent with the facts and 
mislead subsequent studies. This study proposes to modify the model according to 
the local regulations, and improved the Jones model based on the Chinese 
accounting standard. It provides a more appropriate tool to post-location studies on 
Chinese earnings management. 
Moreover, this study has contributions to the literature. Firstly, this paper has 
expanded the definition of the financial background beyond the CPA work 
experience. Then uses the empirical analysis based on the new modified model to 
find the result that a director with a financial background will help the company to 
reduce the accruals earnings management but to increase the real activities earnings 
management.Secondly, this paper has shown that the impact of the relationship 
between the CEO and the controlling shareholder on the company's earnings 
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management. When the largest shareholder's shareholding at a low level, the 
relationship between the CEO and the controlling shareholder is conflict, and the 
company's earnings management suppressed. However, as the increase of the 
controlling shareholder's shareholding, the CEO tends to help the controlling 
shareholder to again with minority shareholders. 
At last, the agency theory has thoroughly discussed the relationship between 
managers and shareholders, and later Sheleifer and Vishny (1997) further proved the 
contradiction between majority shareholders and minority shareholders.However, 
what role do managers play in the conflict between large shareholders and small 
shareholders? Should managers help large shareholders to infringe the interests of 
small shareholders or help small shareholders to fight against and monitor large 
shareholders?The research in this aspect has been a blank of agency theory. 
Based on the setting of whether the manager works for the major shareholders. This 
paper discusses the behaviour of the manager in the conflict between the majority 
shareholders and the minority shareholders, from the perspective of earnings 
management.It finds that the manager will help the majority shareholders to infringe 
the interests of the minor shareholders in the contradiction between the major 
shareholders and the minor shareholders, which makes up for the agency theory. 
7.3 Limitations and Future Research Areas 
Since the model of this paper is improved the Jones model according to the Chinese accounting 
standards. Thus, the improved Jones model only used for the Chinese market.In this study, we find 
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that generic models could not detect some factors' impact on the company's earnings management 
until we improve the Jones model based on the local accounting standard. From our study's result, 
we have reason to believe that the same problem exists in previous reviews about Chinese 
earnings management research. Therefore, one of the future research areas is to revalidate the 
results of earlier studies by the improved Jones model, to detect whether some missing factors can 
affect earnings management. 
Secondly, China is not a particular case. Accounting standard differs from country to country. 
Therefore, studies in each state have to modify the common model following the local situation. 
However, most previous studies have not done that. Thus, the other future research area is to 
improve the Jones model in different states to ensure the accuracy of research results. 
7.4 Advise 
This study strongly suggests that researchers should be cautious in using existing 
models when conducting empirical studies, and must fully understand the 
assumptions and establishment of models when using models. Identify the context in 
which the model was created, the policies, and the laws and regulations that 
influenced it. Before use, we should carefully compare the existing conditions and the 
conditions of the model and make corresponding adjustments to ensure the accuracy 
of the study. 
For investors, the findings of this study can effectively help investors make 
investment decisions. According to the findings of this study, if there are more people 
with a financial background in the company, the possibility, and extent of earnings 
management of the company is likely to be lower. Besides, this study also concludes 
that with the increase of the shareholding ratio of controlling shareholders and the 
difference in the relationship between CEO and controlling shareholders, the CEO is 
also likely to change his position to help controlling shareholders infringe on the 
interests of minority shareholders. Based on the above research results as a reference, 
investors are likely to avoid companies with earnings management risks when making 
investment decisions. 
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Finally, for regulators or policymakers, the findings of this study are also of reference 
significance. To reduce the risk of collusion between the CEO and the controlling 
shareholder to the detriment of the minority shareholder. At the same time, it can also 
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